ContentsCan Russia produce as many drones as it desires?How imports will affect Russia's drone capabilitiesWhat is the vulnerability of Russian management of drone operationsHow Ukraine should act to deter Russian drone attacksThe problem is not only the number of UAVs that Russia produces and will use to destroy Ukraine. The massive waves of Russian drone attacks, in their organizational, human, and industrial content, are already highly organized military operations. In particular, Russia is very quickly drawing conclusions from this war and using its drone potential, gradually formalizing it into military structures—analogous to batteries, squadrons, fleets, and armies. Because of this, Russian drone raids and the maintenance of a 'dead zone' at the front cannot be simply compared with traditional battles.At the same time, as Russian air operations become more complex in their degree of organization, new vulnerabilities for the Russians also appear. So, there is no simple answer to the question of whether Russia has reached its maximum in conducting drone attacks and how their consequences for Ukraine can be minimized. This is a complex of problems. In particular, we must take into account the pace and dynamics of production, Russia's dependence on imports, and the vulnerability of the Russian drone operations themselves.Can Russia produce as many drones as it desires?According to available data, Russian production of aerial drones has two main components.On the one hand, there is the production of long-range Geran and Gerbera class drones. More than half of them are strike drones, meaning they carry a significant explosive charge, while others are decoys, reconnaissance, and logistical (airborne repeaters). These drones are assembled at specialized sites from standardized sets of elements. Production is established at integrated production complexes, such as Yelabuga in Russian Tatarstan. According to current estimates, several hundred can be produced per day. This level allows Russia to form daily strike packages of Geran and Gerbera with regular peak figures of several hundred. The record to date is over 800 large drones in a day, of which about 750 were shot down by Ukrainian air defense. Russia, thus, does not abandon its hopes of breaking Ukrainian air defense with the most large-scale attacks possible, which will only increase. Obviously, the calculation is that the first waves of cheaper drones can oversaturate the air defense, the next waves will destroy the identified 'centers of gravity' of air defense, and then the strikes will be aimed at the production of defense means in Ukraine and the logistics of supplies from abroad.How many drones does Russia need for such a goal? It is obvious that this number is several times higher than the capabilities demonstrated by the Russians. Of course, this figure will also depend on how effectively a decentralized Ukrainian air defense is built, the availability of intelligence information in Russia, and the pace of production and supply of anti-aircraft systems for the defense forces of Ukraine. Today, Russia does not have time for accumulation, as Russian military supply logistics are under pressure from Ukraine's long-range strikes and international sanctions. Therefore, the Russians will likely try to scale up the production of Geran and Gerbera, possibly with the help of the DPRK and China. This will involve creating new production facilities in Yelabuga or launching a similar complex in another location.The second component of Russian drone production is an extensive network of decentralized manufacturers of tactical drones. This network supplies the front with FPV drones of various types, loitering munitions, reconnaissance, and logistical drones that form a 'kill zone' on the line of contact.The production of tactical drones in Russia is less dependent on complex technologies and is largely based on available commercial components. At the same time, there are different estimates of the production rates of such tactical drones. Russian officials talk about many thousands per day. Conservative estimates point rather to hundreds. Realistic forecasts suggest that it is at least hundreds of tactical drones daily, up to a thousand. Russia will undoubtedly try to increase their production as much as industrial capacity and access to world markets allow.Here we come to the, so to speak, external factor.How imports will affect Russia's drone capabilitiesAn important limitation for the production of all types of Russian drones, besides available money, human resources, and industrial capabilities, remains the import of some key components. Geran and Gerbera require imported engines or components for them (in the case of a massive switch to jet drones, import dependence will only increase), inertial navigation modules, navigation signal receivers, radio modules, and batteries. 'Gray' imports and simplified technological solutions, which are difficult to restrict with sanctions, allow Russia to maintain high production rates, but at the same time make it dependent on the bottlenecks of import logistics.Has Russia reached its peak in production? If it cannot launch new production complexes similar to Yelabuga, expand the ecosystem of tactical drone production several times over, and increase the import of key components, then the maximum has already been reached.But there is no doubt that, based on the goals of the war, Russia will make efforts to increase the production of both "strategic" long-range drones and tactical frontline drones. Practically, it does not have the resources for such a significant increase, but the probability of a tangible increase—by tens of percent in the near future—exists.Indicators worth monitoring to assess the growth of drone production in Russia include the expansion of production sites (particularly in Yelabuga), atypical trade supplies from China and other partners, an