Welcome, Ambassador Fried. These are extremely anxious times. And I’m not exaggerating, because the situation is not just bad — it is deteriorating rapidly. Accordingly, I would first like to ask you about the updated U.S. strategic security concept. When I read it for the first time, I was shocked. When I read it a second time, my shock doubled. And when I began analyzing it segment by segment, especially the parts concerning the European Union and Ukraine, my shock tripled. And this deeply worries me. I would ask you to provide a detailed analysis of what this document represents and what specific threats it poses for all of us — for Europe and beyond.Well, I am not a great fan of the new National Security Strategy. It includes language about Europe which is both pointless and needlessly divisive. And the whole document seems infused with a spirit of neo-isolationism, and a kind of ideological anger at Europe, which seems misplaced in the face of the Russian danger and the Chinese challenge.All that said, there are elements in the National Security Strategy which are better and language which is useful. For example, the strategy does acknowledge that Europe is an important partner and friend to the United States and that we need to work with Europe.The document also recognizes that Ukraine's survival as an independent and viable country is a core American interest.Now, I wish the language were stronger. I wish the description of the threat from Russia were clearer. But the question is not whether I like the document, but whether I could work with it were I in the administration. And the answer is, I probably could work with it. I suspect, having experience with such documents, that the original draft was worse and that some people in the administration who have a more Reaganite view of strategy added language to make it less damaging and more workable.Now, I don't expect Ukrainians to be happy with it, and there are reasons to worry about where Trump will end up with respect to the negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S., but this document itself is not — it's not great, but it's not fatal. I think it can be worked with.Ambassador Fried, you are someone who not only understands how American diplomacy acts and operates, but also knows how this entire “kitchen” works globally. And I am not afraid to use this word: you were one of the godfathers of the overall transformation of the security environment in Central Europe. In particular, you played a key role in accompanying Poland’s accession to NATO.We understand that when Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he relied on notions such as pushing NATO back to the borders of 1997 and, in particular, the demilitarization of Central Europe. And we understand what consequences this could have. I doubt that anything resembling the Warsaw Pact will be created again, but in any case the trend is extremely alarming.So I would like you to share your vision: how will the Russians try to implement their goals — by force or through bargaining with the Americans, with the Trump administration? Because they want to keep everything under their control. I don’t know whether that would involve direct occupation or placing their representatives inside various ministries, as was the case in the Polish People’s Republic, the PRL, or even imposing a literal police regime. How do you see the scenario the Russian aggressors intend to pursue?Well, you are correct that Russia wants to reduce Ukraine to the status of a satellite country and wants an enforced neutralization of Central Europe, and really a restoration of either the Russian empire or Russian sphere of domination.And for a Ukrainian, it's not hard to see the historical antecedents. Putin wants Ukraine to be in the position of the Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita before the 3 May Constitution. That is, a state with limited sovereignty, with the czar's agent on the throne, and in no way integrated with the rest of Europe. Ukrainians understand this, and this is a correct understanding.Putin will try to convince Trump to agree to this, and we must — we Americans — need to keep pushing back. The Europeans — the British, French, Germans, and Poles — are all working hard to convince Trump and support Ukraine, convince Trump to support Ukraine, and to support Ukraine themselves. This struggle is ongoing. As an American, I am not proud of the fact that Trump sends such mixed signals about Ukraine, and he moves in a good direction, then he turns in a worse direction, and goes back and forth. But there is still hope that the Americans will end up in the right place about Ukraine.I think the Ukrainian delegations, the Ukrainian negotiators, have handled the Americans as skillfully as they could. And I think the Europeans are going to work on Trump to convince him to hold firm and not accept Russia's aggression.Ambassador Fried, I’d like to ask you for a small clarification. To what extent is this document announced by the Trump administration — the updated U.S. strategic security concept — binding in terms of how they must act? In other words, how much can it change or be modified under the influence of circumstances? For example, if President Macron meets with Trump, or if Keir Starmer manages to persuade Trump on some points — can this document be altered? Or, for instance, how mandatory will it be for the State Department and the Department of Defense to follow it? If Trump is persuaded of something else and it is said: “No, Putin, you must stop; this document is not that important,” would it then be possible to change it?The National Security Strategy document does not have operational force. These documents are general documents and an expression of the American administration's wish list