Distinguished Commissioner, we understand that Europe — the countries of the European Union — remains Ukraine’s most loyal ally. We do not know for certain what Donald Trump might say or what scenarios he may attempt to pursue. Recently, there were reports suggesting that Budapest could be the venue for a meeting between Putin and Trump, but it later turned out that this would not happen. I wanted to ask you about the current position of the European Union and everything important regarding possible negotiations with the Russian aggressor: is this actually being considered, or is it merely propaganda?Well, perhaps there are several topics which I will try, very briefly, to mention. First of all, of course, we are strongly supporting all the efforts to bring peace to Ukraine as soon as it is possible to achieve. But, of course, it depends on Putin, if he will be convinced by different means to sit down and to negotiate peace.First of all, of course, President Trump is doing a lot, and recent sanctions, which were introduced by the United States administration against Lukoil and Rosneft, are very powerful and painful to Russia. And, well, maybe that can make an impact on Putin's behavior.Second, the European Union — we're looking at how we can support Ukraine's defense capabilities, financially and militarily. And there are a lot of different initiatives which are going to be implemented in a parallel way. One of those initiatives, very important, can be an initiative of the so-called reparation loan, when Russian frozen assets — 150 billion euros — will be used for a special loan, which will be given to Ukraine. And with such an amount of financial resources, Ukraine can build its defense capacity up to such a level that Putin will be convinced, at the end, that he will not achieve anything in Ukraine. And maybe that can be the reason why he will go for peace negotiations.At the moment, we do not see very clear evidence that Putin is ready for peace negotiations, but both American pressure with sanctions and our initiatives to support and to strengthen Ukrainian defense capabilities maybe can bring a change in Putin's position.I would like to ask you about the adjustments to the algorithms for the European Union countries’ response to Russian air provocations. We understand that the Baltic states — particularly Estonia, Denmark, and Poland — have been facing this issue. As far as I know, certain protocols have been updated. What is the current situation, and how can it be improved? And more broadly, is there a shared understanding that the United States is ready to fulfill its obligations under Article 5 of the Euro-Atlantic Treaty?Well, first of all, of course, those Russian provocations with drones have shown several things. And some of them are really allowing us to draw the conclusion that our defense capabilities — to detect drones, to defend ourselves against drones, and to destroy drones — for the time being, are not developed up to the level we need to have. So, in some way, we can say thanks to those provocations. Now we are moving ahead with very rapid and ambitious development of our defense capabilities to defend ourselves against drones.The so-called initiative of Drone Wall — now it's called the Drone Defense Initiative. And here we want to learn a lot from Ukraine, and we want to build those capabilities together with Ukraine, and including Ukraine. We have put these initiatives into a very special and ambitious plan of our actions — the so-called Roadmap of Defense Readiness 2030. That plan was approved by the Council, and among the flagship projects which we need to develop in Europe in the most effective way, there are two very closely related to our capabilities to be ready to defend ourselves against aggression or provocation.One is called the European Drone Defense Initiative, and another one is called Eastern Flank Watch. Both of these flagship projects are very crucial for the defense of the whole of Europe, but especially for the frontier region. And here, really, again and again, I can repeat — we are expecting to learn a lot from Ukraine, and we are grateful to Ukraine that it is ready to help us achieve such capabilities which Ukraine has and we do not have.Now, the second is the question, of course, of how we should react to such provocations when our airspace is violated. First of all, of course, we need to have the capabilities to react. And second, of course, political decisions on how to react — or military decisions on how to react, whether to shoot down or just to track, and so on — depend very much on the member states themselves. Because defense policy in Europe is the sovereign right of the member states, which have collective agreements with NATO on defense plans. And that is where the European Union and the Commission are not playing any important role. What is our role is to help member states develop those capabilities in order for them to be ready to implement whatever decisions they decide to implement. So, that’s one thing.Second, NATO Article 5 is crucial for the defense of the whole European Union, of the European continent. All, you know, members of NATO recently, during the NATO summit, pledged that they are ready to implement Article 5. And in order to implement Article 5, all the member states — NATO member states — need to have, again, their capabilities. That is why member states pledged to spend on defense readiness, to increase defense spending up to 3.5% for real defense, and additionally 1.5% for issues related to defense. So, that’s what we can say about Article 5. It’s a powerful instrument for collective defense. And this power, I hope, will convince Putin not to try to test Article 5.I would like to clarify the issue of the Belarusian meteorological balloons. We understand that this is an attempt to raise tensions and exert pressure. In any case, the Suwałki Corridor remains a relevant concern, as the Russians are constantly trying to intimidate by demonstrating their readiness to carry out military provocations there. We recognize that this corridor is of strategic importance.Well, of course, those provocations — hybrid warfare provocations, as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called them — with meteoballoons are something new, a new step in all those hybrid provocations. Yes, we have been witnessing balloons for quite a period of time; they were always used for smuggling tobacco products from Belarus to European Union member states. That was done through Lithuania, through Poland.But now we see deliberate attacks against our Vilnius Airport, when those balloons are targeted using the wind direction — really to send those balloons closer to our airport — which means that we need to close operations at our airport in Vilnius. And that creates, of course, a lot of problems. Disruption of airports is always very painful for passengers, and so on.That is why we decided to use all our instruments which we can use in order to convince the Lukashenko regime that he is making a big mistake if he allows such provocations against Lithuania. We closed the transit through the Lithuanian-Belarusian border, and, of course, we also appealed to all our partners in the EU and NATO. And we hope that this can bring positive outcomes — that the Belarusian regime will finally be convinced to stop those provocations.I would like to ask you whether there has been any progress in implementing the concept of the “Drone Wall.” We in Ukraine are extremely interested in having certain elements of the European Union's air defense system integrated with ours, so that they can help us better protect Ukrainian civilian facilities. Well, the so-called Initiative Drone Wall really is very important. And immediately after those provocations against Poland, both myself and the Commission President in the European Union address — she exactly called for building of such a “drone wall”. The title of this project as “drone wall” received kind of mixed, you know, understanding among European Union member states. Some countries started to ask how that wall will look like, and things like that. Are we able to protect ourselves 100% against whatever drones will come? So we decided, officially, to change the title a little bit. Now it's called the European Drone Defense Initiative, but it has the same content. Really, we need to develop, first of all, in our frontier region, in the Eastern flank region, capabilities to detect drones. And that is what means that we need to have a radar system, which is able to detect drones, so we can use Ukrainian experience with so-called acoustic sensors. And then, of course, we need to have capabilities to destroy drones, which would be cost-effective. Because when drones entered Polish territory, Poland needed to use very expensive missiles, which, you know, the price of one missile is around 1 million euros. And then, when you are shooting a missile of 1 million euros to a drone, which costs maybe 10,000 euros, definitely this is not cost effective. So we need to learn from Ukraine again how to have capacities to intercept drones, how to use drone interceptors, how to use electronic warfare means to jam drones, or how to use classical zenith artillery or machine guns with mobile groups, which are also able to destroy drones. Of course, the countries which have their air force or military helicopters, they can use also those capabilities. But in any case, really, we need to build those capacities in a very effective way. And that is why we are gearing up with all the preparations.We are continuing our consultations with Ukrainians. Ukrainian experience here is really very, very important — very crucial, both for this Eastern Flank region, but also for all European member states. Because defense against drones is needed not only for Eastern Flank countries, not only for Poland, the Baltic states, or Romania, where those countries have witnessed quite a number of different Russian drones coming into their territory, but it is also needed for countries which are more deeply in the continent, like Germany, Denmark, or other countries — even Spain or Portugal cannot be, how to say, safe from the possibility of drone provocations. Because it is very clear that to launch drones, Russians can not only use Russian territory, like Kaliningrad or some other territories of Russia, but they can also launch drones from shadow fleet ships, which travel all along the European coast. From such a ship, you can launch drones when the ship is quite close to big cities, capital cities, or seaports. That is why we need to develop anti-drone capabilities in all European Union member states.And that is what this flagship project, which we now call the European Drone Defense Initiative, is about. So, we shall move forward. We hope that, quite soon, we shall be able to have clearer agreements among member states on how we are moving forward, with the participation also of Ukraine. And we hope that we shall be able to create those capabilities within a quite ambitious timetable.I would like to ask you about the reparations loan and the so-called “Plan B.” Unfortunately, due to Belgium's position, an extremely effective and sound financing scheme for Ukraine's needs will be implemented in a different way. But we understand that this is not just about money, but about the European Union's consolidation in support of Ukraine. Because war requires funds, and our budget needs macroeconomic stabilization.Well, definitely, those frozen assets in some way belong to Ukraine, because they were frozen when Russia started the war, with very clear plans that that money would be used for Ukrainian restoration and reconstruction after the war, or for the needs which Ukraine has during the war — the criminal war waged by Russia. So that was the reason why those Russian financial resources were frozen.Now, of course, there were some discussions among European lawyers and financial experts: can that money be confiscated totally and given to Ukraine directly? Well, some lawyers and some financial experts were concerned that it could have an impact, in general, on the stability of financial systems in Europe. And that is why, you know, there was a clear decision to develop some special plan — one which allows, not to confiscate from a legal point of view, Russian assets, but to use the assets as a guarantee that Russia will pay reparations for damages inflicted by its illegal and criminal war against Ukraine.And since those reparations, perhaps, Russia will not agree to pay, then those frozen assets will serve as a guarantee for the reparations. So, I mean, those reparations could be a guarantee for the loan to Ukraine, but if reparations are not paid, then that guarantee will go on to the frozen assets. It looks like a very sound project from a legal point of view and from a financial point of view. And that is what was discussed in the Council.Of course, since the majority of those frozen assets are, how to say, kept in one of the Belgian institutions — the Euroclear institution, which is located in Belgium — the Belgian government is a little bit more concerned and worried about what kind of consequences there could be and what a Russian reaction might be, and things like that.That is why, as I understand, member states are going to give some guarantees to Belgium that, in case of any kind of problems, Belgium will have security guarantees or financial security guarantees from the member states.And I hope that, in the end, a decision will really be made before the beginning of next year, in order for Ukraine to be assured that it will have those financial resources both for its defense needs and for its budgetary needs.I would like to ask you about the situation with Beijing and China’s position. We understand that most of the attention is on the U.S.-China negotiations, on what Trump said to Xi Jinping, and on China’s reactions. However, the European Union is no less an important partner when it comes to relations on the continent. So I wanted to ask: what signals is the European Union currently receiving in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine? What is Beijing saying?I don't know anything very new. Definitely, we have always been repeating that China is a crucial player in this war, and Chinese support — economic support to Russia — was and still is a very important factor in why Russia is able to continue the war. China was procuring Russian oil in large amounts and quantities, and that is how Russia was able to finance its war efforts. Now, with the recent American sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, we can see some changes in how Chinese refineries are reacting to that, and it looks like they may diminish the purchase of Russian oil. The same is true with India, and that is the most important effect.Everything else — you know, negotiations, diplomacy, and so on — I am not so sure that that can bring very quick outcomes, and I am not so sure that, because of any kind of diplomatic efforts, we can achieve that China will, you know, change its political position, which has been much closer to Russia than to Ukraine.I would like to ask you about the attempts to create a strange Central European triangle: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Well, we in Ukraine are concerned about how this may affect transit through these countries in particular, and in general, how it may affect the European Union's security policy in particular. Because if these three countries are not coordinated from within the European Union, I believe this is a threatening moment.Well, first of all, of course, what we hear from the Hungarian Prime Minister, who is enjoying the possibility to have two similar partners next to him, is more of a political statement and political language, because some kind of regional cooperation is always possible, but that does not mean that this is some kind of union inside of the Union. We have Nordic cooperation, we have Nordic-Baltic cooperation, and Baltic-Polish cooperation. So a lot of those regional formats — traditional regional formats — really exist and are quite valuable.I'm not so sure that even Slovakia will follow Orbán's position towards Ukraine. Recently, I was informed by Ukrainian partners that they had a very productive meeting with the Slovakian government, government to government. And it was a really rational and pragmatic meeting of, I would say, two partners looking into how to resolve different issues. So, that is one thing.Second, definitely, there are European Union policies which all the member states need to implement — for example, on transit, economic transit, and so on — and violation of those rules will be a violation of European Union laws, which can be painful for the countries that are violating them.And the third point is really, I think, that inside the European Union we shall see more and more understanding of how important Ukrainian integration into the EU is — not for Ukraine  only itself, but also for the whole European Union, especially from a security point of view. For us, for Europe, to have Ukrainian defense capabilities with an 800,000-sized, battle-tested military force is crucial.I think that we shall see how that understanding will really become a new normal, some kind of new basis for our future cooperation. And that can change, in general, the whole attitude of the European Union toward how much we need this integration. The countries which try to be, you know, outside of that trend, I think, will make a big mistake. Ukraine is potentially, in the future, a very big economic power, a very big security power. And definitely, having such a member state inside the European Union is a huge interest for the whole Union.