Why Patriot systems won't solve all of Ukraine's air defense problems
global.espreso.tv
Wed, 05 Nov 2025 18:54:00 +0200

ContentThe illusion of a "miracle solution": why one complex does not change the course of the war?How the policy and practice of echeloned defense should be built"Anti-Shahed" system: interceptor drones as a separate echelonHelicopters, light aircraft, and "air hunters"What Ukraine needs from partners for an effective echeloned air defense systemRecently, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the long-awaited strengthening of the Patriot air defense missile system group in Ukraine. For Ukrainians, this is not only news about an increase in the number of air defense systems but, undoubtedly, also a factor of psychological resilience. After all, Patriot has already become a symbol of the ability to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles and save Ukrainian cities from barbaric attacks. This is entirely deserved - it is the Patriot systems that have unique capabilities to shoot down Iskanders and Kinzhal missiles, which Russia uses to destroy Ukrainian energy, all our critical infrastructure, and strike cities. But along with this, the illusion of "magic weapons" has revived in the media space: previously it was Bayraktar, then HIMARS, then ATACMS, now it's Patriot and Tomahawk.
However, focusing only on one type of weapon replaces strategic reality: no system, even the most modern, is capable of changing the balance in the war or "closing the sky" over Ukraine by itself. Modern air defense is not one bright brand, but an architecture. Not a "superweapon," but a multi-level network of radars, means of destruction, control, and communication that works as a single organism.The illusion of a "miracle solution": why one complex does not change the course of the war?Patriot is an important, but only one, upper floor of Ukrainian air defense. It is effective against ballistic missiles, most cruise missiles, and air-launched weapons that fly at high altitudes and speeds. These systems intercept the most expensive and dangerous Russian missiles - from Kinzhal to Zircon and Kalibr.Additional Patriot batteries, which Germany is currently transferring, will allow expanding the "umbrella" over key objects - energy hubs, urban agglomerations, large transport hubs. At the same time, Ukrainian and Western experts rightly emphasize: an increase in the number of launchers and missiles expands capabilities, but does not make the system omnipotent. For the logic of Russian missile terror to stop working, Patriot must be integrated into a multi-level system, and not work "by itself" around several cities.In other words, Patriot is the top of the pyramid. If the lower floors are not built, the top itself will not hold. Russia simultaneously uses dozens of types of air threats:ballistic missiles;cruise missiles of air, sea, and ground basing;guided aerial bombs;Shahed/Geran type attack UAVs;reconnaissance and adjustment drones;front-line aviation and helicopters.So, one system, even the most modern, works optimally only against a part of these threats. Intercepting a cheap "Shahed" with a Patriot missile is a strategic defeat in the economics of war: the system's resource will burn out faster than the enemy spends its drones. That is why the Ukrainian military clearly speaks not about individual weapons, but about echelonment - distributing targets across the "floors" of air defense and selecting optimal, economically and tactically appropriate means for each type of threat.How the policy and practice of echeloned defense should be builtUkrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal, speaking this week with NATO ambassadors, directly emphasized: for Ukraine, the construction of an echeloned defense is critical - from radars and interceptor drones to missiles for air defense of various classes. This is not only about assistance but also about Ukraine's readiness to share its own experience with allies, because no European country has passed such a "combat test" of air defense as our country.In practice, this means several levels:Long-range echelon. Patriot, SAMP/T, modernized long-range Soviet systems - for intercepting the most dangerous targets, including ballistic missiles.Medium-range echelon. NASAMS, IRIS-T SLM, modernized Buk and other systems that cover large regions and troop groupings from cruise missiles and aircraft at medium distances.Close-in zone (SHORAD/VSHORAD). Gepards, Skynex, Avenger, MANPADS, anti-aircraft guns, mobile groups with pickups and machine guns - these are the means that pick up what has passed through the previous rings of defense and work on drones and low-altitude targets.Radars and control system. Without a continuous radar field and a unified control system, even the best anti-aircraft systems turn into "isolated towers." Here, tactical three-dimensional radars, a network of observation posts, data exchange systems, and automated guidance play a key role.It is on this logic that the message that Ukraine is currently conveying to its partners is based: we need not only additional complexes but also a holistic architecture where each echelon works in its niche, and does not duplicate or replace another.
"Anti-Shahed" system: interceptor drones as a separate echelonA separate dimension is the fight against Shahed-type attack UAVs. Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced the creation of an echeloned system to counter these drones and a sharp increase in capabilities in this direction. This involves increasing the number of interceptor crews, forming new units, and strengthening detection and destruction means.The logic of this system is simple but effective:Detection and control. A network of radars and optoelectronic posts, integrated into a single control field, so that the target is immediately "picked up" by the necessary air defense means at the required line.Long-range perimeter. Patrolling using aviation, interceptor UAVs, and electronic warfare means that try to shoot down or "jam" Shahed before entering densely populated areas.Middle line of defense around cities and regions. Mobile fire groups, VSHORAD/SHORAD, electronic warfare systems - what works on targets that have broken through the first echelon.Last line. Short-range means around critical infrastructure and residential areas that intercept individual drones at the final stage.