and worldview. But they are not a reliable guide to policy. They never decide issues.This particular document includes language that different groups within the administration can all use. Remember, the Trump administration is not a single thing. It is an unstable coalition of groups with very different worldviews: Reaganites, isolationists, Asia First, Fortress America, transactionalists. Many different groups are part of the administration and are part of Trump world. They are all pushing and pulling against each other. This is not unique to the Trump administration. All U.S. administrations to some degree are coalitions. The Trump administration is more so. And in that competition lies some hope, because the different groups in the administration are going to be pushing at each other, and Ukraine and its friends can exert some influence.Ukraine does have friends, and as I said, the British, French, Germans, and Poles, plus the President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, the Prime Minister of Italy, Meloni, these are all solid friends of Ukraine. And the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, recently said over the weekend that the Baltic states and Poland were ideal allies. That gives the Poles the ability to work with the White House, and I think President Nawrocki will try.So Ukraine has friends, and those friends are working hard. This is not easy. As I said, I wish the U.S. administration were more consistent. But there is still an opportunity. If Trump realizes that Putin is not serious about negotiations and pushes back against Putin and puts pressure on Russia, there is a reasonable chance this can come out in a decent place. I think the Ukrainian government has handled the negotiations as well as it could. And these talks are difficult. But the Ukrainian delegation has shown skill in maintaining a positive profile and working with the Americans as much as possible.Ambassador Fried, I also have a question about how President Trump’s so-called peace plan will actually be formed. We understand that it consists of many points. Some of them will address the bilateral relations between the United States and Russia, and perhaps certain issues concerning China. We understand that this involves the Russian-Chinese demand for a real redistribution of spheres of influence in the world. This worries us — and we have discussed it with you before.But there are also specific elements concerning Ukraine. We understand that the Russians will try to reach an agreement with Donald Trump and will likely ask him to pressure Ukraine’s allies in Europe. What do I mean by “pressure”? They might say: “Dear representatives of the American administration, could you ask your European friends to give Ukraine less money?”We understand that the situation with Ukraine’s state budget may become critically difficult in the near future — in a few months. And we understand that certain signals may already be appearing. And we still see that the issue of the reparations loan for Ukraine, for many different reasons, remains unresolved. War requires funding. The budget of a country at war requires substantial, additional financial support. But there is hesitation. We have the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary. Belgium’s position also is unclear. There are major debates. But there is no clear understanding of where the money for the war is supposed to come from. And that is why I am asking this perhaps conspiratorial question — or perhaps not. Because global diplomacy can be merciless, not merely cynical.The European discussions and negotiations about the reparations loan to Ukraine are in an intensive phase. That's good. I understand the Belgian position, and a solution may be found. I don't think that Hungary will be able to block this completely. The Czech government is still the current government, and I think the current government will be in office this month when decisions, I hope, are made. So there is a reasonable chance that this loan will be finalized, or that another method of providing Ukraine with resources will be found. I think the large European countries, the Germans in particular, are serious about this.Again, I wish it were resolved already. I wish the money — the Russian immobilized assets — had been used long ago. But we are seeing some progress. The Europeans are making progress. So there is some hope in this.I think that the European governments certainly recognize that Ukraine's success, Ukraine's survival as an independent, viable country, is in their interests. So I think we're seeing some progress here.Ambassador, on the other hand, I have a suspicion that there may also be attempts to pressure Ukraine itself, the Ukrainian government, and certain representatives of the Ukrainian authorities. We have seen the huge corruption scandal involving Mindich and others. As a result, Andriy Yermak, the head of President Zelenskyy’s office, was dismissed. But the point is that there may be many different tools that could be used to influence the internal situation in Ukraine.And here the issue is that Ukraine must be prepared — we must be ready for new challenges and for rethinking our own approach to action. But we also understand that there are many circles around the world that do not like Ukraine and do not particularly sympathize with the Ukrainian government. And we must be ready for potentially critical scenarios.If we talk about critical scenarios — what scenarios could be imposed on Ukraine? In particular, we are talking about the prospect of holding elections during wartime, and who would even guarantee the implementation of such procedures.I'm not Ukrainian. It does seem to me that Ukrainians will insist that their government be worthy of their sacrifice to survive