Indonesia is nearly 10,000 km away from Ukraine – a flight across continents, cultures, and entire histories. Only about 8,000 of the more than 240 million Indonesians are Ukrainian. If anyone dares to bring up Ukraine, they’re expected to also bring up Palestine. And while Indonesia officially values freedom of speech, the reality is… selective. Criticising the authorities? Risky. Talking about Russia? Safely "neutral". Talking about Ukraine? Suddenly "political".

In this environment, where the war is referred to as the "conflict in Ukraine" and any mention of Russia is politely avoided, understanding the local perspective on Ukraine-Russia relations is tricky. It’s a space where colonial history, anti-Western sentiment, strongman politics and Russian narratives blend into a unique – and often misunderstood – picture.

To untangle it, we spoke with Radityo Dharmaputra, lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Airlangga University in Surabaya, head of the Centre for European and Eurasian Studies, and one of the few Indonesian academics focusing on Ukraine, Russian foreign policy, and Moscow’s disinformation campaigns in Indonesia. 

Radityo has spent the past three years studying how narratives about the war travel, mutate and settle in the Indonesian public consciousness.

How would you characterise the official Indonesian stance on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and how it has changed since 2022? 

I think it hasn't changed that much from my point of view.

From the very beginning, the official stance was always trying to keep a distance, trying to be neutral, trying not to offend Russia, but at the same time saying that the invasion is a violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity. 

Even though they never say that it is being done by Russia. It's very similar to Western countries; when talking about Palestine and Gaza, they never say Israel.

In the Indonesian case, they never say that it was Russia who invaded Ukraine. They don't want to use the word "invasion", which is very interesting from my point of view. 

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What word do they use? 

I think they usually just use "the war in Ukraine". No mention of Russia.

But who started this war? 

It's very silly, I know. But I think it's been very clear from the beginning that they don't want to offend Russia. In the last government of Joko Widodo [president of Indonesia from 2014 to 2024], he personally went to Ukraine and to Russia. He was trying to mediate between Zelenskyy and Putin, but it was basically because of Indonesia's interest in the food crisis. After that, just one visit, and no discussion came from the government. 

But back then, the minister of defence and now President Prabowo, two years ago, in Singapore, offered this so-called "peace proposal". Which again was very problematic, especially the referendum part. It is too much even for Indonesia, because Indonesia also has problems with a lot of provinces. 

There is a willingness, I think, especially from President Prabowo, to get involved. He has repeatedly mentioned Ukraine and Russia at BRICS. Also, when he went somewhere in Egypt, he mentioned Ukraine and Russia. Again, it's always "peace is important", "negotiation is important". And I think from the government's point of view, they really want Ukraine to negotiate. 

I can understand that from the Ukrainian point of view, it's unacceptable. But from the Indonesian point of view, especially from the government's, I think they have this tradition. Even with their neighbours – with Malaysia, for example. I wrote an article about this with my colleague, because we and Malaysia are brothers. And brothers fight, so you have to talk with your brother. And their perception of Ukraine and Russia is that they are like Malaysia and Indonesia, because Russia has used this narrative here. And I think this actually shows that many people in the Indonesian government do not really understand the root cause of the war. 

I asked several high-ranking ministry officials a couple of months ago, and they still said, "Yeah, but we need them to have a discussion." For example, Indonesia attended the peace summit in Switzerland, and they didn't want to sign the documents because they said that Russia was not invited. They wanted Russia to be there and then to talk to Ukraine.

Again, it's very problematic, the way they see it. But I think you just have to understand that that's how they see it because they receive a lot of information, a lot of messages coming from Russia that "this is our internal Slavic brotherhood thing". And they understand that, because it's very similar to Indonesia and Malaysia.

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Basically, it's a geopolitical factor within Indonesia that influences all the decisions of the Indonesian authorities?

That as well, because the invasion and then the war have always been portrayed by Indonesian media, foreign media in Indonesia, and also by Russian media, as if this is Russia against the West, Russia against NATO.