According to the command, interceptor drones are already showing an efficiency coefficient of over 70% in real battles against Shahed. The President speaks of Ukraine producing up to 700-800 interceptor drones per day. However, their use requires coordinated efforts.It is precisely to strengthen the drone component within the Air Force that a new branch of troops is being formed - the unmanned air defense systems troops. Their task is to create a specialized air defense echelon that focuses on kamikaze drones, taking some of the load off classical anti-aircraft missile troops and tactical aviation.Helicopters, light aircraft, and "air hunters"Echeloned air defense is not only "classical" air defense with air defense missile systems and radars but also active air assets. Ukraine has already officially begun the process of purchasing Bell AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom helicopters to strengthen its capabilities to counter Shaheds and, in fact, to form another echelon of air defense - with light aircraft and modern helicopters equipped with appropriate sensors and weapons. Currently, this direction is positioned as one of the key for the future aviation component of the Air Force's air defense.
Thus, these helicopters can become not only a "classical" strike tool on the battlefield but also an element of the system for countering drones and cruise missiles at low altitudes - especially in combination with radars, networked targeting means, and ground-based air defense.Separately, in expert discussions, the idea of using light turboprop aircraft such as the Super Tucano appears as a relatively cheap and economical means of patrolling and intercepting slow air targets in areas with low saturation of enemy air defense means. Such aircraft have been considered in many countries as a platform for "police" missions. Now, in Ukraine, they can become a potential tool for combating kamikaze drones and other air targets.What Ukraine needs from partners for an effective echeloned air defense systemIn fact, Ukraine is already playing the role of an vanguard in forming a new European air defense system. What is being tested in our sky today - from networks of mobile groups to the integration of interceptor drones and ground-based electronic warfare - will tomorrow become the basis for the defense of the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, and the Black Sea region.That is why the message to partners must be as clear as possible:Ukraine needs additional Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS, and missiles for them.Tactical level radars, control, and communication systems are no less critical.Absolutely - massive, relatively inexpensive means of countering drones: from interceptors and electronic warfare to machine guns, cannons, and light aircraft.All this must work not as a set of disparate aid, but as a single coordinated system.
Ukraine is gradually moving from thinking "we need another specific complex" to thinking "we need a holistic, multi-level air defense." Partners must share this same logic. There is no magic weapon capable of closing the sky over Ukraine. There is only a comprehensive, echeloned, integrated system in which Patriot, interceptor drones, radars, helicopters, light aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and electronic warfare complement each other.Only such a system can force the Kremlin to admit: the cost of the air war against Ukraine has become too high, and its effectiveness - too low. And only such a system will become the foundation of the future air defense of all Europe.The material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium of Defense Information (CDI), a project that united Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and is aimed at strengthening information support and analytical provision in the field of national security, defense, and geopolitics.
However, focusing only on one type of weapon replaces strategic reality: no system, even the most modern, is capable of changing the balance in the war or "closing the sky" over Ukraine by itself. Modern air defense is not one bright brand, but an architecture. Not a "superweapon," but a multi-level network of radars, means of destruction, control, and communication that works as a single organism.The illusion of a "miracle solution": why one complex does not change the course of the war?Patriot is an important, but only one, upper floor of Ukrainian air defense. It is effective against ballistic missiles, most cruise missiles, and air-launched weapons that fly at high altitudes and speeds. These systems intercept the most expensive and dangerous Russian missiles - from Kinzhal to Zircon and Kalibr.Additional Patriot batteries, which Germany is currently transferring, will allow expanding the "umbrella" over key objects - energy hubs, urban agglomerations, large transport hubs. At the same time, Ukrainian and Western experts rightly emphasize: an increase in the number of launchers and missiles expands capabilities, but does not make the system omnipotent. For the logic of Russian missile terror to stop working, Patriot must be integrated into a multi-level system, and not work "by itself" around several cities.In other words, Patriot is the top of the pyramid. If the lower floors are not built, the top itself will not hold. Russia simultaneously uses dozens of types of air threats:ballistic missiles;cruise missiles of air, sea, and ground basing;guided aerial bombs;Shahed/Geran type attack UAVs;reconnaissance and adjustment drones;front-line aviation and helicopters.So, one system, even the most modern, works optimally only against a part of these threats. Intercepting a cheap "Shahed" with a Patriot missile is a strategic defeat in the economics of war: the system's resource will burn out faster than the enemy spends its drones. That is why the Ukrainian military clearly speaks not about individual weapons, but about echelonment - distributing targets across the "floors" of air defense and selecting optimal, economically and tactically appropriate means for each type of threat.How the policy and practice of echeloned defense should be builtUkrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal, speaking this week with NATO ambassadors, directly emphasized: for Ukraine, the construction of an echeloned defense is critical - from radars and interceptor drones to missiles for air defense of various classes. This is not only about assistance but also about Ukraine's readiness to share its own experience with allies, because no European country has passed such a "combat test" of air defense as our country.In practice, this means several levels:Long-range echelon. Patriot, SAMP/T, modernized long-range Soviet systems - for intercepting the most dangerous targets, including ballistic missiles.Medium-range echelon. NASAMS, IRIS-T SLM, modernized Buk and other systems that cover large regions and troop groupings from cruise missiles and aircraft at medium distances.Close-in zone (SHORAD/VSHORAD). Gepards, Skynex, Avenger, MANPADS, anti-aircraft guns, mobile groups with pickups and machine guns - these are the means that pick up what has passed through the previous rings of defense and work on drones and low-altitude targets.Radars and control system. Without a continuous radar field and a unified control system, even the best anti-aircraft systems turn into "isolated towers." Here, tactical three-dimensional radars, a network of observation posts, data exchange systems, and automated guidance play a key role.It is on this logic that the message that Ukraine is currently conveying to its partners is based: we need not only additional complexes but also a holistic architecture where each echelon works in its niche, and does not duplicate or replace another.