as Ukrainians in a Ukrainian state. As a Ukrainian nation that embraces all who live there, but is effective and honest. I suspect this is what Ukrainians will insist on. How this happens is not for an American to decide; it is for Ukrainians to decide.Certainly, the Russians are making the most of the corruption issue having to do with Energoatom and trying to use it to undermine Ukraine's support in Europe and the United States. Ukraine's enemies are happy about the scandal because they argue that it vindicates their negative views of Ukraine. Ukraine's friends are pointing out that independent institutions in Ukraine have uncovered the scandal, and the government, under the pressure of public opinion, is taking action. This will be something the Ukrainians work out.With respect to elections, I really am not interested in the Russian argument that Ukraine is not a democracy because it hasn't had elections. We don't have to accept Kremlin nonsense like this. And it is nonsense, of course.The question of Ukrainian territories claimed by Russia. The Russians are demanding not just occupation, they are demanding both international and Ukrainian recognition of this occupation, along with a renunciation of any future claims. This is unprecedented, but as far as I understand, it is one of the key items on the agenda that the Kremlin is trying to advance. What scenarios are currently being considered, what options are on the table now when we talk about diplomacy? I’m not talking about a finalized version.I don't know the details. Territory is obviously one of the major issues. The other major issue is security for Ukraine after the conflict. Those are the issues that need resolution.The language about territory will matter a great deal. So will the ultimate ceasefire line. These are separate issues.I believe that President Trump was absolutely right when he said that the ceasefire line should be the current line of contact. The current line of contact. I don't understand why the United States would be pushing, if indeed we are pushing, for Ukraine to retreat from territory that Russia has been unable to conquer after nearly four years of war. That is one issue.The second issue is the status of the territory that Russia now occupies illegally. There is a great difference between recognition of the physical fact of Russian occupation and recognizing that occupation as legitimate. Those are two very different things.During the Cold War, West Germany acknowledged the reality that East Germany was not part of the German state, but they never recognized it as final or legitimate. And in the end that position was vindicated. The United States in 1940 issued the Welles Declaration in which we said we would not recognize the Soviet illegal annexation of the Baltic states. But of course we did recognize the physical reality that Moscow was in control of the Baltic states. So these are two very different things.How this is worded, and the location of the armistice, the ceasefire line, have to be worked out. I see no reason to give in to Russian pressure to surrender territory that Russia has been unable to conquer. But that is not my decision. My opinion doesn't matter. What matters is the Ukrainian view and what the Ukrainian government decides.Ambassador Fried, the Russians operate within historiosophical models. They very often exploit historical patterns and historical narratives. Accordingly, they view their current aggression — their attempt to seize additional Ukrainian territories and maintain or even increase their influence over the Ukrainian state — through the same model that the Russian Empire once used against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Poland. And they understand that they intend to act in stages. They understand that they will try to exert pressure.At the time, they pressured King Stanisław August; today we have President Zelenskyy. They will pressure him as well and, while demanding bad decisions from him, they will count on a wave of public outrage. In the Commonwealth, there was once the so-called Bar Confederation, which they also manipulated. And this is the model they are most likely seeking to use.I am far from certain that our president understands the game the Russians are preparing to play, but I feel that such a threat exists.In your view, what is the “bad plan” the Russians might try to implement now against Ukraine? The situation is indeed extremely difficult, and, I repeat, the trend is toward further deterioration.President Putin makes no secret of his ambitions to control all of Ukraine. And his use of history suggests that what he fears most is an independent, sovereign, and European Ukraine. Because I think to Putin this would reverse the verdict of the 17th century that allowed Russia to rise because it controlled Ukraine. And I think, as my old professor Zbigniew Brzezinski used to say, Russia with Ukraine is an empire; Russia without Ukraine is a nation.These are the issues. And Ukrainians, I think, know this perfectly well. So do Ukraine’s Polish friends. The issue is whether Russia will dominate Ukraine. And at least in my experience, Russian domination is not stable because it leads to poverty and corruption. And people who live in poverty and corruption don't like it. They want something better. That's why Ukrainians were on the Maidan, the Orange Revolution, and the second Maidan. That's why the Poles overthrew their own communist system in 1989. So these historical issues are relevant today. There are people in the Trump administration who know them, but not in the circle right around Trump. I suppose General Kellogg is one of them. He’s leaving. I hope his replacement will be as well grounded strategically as he is. This is not an easy time, but there is still some hope