And for the Indonesian side, we don't want outsiders to come to Indonesia. We don't like it when people, especially from the West, come to Indonesia and say, "You have to do this" [this is probably connected with the fact that the Dutch colonised Indonesia – ed.]. And from what they understand, I think it's because it's framed as the West and NATO against Russia. Ukraine is just like a pawn in the middle. That's why they said, "Yeah, this is just the West wanting you to fight. You should talk to Russia."

I think that’s because of the long history between Indonesia and Russia in the Soviet Union, but in the Indonesian mindset, it is always Soviet Russia. Not other countries, not even Ukraine. It's always Russia and all those connections with Russia: "Russia has great power", "Russia is Indonesia’s friend from the Soviet period". It shapes their point of view that we still want to be friends with Russia. 

If you look at writings from former diplomats, from senior officials, especially at the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, they always pitied Ukraine, because Ukraine is in a very difficult position between two powers. 

From their point of view, it's the same with Indonesia, China and the US, and we are trying to be in the middle. I’ve argued with them before directly that "No, it's very different because China is not there, and Indonesia is not its neighbour." It's not aggressive, at least in mainland Indonesia. So you cannot really compare them, but that's how they think.

And from your point of view, what was the starting point of this narrative that it's Russia against the West, Russia against the US, and Ukraine is just a pawn? 

I think it started even before 2022. You can see such statements in 2014 as well, when the Crimean annexation happened.

I think the government said very clearly then that we do not accept that annexation, it's illegal, and so on. That was a bit stronger than the current response. But at the same time, you can see that they said: "Yeah, but then you have to talk. This is still the western influence in Ukraine, especially with Maidan."

I think there was the same statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though they condemned the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and they mentioned Russia at the time, but then they said, "Yeah, but this revolution in Maidan, it's Western, it's not the people, it’s Western influence." So all those narratives were there – propagated by Russia, of course.

At the same time, Indonesia never trusts the US. The other European countries are probably a bit different, but the US, especially after 2001, 2003, after the war on terror, the time under Bush, has been trying to meddle in other countries’ affairs, and Indonesia doesn't like that.

They can just put their experience and then see: "Oh, maybe the US is also present in Ukraine and trying to influence Ukrainian society." So, even before 2013-2014, it was already there. 

And the problem before that is that no one really looked at Ukraine. I don't think even Ukraine looked at Indonesia that much. That's also a problem, because Ukraine is not really present in Indonesia. I think the embassy just started [to be more present] a couple of years ago. So it's very understandable. 

But Russia has been here for a long time. You can see that they have very good cooperation here already. I'm not saying they are influencing the Indonesian government, because that would mean the Indonesian government really listens to them, but the way they actually talk about Ukraine, and not only Ukraine – Georgia, all the other countries – is because Russia framed it like that. Russia framed it to us as "This is Western influence – 2004, 2008 in Georgia." 

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Can you tell that Russia has somehow shaped this narrative with propaganda inside? 

Inside society, I think, it's clear, especially since 2015-2016, right after the Crimean annexation. But it was not about Ukraine back then – it was about Syria. Russia’s intervention in Syria back then, helping Assad, wasn't received well within the Indonesian Muslim community. They didn't want Russia to come, especially with the experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya. So they wanted Russia out of Syria, basically. A lot of Muslim communities, especially the more conservative groups, demonstrated in front of the Russian Embassy in 2015-2016.

And I think, starting that year, Russia started to look at Indonesia more, because they know that this majority-Muslim country (not only Indonesia, but Indonesia was one of the biggest) is important for their own narrative, because otherwise they will get criticised by all these Muslim majorities. So they started using Russia Beyond the Headlines [an English-language tool of Russian propaganda now known as Russia Beyond – ed.] because they didn't have RT here back then. Russia Beyond used to be just this cultural introduction to Russia. I think in 2016 they started to switch the narrative using this Muslim dimension.

