Exhaustion tactics on the negotiation front. Russian diplomacy as a tool of systemic influence in the war against Ukraine

Henry Kissinger noted that the heaviest burden of politicians is the need to make decisions when there is not enough time or information, and the consequences of your decisions cannot be predicted. Unlike a historian or analyst, a statesman is given only one attempt and his mistakes are irreparable.

In the fall of 2019, having successfully passed the entrance exams and with the epaulettes of a major general on my shoulders, I crossed the threshold of the Faculty of International Relations of the Ostroh Academy with trembling knees. The age and significance of this institution in the history of Ukraine caused a slight dizziness and left forever memories of the great responsibility that these walls conveyed. Yes, it was here that Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny (a Cossack commander who successfully fought against both the Moscow Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire) and Meletius Smotrytsky (who systematized the Church Slavonic language) and other prominent Ukrainians in the past received their education. I understood well where I would receive my education. But what I could not understand was that international relations would one day become my second breath. The breath of another battlefield, no less harsh and dramatic.

Drama in diplomacy, unfortunately, is already a common phenomenon. As in battle, when repelling a frontal attack of the enemy, you need to be confident both in your flanks and in diplomacy, the stability of your own position depends on the reliable support of the flanks. The drama occurs where the flank is open. Then success will depend precisely on the speed of closing this breach. From the ability and confidence of a partner to unite to maintain stability. This is diplomacy. A front where its own laws and rules operate, where strength is not always in truth, but rather – truth in strength. Where countries implement their foreign policy mainly through strength.

However, this axiom only works when there is power. When there is no power, the "strong" call to the negotiating table. Here we are, a country that has been fighting for its existence for 11 years in a row, in a situation where we increasingly hear from the "strong" about the need for negotiations. Of course, negotiations have always ended wars. However, it is extremely important to understand two simple things. First of all, what is being decided is our fate, Ukrainians, and perhaps the fate of Europe. Secondly, with whom will these negotiations take place. Recent events, especially in Alaska, and the events that took place after that in the Kremlin, indicate that the war may end. But of course, according to the Kremlin master, only on Russia's terms. There is still confidence in victory through military action or at the negotiating table.

That is why calls for Ukraine and Russia to focus not on a cessation of hostilities but immediately on reaching a comprehensive peace agreement are premature. A full peace agreement could require months, if not years, of difficult negotiations.

It is difficult to say whether those who try to push us into certain decisions understand this. However, it is absolutely clear that our fate is in our own hands.

In today's conditions, especially geopolitical instability, populism, and inflated expectations, negotiations remain one of the key tools for implementing foreign policy and protecting Ukraine's national interests.

They say that war begins where diplomacy fails. However, when diplomacy becomes another front of war, negotiations are the only public arena for direct confrontation between Ukrainian diplomats and government officials with representatives of the Russian Federation. A confrontation in which, as on the battlefield, we are satisfied with only one obvious result.

It should also be recognized that this arena significantly influences the formation of the international community's position and the level of support for Ukraine in the war.

Another reality for modern Ukrainian diplomacy is that in 2022-2025 Ukraine found itself in a situation of constant negotiations with Western allies and fighting the enemy on the battlefield. Studies by RAND Corporation (Kofman & Lee, 2023), Chatham House (Freedman, 2023), SIPRI (2024) indicate that negotiations have become an integral part of military-political strategy.

As the NATO Defense College study (2024) emphasizes, modern warfare is increasingly characterized by multi-level interaction, where the military is forced to mediate between political decisions and battlefield realities. Similar challenges are also recorded by the RAND Corporation, which emphasizes that officers in the 21st century must possess the competencies of a negotiator, understand intercultural differences, be able to work with delegations of international organizations, and avoid emotional pressure.

That is why, since the beginning of the full-scale aggression, both I personally, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and representatives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been constantly involved in the negotiation process with partners. Also, a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was part of the negotiating group in March 2022 in Istanbul.

Today we see the participation of representatives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and other representatives of the security and defense sector in peace negotiations in Istanbul in 2025 in accordance with the Decrees of the President of Ukraine dated May 15, 2025 №306/2025 and July 22, 2025 №539/2025.

