International information and analytical community Resurgam shared the analysis.Resurgam explains that until February 24, Moscow oil accounted for 34% of the European market, but by 2025, that share has fallen to just 3%. These remaining imports come largely from Hungary and Slovakia, which “not only did not take advantage of the exemptions to painlessly abandon oil, but on the contrary, increased their dependence on the Kremlin: Hungary from 61% to 86%, and Slovakia actually brought it to 100%.”Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has already stated that despite pressure from former U.S. President Trump, Hungary will not stop buying Moscow oil. Resurgam believes the claim that “there are no available alternatives because they have no sea” is misleading.The key point, Resurgam notes, is that Hungary will no longer be able to rely on exemptions. At the UN General Assembly, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a series of initiatives accelerating the EU’s transition away from Russian oil. Following the August plan to completely phase out LNG by 2027, the Commission outlined September adjustments proposing to move the deadline forward by one year.Resurgam explains that a similar approach is expected for oil. In 2022, the EU granted exemptions to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, recommending a full replacement of Moscow oil by the end of 2026. Only the Czech Republic, which diversified its supplies earlier than anticipated, managed to meet this target.Reports from European Commission sources indicate that Brussels is aiming to shorten the deadline for abandoning Moscow oil, with the likely target now the end of 2025.Avoiding a Hungarian-Slovak vetoResurgam says the European Commission plans to use trade law mechanisms, which do not require unanimity, to bypass potential Hungarian and Slovak vetoes. Brussels has previously applied this strategy in 2024 to impose restrictions on Moscow's agricultural products, significantly raising customs duties.The same mechanism is planned for oil: additional duties would make Moscow oil commercially unattractive for Hungarian buyers, as it would become significantly more expensive than alternatives. Resurgam believes that if Prime Minister Orbán continues purchasing this oil at higher costs, it will raise public scrutiny over government policies and corruption ahead of the elections.Ursula using Trump as leverageResurgam explains that Brussels’ approach deliberately involved Trump to exert external pressure. The plan requires a qualified majority, and consensus was insufficient. Some governments openly support Moscow oil, such as Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, while others quietly benefit from oil flows to Hungary, where it is processed into petroleum products.Resurgam adds that “it is no coincidence that two journalists asked Trump about Orbán at the UN General Assembly.” This strategy allows von der Leyen to secure approval from European leaders who quietly opposed pressure on Orbán and Fico, while avoiding direct accusations of “belligerence” ahead of no-confidence votes initiated by Orbán for October.A double blow for Orbán and FicoAccording to Resurgam, Brussels’ decision delivers a double blow. First, it undermines Moscow-linked corruption schemes in Hungary and Slovakia. Second, the forced reduction of Russian oil imports on the eve of Hungarian elections is likely to either spike oil prices—if Hungary continues buying Moscow oil—or leave Orbán scrambling for fuel while diversifying supplies.In both scenarios, Resurgam notes, Orbán faces significant political risk: he loses a corrupt revenue stream ahead of elections and must manage rising prices caused by his own short-sighted policies.