Oleksii Izhak, an analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information, stated this in an interview with Espreso.He analyzed incidents that occurred in the Black Sea in late November and early December involving merchant ships belonging to Russia's so-called shadow tanker fleet.First, the tanker Kairos was hit, then the tanker Virat. Ukraine acknowledged its involvement in striking these vessels. Later, the Russian tanker Midvolga-2 was damaged.According to the expert, Kairos and Virat, which were sailing empty to Novorossiysk to load Russian oil, fully fit the characteristics of the "shadow" fleet: they are listed in EU and UK sanctions lists for violating sanctions regimes during the transportation of Russian oil. They are also on lists of vessels that regularly switched off their automatic identification system (AIS) in violation of the requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).On December 2, Turkey reported that the Russian tanker Midvolga-2, carrying sunflower oil and heading to Georgia, had been hit. Ukraine denied involvement in this incident. The expert clarifies that Midvolga-2 differs from Kairos and Virat; it is formally a Russian tanker registered in the Russian maritime registry under the Russian flag. It does not formally belong to the shadow fleet and is not under international sanctions."However, its course at the time of the attack – significantly south of the usual route – raised additional questions: usually, vessels traveling between Russia and Georgia move along the eastern coast of the Black Sea, not through the southern sector where the incident occurred. This circumstance and the absence of serious damage indicate the possibility of a Russian staging to create international pressure on Ukraine," Izhak emphasizes.According to international monitoring organizations, over 500 vessels were involved in Russian oil transportation schemes in 2024–2025, of which at least 250–300 operate in a "gray zone." A strike on two tankers of this fleet, even without sinking them, can create a broader effect, the expert believes. He adds that if the shadow fleet is forced to increase its distance from the Turkish coast, avoid standard routes, or move under the escort of tugs and guard vessels, the oil delivery time increases. For Russia, this means a reduction in the pace of shipments and, consequently, a decrease in revenues. For buyers, it means the possibility of demanding larger discounts. For Ukraine, it means the opportunity to exert systemic pressure on a key source of financing for Russian aggression."The sanctioned status of the shadow fleet under flags of convenience, which provides financing for Russian aggression, makes such vessels legitimate targets. Therefore, these strikes, if carefully planned and taking into account all relevant factors, from political to environmental, are highly effective. Ukraine has not exceeded these legal boundaries," concludes Oleksii Izhak.