So they're trying to influence Indonesian views using public diplomacy, using their media. Or at least to shape the view of Indonesian society into one specific narrative, especially the Muslim part. The anti-Western view, or view that’s more critical of the West, is already there. They don't need to do anything. It's already here. They just need to pick the same narrative. As long as they criticise the West, people will jump in and will follow them. 

There is another effort, I think, not by the Russians, but by Indonesian politicians, trying to say that Putin is a very strong leader. And Putin is very popular in Indonesia. I think it started in 2014 – that was the election between Joko Widodo, the former president, and the current president, Prabowo.

And the current president was portraying himself at that time as this strong man riding horses, but not naked, not like Putin.

So he was inspired by Putin?

Yes. 

The current minister of culture, Fadli Zon, has a degree in Russian literature from the University of Indonesia. He said in 2019, "We need a president like Putin here, and Prabowo is the one. A strong leader, nationalistic and so on." So I think that's how people see it. He is not as popular as other Muslim leaders from Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, but still, compared to the others, compared to Biden, Obama... But don't compare him to Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy's down there [he points downwards – ed.]. 

Unfortunately, he’s down there because of many things, but Putin is always considered a strong leader – not only because of his anti-Western rhetoric, but it's just the way he’s portrayed himself, sometimes with fake pictures, but still, it's very popular among Indonesians.

The current President Prabowo has now changed his image a bit into more of a nice grandpa, and it works. But before, it was a militaristic general, very strong, anti-western, nationalistic.

In the beginning, especially in 2022, I think Russia was quite surprised that even before the intensive or extensive propaganda that they did, there was already a very strong narrative sympathetic towards Russia – because of the Muslim dimension since 2016, because of the strong man Putin, because of the anti-Western mentality, because of the history and tradition, post-colonial history and so on. Also, the history of the Soviet Union helping Indonesia in the 1960s. 

But Indonesia is a very anti-colonial country, and Russia tries to colonise other countries. How can these things coexist?

I think this is very crucial: not many people know that Russia and the Soviet Union at that time colonised other countries or had a very imperial strategy, or that the imperial dimensions of Russia were there, even during the Soviet Union.

I wrote an article back then about Estonia, Georgia, and why all these countries don't want anything to do with Russia, because they have their history: in the 1920s, in the 40s, how Russian soldiers entered Estonia and then basically colonised the country. I don't think Indonesians know about this. They think it was just one big country – the Soviet Union, which is Russia, and then suddenly it broke up into 15 different pieces.

They don't understand that inside the Soviet Union, even back then, there were already efforts from Ukraine, from Estonia, from Kazakhstan and all the countries basically trying to fight the Russian empire, the Russian imperial narrative, Russification of the language, and so on. They don't know about this. 

It's very difficult to talk to people and say that Russia is imperial and a coloniser now, because they say, "No, they helped us against the real coloniser, which is the West." 

Russia is always perceived by Indonesia as the anti-imperial country from back then – the Soviet Union. Indonesia doesn’t understand that even now, inside Russia, there are a lot of smaller nations that were basically colonised by Russia. 

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Indonesia recently became part of BRICS. How has this influenced Indonesian engagement with Russia and the Global South? Do you think that after joining BRICS, Indonesia will become closer to Russia?

My criticism towards the current government is that they don't have a vision. At least, we cannot see that there is any vision from the government. And the president really just likes to be among great leaders, especially strong men.

And there’s no better way to offer him that than BRICS. Because in BRICS, you have Lula, Putin, Xi Jinping, and Modi. Sometimes Türkiye is also invited as a candidate or as a partner. So you have all the strong men of the world there. Based on that alone, I don't think BRICS is a very strategic move by the government; it's just a very pragmatic decision.

You can see that even the government is still trying to say, "No, no, we don't really consider BRICS as us going closer to China and Russia." They still try to engage with Trump. They give Trump whatever he wants for the trade deal. Trump wants everything, and then they say, "Yeah, yeah, we'll give you that." So they’re basically trying to sit on two chairs. 

