During the past week multiple theories circulated about what exactly was used against Ukraine. Video of a munition that fell in a field allows us to make a preliminary assessment, military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko writes in his article for Oboz.ua.At first the guesses ranged from the Grom-1 rocket-bomb complex to a D-30SN UMPB unit, or a modified OFAB-250 variant. "I examined the weapon’s characteristics several times and noted similarities with the Grom-1 and D-30SN families — but the reality turned out to be worse. It was actually a standard free-fall OFAB-500 aerial bomb fitted with a universal planning and correction module (UMPK) and a rocket motor very similar to the Chinese Swiwin SW800Pro," Kovalenko said.A weapon upgraded for terrorThis is not entirely surprising: more than a year ago I reported that Russia was developing rocket boosters for glide bombs (KABs). They have implemented that idea. And while there was time to prepare for this threat, we did not. Why am I so sure? Because a KAB flying 150 km or more surprised many — and the surprise was deadly. Here’s why.Russia produces roughly 3,500–4,000 free-fall aerial bombs every month (OFAB-250/500/1500/3000 and their variants such as RBK, ODAB, BETAB, etc.). Not all of them are currently used in a UMPK + rocket-motor configuration, but we can already verify two bomb types being employed this way: the OFAB-250 and OFAB-500.Even that production volume of OFAB-250/500 is enough to create serious problems in Ukraine’s near and mid rear areas — not only to expand terror but also to force air-defense systems to expend ammunition.The rocket motor (Swiwin SW800Pro) increases the KAB’s range, but it also makes these weapons vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles from short- and medium-range SAM systems. So on paper, Russia extended the reach of its KABs while making them more susceptible to interceptor missiles. Yet producing an OFAB, adding a UMPK and buying a Swiwin SW800Pro (about $40,000) is cheaper and faster than acquiring, producing and delivering AIM-9 or AIM-120 interceptors to Ukraine.That means even if a KAB does not hit its target, it still forces air-defense systems to spend interceptors — just like decoy drones or cheap loitering munitions do.Range depends on more than the boosterA KAB’s 150 km range depends not only on the rocket booster but also on release altitude. So far, there have been no confirmed drops from the Su-34’s maximum practical altitude of 15 km; observed drops have been from 9–12 km. If released from the maximum height, planning range could exceed 150 km.Therefore, the threat affects not only border regions and frontline cities but also near- and mid-rear areas. Regions at risk include Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — and also Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Odesa.How to respondClassic air-defense systems — short- and medium-range SAMs — can be effective against rocket-boosted KABs, but doing so will deplete our interceptors while Russia can produce these modified bombs faster and cheaper.Promoted interceptor drones sound promising, but their effectiveness against targets travelling at 550 km/h at 9–12 km altitude remains questionable.Electronic warfare (EW) has shown good results against KABs, yet expanded ranges and release altitudes mean strike zones and approaches have multiplied; we cannot fully cover them with EW today. Again: we knew of the threat and did not sufficiently prepare.The most effective method, in my view, is not passive defense but attack — not wasting interceptors on cheap munitions but striking their carriers: the comparatively expensive and scarce front-line bombers like the Su-34.The emergence of long-range KABs only amplifies the strategic importance of degrading Russian tactical front-line aviation — in the air and on the ground. Operations such as Spider Web demonstrated how targeting these assets reduces missile terror against Ukraine’s rear; the same logic applies to KABs and further justifies actions against Su-34s.