1. China neither wants Russia to be defeated nor to achieve a decisive victory. It prefers a weakened Russia focused on China. An outcome in which both sides perceive themselves as victorious would be ideal for Beijing. The main red line, however, is Odesa, which must remain Ukrainian. Strengthening Russia in the Black Sea in the near term would shift the balance of power in the region — something that runs counter to China’s interests.2. We must immediately dispel the myth that China is on the verge of taking over the Russian Far East. This is false; there are currently no plans to resettle millions of Chinese in Siberia. At this stage, China’s strategy is focused on resource extraction, which is facilitated by a weak Russian center and the potential reorientation of at least part of Russian big business toward China. This will remain Beijing’s primary approach in the coming years. There is no question of any territorial seizure of Transbaikalia.3. Due to technological decline and a deep demographic crisis, Russia has only two paths of development: either an attempt at technological diversification with the West (conditional on ending the war and at least appearing to play by U.S. rules) or a slide into full technological vassalage to China, with all the associated political consequences. Currently, Putin believes he has enough time to win the war first and then pursue diversification.4. Is China interested in ending the war (within the next six months)? The answer is not as straightforward as many assume. The war against Ukraine is part of a much broader strategic game, in which Russian resources and technological dependence are only one key component.What other parts are there to this game?Security in Europe, which China can guarantee by putting pressure on Russia. In exchange, China wants to understand the rules of trade with the EU and how it will profit from this trade;the rules of trade with the U.S. and how China will profit from this trade;the rules of the game in Africa and how Africa will be divided between the main players (the U.S., China, France, Russia, and Britain);the rules of the game in the Pacific region and how these rules will be arranged;the issue of nuclear security and the prevention of direct military conflicts between the U.S. and China.This is not an exhaustive but important list of issues that will influence the end of our war.5. All this, at least for now, is not a division of the world, as many believe. It is the development of complex rules of the game in a world where two hegemonies are not going to fight (at least in ground operations) for their allies. And this is a world in which neither the U.S. nor China currently offer coherent value concepts.Overall, we are entering a transitional period where, unfortunately, values will not play a significant role, and situational alliances will be more important than long-term agreements.On the good side, China and the U.S. are doomed to reach an agreement. And so the issue of Ukraine will become part of the agreements on Europe.I will simply repeat what I have been emphasizing for many months: without normalizing relations with China, Ukraine will not be the one shaping the game — it will, in many ways, have the game played for it.SourceAbout the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog authors.