increase in orders from civilian Russian manufacturers, and how personnel will be recruited.What is the vulnerability of Russian drone operations managementRussia's drone strikes are, of course, coordinated with other military and hybrid measures. They are also prepared and have their own system of planning and command, which is obviously centralized.Planning involves a complex set of actions: selecting targets and routes for groups of drones, taking into account weather, the position of air defense systems, and intelligence data. Then the drones are programmed for certain routes, which can be changed for other waves depending on telemetry and operational data. In a broader sense, which will become even more noticeable with the introduction of artificial intelligence elements, the individual behavior of a large number of unmanned strike assets will be determined, possibly without constant human involvement in target selection.Such tasks require control centers, in fact, commands and staffs, communication, logistics, and engineering support. It is unlikely that Russia will achieve such a high level of combat management automation that "strategic strikes" with long-range drones will occur completely without military planners, engineers, operators, and their commanders. This means that it is unknown what will be a bigger problem for the Russians – the number of drones or the operations management systems. These systems will be no less vulnerable than the logistics of production.In particular, such sore spots of Russian long-range strike management are the central points (staffs and commands), communication and telemetry repeaters. For example, these are airborne repeaters, which are often so-called MALE drones - Medium Altitude Long Endurance drones. Finally, the logistics of launch sites, where final outfitting before launch often takes place, become particularly vulnerable—objects similar to airfields. For obvious reasons, they are easier to detect than other elements of the 'strategic drone forces.'At the front, the Russians, as far as is known, combine centralized support for operations with decentralization: small drone crews and companies work alongside infantry or as part of battalion-regimental mobile groups, performing reconnaissance, fire correction, and strikes on the logistics of the defense forces of Ukraine. For example, the Russian Rubicon shows such centralized management of frontline drone operations—initially a resource hub for procurement, tactics testing, and operator training, and now a unit with the combat functions of a strike unit.Such a model of using tactical drones increases efficiency by an order of magnitude. But the centralization of resource and process management creates a bottleneck: a strike on it will disrupt all planned operations, as the chaotic use of tactical drones will not be effective even with thousands of drones per day.Therefore, even if drone production in Russia is working and scaling, hitting the system for managing the use of these drones—both long-range and tactical—will significantly limit their combat effect. Do we have the necessary information about the structure and infrastructure of Russian drone operations? This is already the competence of the intelligence services. But it is certain that they are well aware of these Russian vulnerabilities, so hopefully, Russian drone operation control centers are already waiting for Ukrainian strikes.How Ukraine should act to deter Russian drone attacksIt is unlikely that Russia can drastically increase the production and use of drones to a level that would allow them to destroy Ukraine's air defense system and destabilize the defense line at the front. An increase in waves of drone strikes is possible, but a "tsunami" is impossible. This would require at least a multiple scaling of production and the creation of logistics for the use of such a number of drones. Russia does not have the resources for this.However, it is obvious that we must be ready for a tangible increase in UAV production by the Russians. Therefore, even before the waves and swarms of Russian drones make combat contact with the defense forces of Ukraine, they must be deterred. And this deterrence must be on all three key fronts.First – in the production of Russian drones: both the centralized production of long-range drones and the decentralized production of tactical ones. In both cases, the production chains are vulnerable.Second, in limiting critical imports. Of course, the supply networks to Russia for imported engines, inertial and satellite navigation modules, communication radio modules, and high-precision sensors for creating long-range drones are extensive and hidden. However, even partial exposure can create a significant effect. The production of tactical drones does not have obvious critical import elements; what is critical is access to the market for components for tactical drones. Closing these markets with sanctions and administrative procedures does not create a significant effect for the economies of the supplier countries, but it can significantly affect the production of drones for the front in Russia.Finally, third, in the destruction of drone management structures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As already noted, all the commands and staffs for managing drone operations in Russia have not yet been finally formed. However, they already exist de facto, and their vulnerable elements are apparent: planning and control centers, communication systems, supply logistics, and launch sites. Therefore, we must make every effort to reduce the Russian drone potential even before its combat use.The material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that has united Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and is aimed at strengthening information support and analytical provision in the field of national security, defense, and geopolitics.