Therefore, the success of diplomacy in wartime will also depend on the military, for whom this area remains out of focus in peacetime.

But perhaps the most important feature of today's diplomacy is that Russia, despite the changing global context, demonstrates a set of methods in negotiations that are completely incompatible with the principles of transparency, mutual trust, and constructive dialogue. This fact is of particular importance for Ukraine and its partners, as it shapes predictable, but at the same time dangerous scenarios for further actions by the Russian Federation. Perhaps all this is not yet sufficiently understood in the West, but for Ukraine it is the price of survival.

Therefore, in the conditions of a full-scale war, Ukrainian diplomacy is faced with the challenge of understanding the specifics of negotiations with the Russian Federation, which has inherited many features of the Soviet diplomatic school.

Then the main task today is, first of all, to identify the features of the Russian diplomatic machine, determine its influence on international negotiation processes regarding Ukraine, and develop recommendations for the systematic training of Ukrainian negotiating teams. This preparation should include working out scenarios and tactical options, a clear division of roles in the team, and developing a course of action in case the opponent is ready to make agreements or, conversely, tries to delay the process. It is important to recognize that it is not so much the content of the discussions that is decisive, but the tactics of conducting dialogue and exchanging proposals. This will shape the public image of Ukraine as a responsible and constructive participant in the negotiations and at the same time create additional international pressure on the aggressor state.

Therefore, an important element of preparation for such negotiations is taking into account the historical experience, primarily of Soviet diplomacy, on which the negotiation practice of Russian foreign policy is still based.

Bennett Gill, Chief Historian of the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom from 1995 to 2005, described Soviet diplomacy as follows:

"Entering the negotiations, the Russians knew what they wanted and came to the table with a clear vision of their ultimate goal, ready to take all necessary measures to achieve it, including, if necessary, by disrupting the negotiations".

It makes sense to mention, first of all, the so-called "politburo style", well known both to a narrow circle of specialists and widely described by Western diplomats.

The main features of this style include:

• collective impersonality (use of only the pronoun "we");
• formalism and ritualization (long speeches, full with ideological quotes);
• rigid intransigence (the embodiment of which was A. Gromyko, known as "Mr. No");
• systematic delaying of negotiations in order to gain time.

Instead of open discussion, hints and ambiguous signals were used, which made it difficult to reach transparent agreements.

The origins of this approach date back to the Stalinist era, when negotiations were seen primarily as a demonstration of strength, rather than as a search for compromise. Later, this canon was only supplemented: Mikhail Suslov, the chief ideologist of the Politburo, built a strict ideological framework for negotiations, where any concessions were interpreted as a manifestation of "weakness". Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB, transferred the logic of the special services to the negotiation process – total control, verification, distrust, and the use of negotiations as a tool for intelligence and risk management.

Thus, the Soviet diplomatic tradition developed a unique system of negotiation practices, focused not on finding agreements, but on securing tactical and strategic advantages in the international environment. Its elements are preserved in modern Russian diplomacy.

One of the most prominent representatives of the Politburo school of negotiation was Andrei Gromyko, who held leading positions in the USSR's foreign policy apparatus for over four decades. He was Permanent Representative to the UN, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Gromyko represented a set of negotiating tactics that combined, among other things, rigidity, bureaucratic discipline, and pragmatic calculation. His diplomatic activities are often associated with the phenomenon of "silent intransigence," when delaying negotiations and avoiding clear commitments became tools for achieving benefits for the Soviet Union (Hamilton, K., Haslam, 2011). This approach is also evident in Russia's current aggressive policy, where diplomatic negotiations are viewed not as a tool for solving problems, but as a means to buy time, legitimize one's own actions, or create the illusion of finding solutions.

His tactics were based on several key principles:

• maximum preparation for negotiations (study of details, facts, legal aspects);
• control over emotions (no impulsive decisions);
• combination of legal and political arguments (active use of international law as a tool of pressure);
• tactics of stalling and blocking undesirable decisions if it was beneficial to the USSR.

