1. Putin doesn’t care how much territory he captures, because that’s not what he’s fighting for. This is not a war for land. From the very start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Putin stated that occupying Ukraine was not part of his plans. And that was true — both in 2022 and now.Russia is fighting for a global redistribution of spheres of influence, in which, according to Putin, Western countries should voluntarily give up part of their domain under Russia’s control. It was precisely to them that his ultimatum at the end of 2021 was addressed.In this plan, Ukraine is assigned only a symbolic role as a showpiece victim. Its fall in a mythical three days would serve as a key argument to strengthen Russia’s claims.That is why Ukrainian territory is of secondary importance to Putin. He didn’t start this war for the land. Putin is not fighting Ukraine over square meters, but the global West over a “new security architecture.” This is also why he negotiates with the U.S. president, as the leader of the united West, rather than with the president of Ukraine.And this, by the way, is one of the main reasons he avoids negotiations with Zelenskyy. Putin is not fighting Ukraine. Even if he wanted to, Zelenskyy cannot sign anything on behalf of the U.S. or European countries, so, in the Russian dictator’s view, there is nothing to discuss with him.2. The course of the war has shown that, politically, Putin has lost everything. The longer the war continues, the more evident this defeat becomes.War is always a continuation of politics. Politically, the war against Ukraine would have made sense if it had produced a swift victory. Then it would have been about a rapid change of political power in Ukraine to a more Russia‑friendly government — say, someone like Medvedchuk. After that, negotiations with the Europeans would have begun. In that scenario, Putin would have presented himself as the victor who had just seized the largest country in the heart of Europe.Right now, Putin is negotiating from a position where he hasn’t been able to seize parts of just two Ukrainian regions in over three and a half years. The greatest shock to the world is not the strength of the Russian army, but its brutality and its ability to kill hundreds of thousands of people for no reason. This is to be expected from insane fanatics, but not from neighbors, from whom people were still buying gasoline yesterday.So politically, as a result of the war, Putin has lost almost everything. Russia’s political position in the world is now far worse than it was in 2022. The only question is — when will they stop? No one understands why they are killing themselves and others. This is exactly what the West has made the focus of negotiations: Russia must stop killing, and only then can the “root causes of the conflict” be addressed.3. The key question is —  what can you even negotiate with Putin? The Americans allow themselves to discuss the fate of Ukrainian territories, but they don’t even entertain the idea of a “new security architecture.” Putin’s goals are political, meaning they can only be achieved through political negotiations. Capturing Kramatorsk or even the fall of Kyiv (now an unattainable scenario) would not bring the Kremlin any closer to its objectives.So for Putin, negotiations are more important than for Trump or the Europeans. But for them to yield any results, Putin would need to abandon his unreasonable demands toward the collective West.If he is not ready to make such concessions, then the only topic left for negotiation might be a simple swap of Ukrainian territories.4. Limits of Ukraine’s territorial compromise. It’s worth noting that currently (at least at the level of unofficial talks) Ukraine’s territorial compromise is limited to freezing the front line and giving up the idea of reclaiming occupied territories by force. Rumor has it that Putin has agreed to this regarding some of Ukraine’s southern regions.It seems Trump believes the war can be ended by negotiating territories with Putin. But since Putin isn’t fighting for territory, the prospects of such a plan already look doubtful.SourceAbout the author. Mykola Kniazhytskyi, journalist, Ukrainian MPThe editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog or column authors.