"Anti-Shahed" system: interceptor drones as a separate echelonA separate dimension is the fight against Shahed-type attack UAVs. Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced the creation of an echeloned system to counter these drones and a sharp increase in capabilities in this direction. This involves increasing the number of interceptor crews, forming new units, and strengthening detection and destruction means.The logic of this system is simple but effective:Detection and control. A network of radars and optoelectronic posts, integrated into a single control field, so that the target is immediately "picked up" by the necessary air defense means at the required line.Long-range perimeter. Patrolling using aviation, interceptor UAVs, and electronic warfare means that try to shoot down or "jam" Shahed before entering densely populated areas.Middle line of defense around cities and regions. Mobile fire groups, VSHORAD/SHORAD, electronic warfare systems - what works on targets that have broken through the first echelon.Last line. Short-range means around critical infrastructure and residential areas that intercept individual drones at the final stage.
According to the command, interceptor drones are already showing an efficiency coefficient of over 70% in real battles against Shahed. The President speaks of Ukraine producing up to 700-800 interceptor drones per day. However, their use requires coordinated efforts.It is precisely to strengthen the drone component within the Air Force that a new branch of troops is being formed - the unmanned air defense systems troops. Their task is to create a specialized air defense echelon that focuses on kamikaze drones, taking some of the load off classical anti-aircraft missile troops and tactical aviation.Helicopters, light aircraft, and "air hunters"Echeloned air defense is not only "classical" air defense with air defense missile systems and radars but also active air assets. Ukraine has already officially begun the process of purchasing Bell AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom helicopters to strengthen its capabilities to counter Shaheds and, in fact, to form another echelon of air defense - with light aircraft and modern helicopters equipped with appropriate sensors and weapons. Currently, this direction is positioned as one of the key for the future aviation component of the Air Force's air defense.
Thus, these helicopters can become not only a "classical" strike tool on the battlefield but also an element of the system for countering drones and cruise missiles at low altitudes - especially in combination with radars, networked targeting means, and ground-based air defense.Separately, in expert discussions, the idea of using light turboprop aircraft such as the Super Tucano appears as a relatively cheap and economical means of patrolling and intercepting slow air targets in areas with low saturation of enemy air defense means. Such aircraft have been considered in many countries as a platform for "police" missions. Now, in Ukraine, they can become a potential tool for combating kamikaze drones and other air targets.What Ukraine needs from partners for an effective echeloned air defense systemIn fact, Ukraine is already playing the role of an vanguard in forming a new European air defense system. What is being tested in our sky today - from networks of mobile groups to the integration of interceptor drones and ground-based electronic warfare - will tomorrow become the basis for the defense of the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, and the Black Sea region.That is why the message to partners must be as clear as possible:Ukraine needs additional Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS, and missiles for them.Tactical level radars, control, and communication systems are no less critical.Absolutely - massive, relatively inexpensive means of countering drones: from interceptors and electronic warfare to machine guns, cannons, and light aircraft.All this must work not as a set of disparate aid, but as a single coordinated system.
Ukraine is gradually moving from thinking "we need another specific complex" to thinking "we need a holistic, multi-level air defense." Partners must share this same logic. There is no magic weapon capable of closing the sky over Ukraine. There is only a comprehensive, echeloned, integrated system in which Patriot, interceptor drones, radars, helicopters, light aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and electronic warfare complement each other.Only such a system can force the Kremlin to admit: the cost of the air war against Ukraine has become too high, and its effectiveness - too low. And only such a system will become the foundation of the future air defense of all Europe.The material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium of Defense Information (CDI), a project that united Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and is aimed at strengthening information support and analytical provision in the field of national security, defense, and geopolitics.