After 1991, the Russian Federation retained a significant part of the diplomatic apparatus, personnel traditions, and negotiation methodology inherited from the USSR. This is manifested in rhetoric, behavior, methods of pressure on partners, and the desire to achieve results by dragging out negotiations, creating the illusion of compromise, and at the same time unconditionally insisting on taking into account Russia's position.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's negotiation culture underwent a transformation. The "politburo style" was supplemented with postmodern elements, including the right to question the facts themselves. This "post-truth" tactic allowed for more weight to be given to subjective points of view than to objective data. Supported by large-scale disinformation campaigns in the media, Russian negotiators were given a tool for manipulating "arbitrary interpretations" that displaced factual arguments.

An analysis of the methods and style of Russian negotiations allows us to formulate important lessons for Ukrainian diplomats, in particular, taking into account the specifics of involving the military in the negotiation process.

Methodical training and analytical thinking

​Gromyko was known for his meticulous attention to detail, studying all the materials of the negotiations, analyzing the contradictions and motivations of opponents. His approach was to break down the problem into parts, analyze each separately, and eliminate uncertainty and ambiguity.

Endurance and psychological pressure

​The use of a strategy of long, sometimes monotonous negotiations, deliberately exhausting the opponent. This technique was based on the ability to resist irrelevant emotions and pressure, and at the same time provoke them in the opponent, which made it difficult for the latter to think logically and make decisions. In this way, a psychological advantage is created.

Tony Bishop, a British diplomat, recounts the following story: "In May 1974, at talks at the Foreign Office in London, the British Foreign Secretary, then Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, tried in vain to stop Gromyko, who was expounding the Soviet Union's position: 'Raising his hand like a street policeman,' he reminded Gromyko that he knew perfectly well the content of the latest Pravda editorials and that reciting them would accomplish nothing. But Gromyko continued to speak, without stopping, until Douglas-Hume proposed a break and invited Gromyko (without his delegation) to continue their meeting at the Carlton Club".

Rigidity in position, but paradoxical flexibility in wording

​This combination of the most stringent requirements with the simultaneous use of complex, multi-valued language constructions is a classic manipulation. The point is not to agree to compromises, but to demonstrate readiness for dialogue, which can later be interpreted in different ways. This technique also corresponds to the tactic of separating truth from untruth – it is in diplomacy that these boundaries are deliberately blurred.

Using fear and authority to strengthen a position

The Soviet school acted taking into account the psychology of power: creating an impression of strength, readiness for tough actions, designed to form fear and indecision in opponents. Psychologically, this is the use of authoritarian communication styles, which significantly affect the negotiation process. Here is an example of how Gromyko himself describes his meeting and conversation with the then President of the United States of America on October 18, 1962:

"During the conversation, Kennedy, contrary to the claims of some opinion leaders in the West, never once raised the issue of the presence of Soviet missile weapons in Cuba, I repeat, never once mentioned it. Therefore, I did not have to give a direct answer – whether there are such weapons in Cuba or not. At the same time, I explained to the president that Soviet aid to Cuba was aimed solely at strengthening its defense capabilities and developing the peaceful economy of that country. The training of Cubans by Soviet specialists in the use of weapons intended for defense could in no way be regarded as a threat to anyone. At the end of the conversation, I said: "Mr. President, let me express the hope that the United States now has a clear idea of ​​Soviet policy towards Cuba and of our assessment of US actions towards this country... The conversation with Kennedy on the issue of Cuba was full of, how to put it more precisely, sharp turns, breaks, if I may say so. He was clearly nervous, although he tried not to show it".

Information manipulation and outright lies (disinformation)

​To gain an advantage, methods of creating a double reality were used: the deliberate dissemination of false or distorted facts combined with legal ambiguity in wording. This complicates the opponent's ability to draw unambiguous conclusions and weakens trust in the negotiation process.

Henry Kissinger, in his book "Diplomacy", mentions that Soviet diplomacy formed a specific type of negotiating behavior, which was characterized by a combination of maximum demands, ultimatums, and psychological pressure to achieve strategic goals. The tactic, honed over decades, consisted of controlling the negotiating framework, using negotiations as a tool to legalize already achieved goals, and constantly demanding more than was initially offered.

