Even amid a full-scale war, Ukraine has on the whole not witnessed the wartime explosion of graft often seen elsewhere. That is remarkable, a testament to its dynamic anti-corruption ecology. Yet progress is fragile. If trust erodes between anti-corruption actors or elites start to manipulate oversight institutions, the country could slip into what might be called a "social conflict model of anticorruption", where reforms become a battleground for power that benefits no one. Serbia's specific experience in the field of anti-corruption offers a warning of how quickly such regression can unfold.

A Robust Foundation

Ukraine's anti-corruption 'engine' is impressive. Since 2014, it has established prevention policies and key institutions, such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), and the High Anti-Corruption Court, which continue to investigate senior officials, issue indictments, and secure convictions even under wartime conditions.

The second pillar – social foundations – may be Ukraine's greatest strength. Anti-corruption in Ukraine was born from within. After the 2013–14 Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainians demanded a clean state. Civil society groups, investigative journalists, and reform-minded officials built a movement that shield against policy retreats. Surveys show corruption remains one of Ukrainians' top concerns, even amid war, a sign of enduring civic intolerance for abuse.

Equally important is elite behaviour. While no leadership is immune to self-interest, Ukraine's governors have been willing to let most reforms proceed. Of course, this is also where anti-corruption in Ukraine may become vulnerable. When the Rada passed a controversial law in mid-2025 threatening to weaken NABU and SAPO, public protests erupted across the country. While, President Zelenskyy and legislators reversed course, recognising that citizens would not tolerate backsliding, a sense of uncertainty over elite intentions remains.

Why Serbia's Anti-corruption Experience Serves as a Warning

At the U4 Anti-corruption Resource centre, we study anti-corruption dynamics across different countries. The worse that could happen for Ukraine is if this current situation descends into Serbia-style mode anti-corruption as a battleground of accusations, miscommunication, and power struggles. It must remain a national cause.

Serbia is not the same as Ukraine, but on anti-corruption, Serbia once seemed on a similar path. It built agencies, adopted EU-aligned laws, and fostered active watchdogs. But elite behaviour in Serbia shifted, especially over the last decade.

Crucially, this regression was hard to spot, occurring gradually, within a smoke screen of well-publicised anti-corruption reform and strategies. The government announced strategies and laws, but genuine implementation was lacking. Oversight agencies were undermined through temporary leadership and politicised appointments. Scandals implicating elites were ignored or deflected by smear campaigns. Anti-corruption became performative, which set the ground for Serbia to enter a second, more dangerous phase: the social conflict model of anti-corruption.

The canopy collapse at Novi Sad railway station in March 2024, killing 16, became a catalyst. The station was part of a Chinese-financed high-speed rail project that bypassed many public procurement laws. Protesters demanded the release of construction documents, transparency and prosecution of those responsible. The movement spread to over 400 towns, symbolising a broad societal demand for accountability.

But what began as a unifying agenda to strengthen rule of law became a divisive battleground. The government responded not by addressing corruption but using the context to extend political power against opponents. Social conflict emerged as a response to calls for anti-corruption reform. This model is characterised as:

Anti-corruption activists as enemies of the state: Serbian authorities brand critics as foreign agents or terrorists, shield allies, and direct law-enforcement against opponents. President Vučić labelled protesters 'terrorists'. Rade Djuric from the Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia has observed a narrative assault on civic actors with government officials engaging in verbal attacks and spreading disinformation. Anti-corruption grievances are recast as attacks on the state. At the same time, the government paints itself as the guardian of order. In this toxic environment, the very term "anti-corruption" has become politicized. It is no longer an impartial policy goal; but a slogan in a struggle between the regime and opposition.

Authoritarian reflex: Responses become increasingly aggressive, threatening basic rights. Protestors demanding accountability for the Novi Sad collapse faced police violence, arrests, home searches and online threats. Reports suggest police used excessive force; students and journalists were beaten, and over 300 people were arrested. Police raided the offices of NGOs that supported the protests, and the regime ramped up pressure on independent journalists who reported on corruption

Abuse of judicial institutions : Serbia courts tend to dismiss corruption cases involving the ruling party while targeting protesters with fabricated charges. The co-option of institutions not only undermines anti-corruption but also turns the legal system into a tool for punishing opponents. An EWB article on the 2025 corruption arrests observed that pro-government media attacked prosecutor Nenadić, accusing him of staging a coup against the government. Simultaneously, the arrests focused on former officials who had fallen out of favour, while associates of the president remained untouched or chosen carefully to project a sense of action.

In sum, the social conflict model has poisoned the well: many citizens may now believe that any anti-corruption action is just score-settling between rival factions, not a genuine pursuit of the public good. This loss of credibility is harmful. It means even honest reformers in Serbia will have a harder time convincing the public of their integrity.

Lessons for Ukraine

Ukraine is not Serbia, but the parallels are instructive. Even with strong institutions and active citizens, once the social conflict model sets in, reversing it is extremely hard.

Key early warning signs are:

• Increasing mistrust, bad words, and soured discourse between anticorruption actors
• Polarised narratives and disinformation around anticorruption activities
• Fewer convictions of high-profile politicians
• An increase in disciplinary actions against judges or prosecutors seen as independent.
• More informal decision making as instructions given via party structures or intelligence services rather than legal superiors.
• Sudden or irregular dismissals of independent heads (e.g. judges, prosecutors, regulators).
• Unexplained budget cuts, withheld disbursements, or diversion of funds from core functions.

Ukraine should focus on maintaining a social contract model, anti-corruption that aims to progress the public good and work through mutual trust across society and official institutions. Three priorities are important here:

1. Protect independence. Oversight bodies must remain free from political interference. Appointments should be transparent, mandates secure, and leaders shielded from arbitrary dismissal. Any attempt to subordinate NABU, SAPO, or the anti-corruption court must trigger immediate scrutiny.
2. Ensure substance over symbolism. Reform should deliver measurable outcomes, such as credible investigations, recovered assets, cleaner procurement and not just new laws or action plans. Public confidence hinges on visible results, not bureaucratic activity.
3. Sustain civic pressure. Ukraine's greatest safeguard is an engaged public. Civil society, journalists, and local watchdogs must retain resources and access to information. Protests in 2025 showed citizens can still force course corrections. Maintaining this vigilance will be vital as war fatigue and reconstruction challenges grow.

International partners also have a role. External support should reinforce domestic accountability rather than substitute for it. Ukraine's reform drive is internally anchored, more of a product of popular demand than donor conditionality. Preserving that ownership is key to resilience.

David Jackson, U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre