Oleksandr Kovalenko, Ukrainian military and political observer with the Information Resistance group, reported this information, writing for Oboz.UA.How Russia’s terror capability looks nowSince February 24, 2022, Russia’s main instruments of terror have been various missiles and 'kamikaze' drones. Heavy consumption in 2022–2024 exhausted large parts of Soviet and modern stocks, forcing the Kremlin to pivot to cheaper, mass-produced Shahed-type loitering munitions.Shahed-type dronesFirst used in September 2022; in September 2025 roughly 5,651 Shahed/Gerbera/Parody drones had been expended.Current daily finished production: about 100 units (±15%), or roughly 3,000 per month.Despite steady output, Russia lacks the launch infrastructure to suddenly scale to truly massive raids (for example, 1,000 drones in a single night). New launch sites have been observed, but combined raid sizes rarely exceed a few hundred devices.Missiles — production and stockpiles (approximate) Kh-101 — ~2 finished/day; stock ≈ 400. 3M14 Kalibr — ~1/day; stock >450. 9M723 Iskander-M — ~2/day; stock ≈ 250. 9M728 Iskander-K — ~1/day; stock ≈ 300. Kh-22/32 — production unclear; restoration/modernization from storage; stock >250. Kh-47M2 Kinzhal — ~1 per 3–4 days; stock >100. 3M22 Zircon — ~1 per 4–5 days; stock ≈ 50. KN-23 (North Korean copy) — up to ~50.Why Russia cannot suddenly “stun” UkraineRussia’s current inability to conduct massive missile strikes against Ukraine stems from a combination of combat losses, technical degradation, and limited production capacity.First, since mid-2025, Moscow’s ability to launch large-scale Kh-101 cruise missile attacks has been sharply reduced following the SBU’s Operation Spiderweb on June 1, 2025. This special operation destroyed or seriously damaged dozens of strategic bombers — Tu-95MS and Tu-160 — which serve as the main carriers of Kh-101s, as well as Tu-22M3 aircraft used for launching Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles. As a result, Russia no longer has enough operational aircraft to organize massive sorties of 100 or more missiles, as it did in previous years.The surviving bombers are heavily worn and kept in service through constant maintenance and cannibalization of spare parts. The Russian command tries to preserve these aircraft, spacing out launches as much as possible. For example, after months of stockpiling, Kh-101 strikes were recorded only twice in October 2025 — on the 5th and 30th — even though the available ammunition and crews could technically support an attack every few days. The last major salvo of around 50 Kh-101 missiles took place back on December 25, 2024.Second, Russia’s capability to conduct large Kalibr cruise missile launches has been severely diminished by losses in the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes have destroyed or damaged several key ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet that once carried these missiles. Consequently, throughout 2025, Russia never managed to launch even 30 Kalibrs in a single strike — the maximum observed was between 16 and 18 missiles, underscoring how limited its naval strike potential has become.Third, Russia increasingly relies on its land-based 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic and 9M728 Iskander-K cruise missiles. These systems have become the backbone of short- and medium-range strikes against Ukraine’s frontline and rear areas. However, their use is also constrained by the limited number of available launchers. The most extensive attack recorded recently — on the night of October 10 — involved 14 Iskander-M and 12 Iskander-K missiles, a total of 26. At least 13 launchers were used in that operation, which realistically represents the upper limit of Russia’s current capacity for simultaneous land-based missile launches.Bottom lineRussia still has a substantial arsenal, but production rates, damaged carriers, and limited launch infrastructure prevent a sudden, dramatic escalation beyond patterns already recorded in 2022–24. Combined strikes are unlikely to exceed ~100–120 weapons without significant reinforcements or new guided systems. That said, unconventional or isolated uses (e.g., rare systems like RS-26 Rubezh) could be tried — but these are unlikely to produce anything truly “sensational.”