As a countermeasure, negotiators can use counter-manipulation and attacks on the opponent's stated positions, as well as techniques for limiting the opponent's encroachments through counter-conditioning of unrealistic demands.

Analyzing the behavior of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry and his rhetoric during international meetings, we can see an almost literal reproduction of the principles of "delay tactics," "formal invulnerability," and "rhetorical reversal" of opponents, which were characteristic of the "Soviet school". This indicates the institutional inheritance of diplomatic culture, which is based on the long-standing practice of the Soviet Union.

A characteristic feature is the use of the so-called "linguistic asymmetry effect", when key theses are presented in the form of legally sound but ambiguous formulations. The Russian Foreign Minister, like his Soviet predecessors, systematically evades specific answers, reducing the discussion to minor details. This tactic reduces the sharpness of criticism and makes it difficult for opponents to form a unified position, creating a situation of internal contradictions for them.

The second element of continuity is the tactic of using historical parallels and the "moral mirror". In public statements, S. Lavrov often refers to the precedents of the colonial policy of Western states, trying to relieve Russia of the burden of responsibility for its own actions. This technique harks back to practices of Gromyk in negotiations during the Cold War, when he appealed to the problems of racial discrimination in the United States to divert attention from issues of Soviet human rights violations.

Another characteristic feature is the purposeful creation of information pressure through an excessive number of "counterarguments".

According to international communications researchers, this approach works as a "tactic of exhaustion": a large number of remarks, even if they have no evidentiary value, complicates the discussion for opponents, forcing them to waste time on refutations. This is a typical technique of the "Gromyk school", which the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry inherited and improved in the new conditions.

In the context of international law, the use of the practice of "selective citation" of documents is particularly indicative. S. Lavrov, like his predecessors in Soviet diplomacy, avoids recognizing the full legal picture, focusing only on the advantageous provisions of treaties or resolutions. This practice creates the illusion of legal validity of the position and reinforces it with the appearance of formal legitimacy.

It is safe to say that this style is not an accident, but probably constitutes a holistic system of personnel training for the Russian Foreign Ministry. It is focused not so much on finding a compromise as on maintaining control over the agenda and preventing strategic concessions.

It is important to emphasize that this model of negotiations also has a downside: it gradually reduces trust in Russian diplomacy as a tool for resolving conflicts. Excessive rhetorical manipulation and a lack of readiness for constructive steps create a sense among international partners of predictability and patterned behavior of the Russian foreign ministry. This indicates that the Soviet legacy, adapted by the Russian Foreign Minister, is both a powerful tool of tactical influence and a strategic constraint for Russia itself.

Firstly, this school manifests itself in modern diplomacy as a tool not only of formal rhetoric, but also as a method of crisis management. The legacy of Soviet diplomacy, with its caution and protracted negotiations, is becoming a way to buy time and create the illusion of dialogue. This allows the Russian Foreign Ministry, in particular its head, to use diplomatic discourse as a cover for aggressive policies, without going beyond internationally recognized formats.

Secondly, current practices demonstrate a combination of delaying tactics with the use of international organizations to promote their own narratives. It is obvious that it is the traditions of the "Gromyk school" that underlie the methods by which Moscow tries to block undesirable decisions in the UN, OSCE, or elsewhere, creating "institutional paralysis" and reducing the effectiveness of collective decisions.

Thirdly, it is important to consider that Lavrov's diplomacy is a modernization of the Soviet school: the rhetoric remains conservative, but the content is filled with the tools of information and psychological operations. NATO StratCom COE researchers (2021) note that contemporary Russian negotiation practices cannot be separated from a systemic disinformation campaign. This means that diplomacy has become a multifunctional platform that operates in the realms of law, information, and propaganda.

In S. Lavrov's practice, we also see that Moscow does not count on quickly reaching agreements, but builds long-term positions that allow it to adapt to any changes in the international environment and continue aggressive actions in the international arena under the umbrella of the negotiation process under the slogan: while negotiations are underway, sanctions are not strengthened. As R. Sakwa (2017) writes, "Russian diplomacy functions not to resolve conflicts, but to stabilize its own positions in the changing architecture of global politics".