because Ukrainians enjoy the backing of Europe and the backing of many Americans. The American public does support Ukraine, including Trump supporters. Trump supporters, the so-called MAGA movement, supports Ukraine. That’s what the public opinion polls tell us.So Ukraine is right to keep working with the Americans. And many of us in Washington and otherwise are working to help convince the Trump administration to do what is in American interests and help Ukraine.I would just like to clarify: how should we best work or engage with the American administration? We understand that next year there will be congressional elections. We understand that not everything is stable either among the Republicans or Donald Trump’s inner circle, but that doesn’t make things any easier for us. America has major internal problems — we sympathize with the United States, but our situation is far worse, and you are aware of that.So I wanted to ask how Ukraine should behave right now: who should we be working with, and who should we avoid? Should we rely on the words of Witkoff? Can we hope that Donald Trump won’t change his mind completely in a matter of a week? How much of a man of his word and how consistent is the president’s son-in-law, Kushner?I have the feeling that I am in a dream, like reading a sequel to George Orwell’s dystopia “1984.” A couple of years ago I could not seriously have imagined that we would be discussing this. Yet we are rapidly returning to the age of monarchies. One would like to believe that there are still safeguards and laws that can force existing legislation to be enforced. But Ukraine must also act quickly, dynamically, and creatively.I would ask you to share your recommendations and your assessments of the players who are now trying to play with Ukraine or against it — I don’t know which.Well, you have raised a lot of issues. The American debate about Ukraine reflects larger issues that Americans are debating, which is our role, our American role, in the world. The United States fought frustrating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It failed in Afghanistan. It only partly succeeded in Iraq. And those wars left a bitter taste with Americans, many of whom now argue that America should reduce its role in the world and other countries should step up rather than relying on America.This is a debate that is not new. We have had this before 100 years ago. And that debate unfortunately touches Ukraine.There are still many Americans who believe that it is in the American interest to support Ukraine. In fact, as I said, a majority of Americans, including a majority of Trump supporters. We will see how the next elections work. But it is not clear to me that the American debate, as difficult as it is right now, will result in a consensus for neo-isolationism. I'm not sure that we're going to end up there.But of course Ukraine needs our support now. And the signals from the United States are mixed. And this is frustrating to Ukrainians and frustrating to me. But I think that Ukraine can work with members of Congress, it can work around the country, it can continue to make its case, and I will do everything I can to be supportive because I think Ukraine's success is in American interest.Ambassador, one last question. If we talk about timing — how quickly certain processes might move — I understand we can speak only approximately. And also: how certain processes might be slowed down. Until recently, the Russians were in a great hurry, but now we see that they are prepared to abandon the so-called Trump peace plan. At the same time, we do not know what the Trump peace plan actually looks like in full, in its entirety. Some points are being discussed, yes — but certain things could be added on.In the past, there were addenda to the Stalin–Hitler Pact, to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Publicly, one version existed, while in the non-public sphere something entirely different existed. And therefore we do not know what these grand arrangements — China, Russia, the Trump administration — might entail. But this also raises the question of timing: how quickly they might move in one direction, and how quickly — or rather how slowly — certain processes might be blocked.We all saw the original 28-point plan, which was not very good. It had some elements that were decent, some elements that were bad, some elements that were confused. That plan was superseded by a better document. That better document has not been leaked.I don't know where we stand at the moment because the negotiations have taken place in private, without a lot of public discussion. There was a good joint U.S.–Ukrainian statement that came out over the weekend. But more recent reports suggest some serious differences about territory. I don't think there will be a secret clause, a secret agreement between Washington and Moscow like the Molotov–Ribbentrop plan. I don't think so. I think that the Trump administration is going to be clear about what it wants. I don't know that I will like everything that it does. And you could have some bad American decisions. But I don't think there will be a secret agreement, at least not one that the U.S. government as a whole embraces. Remember, there are many people in Trump world and all kinds of things are said, but I think that Ukraine and the Europeans will succeed in at least having the Americans be transparent about what they are doing. Still, I have some sympathy for the Ukrainian position of frustration with the different signals coming from the United States. Still, the frustration aside, there is a decent chance that a good-enough outcome can emerge which will leave Ukraine a sovereign country and an independent one, despite the temporary loss of some territory to illegal Russian control.