Along with this, a characteristic feature is the demonstration of "coolness" in public discussions. We can observe the style of a "steadfast diplomat", who supposedly controls any situation. But it is obvious that this is not only a tactical technique, but also a means of influencing the audience, including Western ones. Then the Ukrainian side should work out a program of counter-influence on the international audience and build negotiations not from the task of reaching agreements, but mirroring the behavior of the aggressor to create pressure from the international community on the Russian Federation, demonstrating all the negative moral and practical side of the "Gromyko method".

It is also worth noting that the Soviet school in its modern incarnation has acquired another feature – an orientation towards "overloading the discussion" with technical details. This creates ambiguity and hinders constructive dialogue. This practice undermines the ability of international partners to form a unified position, as it requires excessive resources to check facts and refute false arguments.

Analyzing Russia's implementation of the Soviet school in the 21st century, we can conclude that, on the one hand, it is the preservation of old methods of negotiation, and on the other, the active use of new technologies, in particular social networks and controlled media. This is confirmed by the integration of diplomatic statements into a broad system of Kremlin information campaigns.

Monitoring the foreign policy rhetoric of the Russian Federation allows us to demonstrate the key features of modern Russian diplomacy.

1. The goal is to change the agenda, impose one's own interpretation.

2. The style of negotiations is aggressive, provocative.

3. The main tool is manipulation of facts, false statements, information attacks.

4. Interaction with opponents is emotional outbursts, humiliation of opponents.

5. Information support is global media campaigns and propaganda networks.

Based on the analysis of the characteristics of this school and the negotiating style of modern representatives of Russian diplomacy, in particular S. Lavrov, the following practical recommendations can be identified for increasing the effectiveness of the participation of representatives of the security and defense sector in international negotiations:

• thorough preparation: Ukrainian negotiators must know not only the subject of discussion, but also the history, context, and tactics and strategy of the Russian side, and must understand the psychodynamics and manipulative techniques of the Russians;

• endurance, patience, and clarity of position: not to succumb to psychological provocations, while maintaining flexibility in wording to expand opportunities. Gromyko's approaches can be applied to the Russians, in particular, not to succumb to pressure and continue negotiations for a long time for the sake of the ultimate benefit;

• mastery of logical analysis methods: to correctly distinguish true agreements from multiple interpretations;

• knowledge and application of the methodology and techniques for disrupting opponents' manipulations and forcing them to reveal their true intentions and publicly "lose face", when the only method of negotiation left for the Russian Federation is the use of direct threats;

• comprehensive training of participants from the security and defense sector using the best practices of modern business and special services: the participants in the negotiations must understand the opponents' work models, such as psychological pressure and disinformation methods, in order to promptly respond to any attempts to transfer the negotiations into the plane of Russian dictate under unrealistic conditions;

• recognizing manipulations in the formulation of positions to avoid unfavorable compromises.

At the same time, an analysis of modern negotiations demonstrates that the effectiveness of negotiations with Russia depends on a comprehensive approach: diplomacy must be sustainable, consistently planned, and combined with a willingness to respond to powerful pressure. Ukraine must constantly strengthen its diplomatic potential, develop the tactical skills of negotiators, preparing for long and difficult negotiations in changing conditions. Knowledge of this tradition will help you avoid ill-considered steps and use the most of negotiations to protect national interests.

In conclusion, I would like to note that in an attempt to end the Vietnam War, the first rounds of peace negotiations were initiated by Richard Nixon's predecessor as US President, Lyndon Johnson. Diplomatic meetings to achieve peace lasted, in total, five years.

The negotiations sometimes reached a dead end, then the parties exchanged ultimatums, then they moved to a behind-the-scenes format, then allies of both sides were involved. Kissinger met with North Vietnam officials 68 times in total. In January 1973, peace agreements were finally signed in Paris, despite South Vietnam's rejection of them. The US withdrew troops in 1973, the sides exchanged prisoners of war, and Henry Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The American diplomat accepted the award, but his Vietnamese colleague Lê Đức Thọ refused, because the Vietnam War lasted for more than two years and ended only in 1975 after the fall of Saigon.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi , Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021 – 2024)