But the problem is that from the other way around, China and Russia will use Indonesia. This is a big country, Muslim majority, one of the leaders of the Global South. The leader of Southeast Asia, if we can still claim that. 

So for China and Russia – especially for Russia at this moment, with all the isolation, all the sanctions – it is very important. And I don't think the Indonesian government realises that. For them, it's just "We were invited – we just go." Prabowo wants to be there, to see Putin. 

Look at all the decisions, all the MoUs [Memorandums of Understanding – ed.] that were signed during his visit to Russia. It's just promise after promise after promise. No real investment from Russia. I don't think Russia can invest in anything anyway.

So from the Indonesian point of view, it's not really beneficial. It could be, specifically with Trump acting like Trump did. BRICS could be beneficial for Indonesia, but they don't really use it at the moment. They're just there for the ceremony. And that's the problem.

If they want to balance the US, BRICS might be a good platform, but at the same time, we don't really use it. We're being used, especially by Russia. And that's the problem. 

I don't care if you want to go to BRICS to gain something. And I think all the countries want to gain something from this. And we already have investment from China. We already have cooperation with Russia, with India, with South Africa, and with Brazil. Why do we have to go to BRICS? That's a big question. Unfortunately, it seems like he [President Prabowo – ed.] is moving closer to China and Russia. But I think it's just because China and Russia know how to use Indonesia and how to invite it.

I said the same to Western partners: he [President Prabowo – ed.] just wants a stage. Put him on a stage, give him a chance to give a keynote speech – he would go. And that's what happened when he went to Russia instead of going to the G7 in Canada – because Russia let him have a speech. It's not a big forum. It's just meeting Putin and then going to the St Petersburg Economic Forum, which is not really a big forum. It's not for Indonesia's investment. They actually asked him to invest in Russia, because Russia needs the money. But he went there anyway, because he said they invited him first, and, of course, he would get the stage. He would be there with the most senior members. 

So I think this is not about getting closer to BRICS. You have to know that Prabowo's foreign policy is driven first of all by ambition, personal view, trying to be on the world stage. 

I think Macron did a very good job inviting him to Bastille Day. You know what he said when Macron invited him? He said, "The last time I was in Paris for Bastille Day, I was in the back row. Now I can be there in the front row" – and he went there.

So he's kind of narcissistic. 

In a way, he is. Just give him what he wants. He wants a stage. He wants a speech. Give him that.

And if Ukraine invited him to a major event and gave him a keynote speech, do you think he would come? 

If Ukraine invited him, the problem is that Russia would do something to persuade him not to come. So Ukraine needs someone else – the European partners. So, let’s say, organise a conference or a meeting. A conference would be good. France, Germany and the UK – all the "big three" of Europe at the moment. Zelenskyy is there, and you invite people like Prabowo, like Modi, to give a speech. He might come – unless Russia does something at the same time: organises a conference with all the other leaders.

But Zelenskyy alone cannot… I think the capital that Zelenskyy has here in Indonesia is probably quite low. I think in 2022-2023, when Ukraine started to fight back with the counteroffensive, the help from the US, Europe, the UK – they gave a lot of money to Ukraine to have a counteroffensive. And it worked. At least the way I see it, it worked. It changed the discussion a little bit.

And then 7 October happened [the escalation between Gaza and Israel – ed.], and the first statement from Zelenskyy that Indonesia heard is "We will support Israel." Unfortunately, thatʼs what people remembered. The day after that, many people in our group – I think most of the people in our group – said, "I’m done supporting Ukraine. How can I support them when the president said that?" 

And he backtracked later, and when he visited Singapore last year, he had a very different speech, criticising Israel and so on. But no one remembered that second part. 

And when he said that, I was like, "Oh God. What can we do now?" Because it’s very difficult. That's why a lot of different narratives about Ukraine started to go down since 2023. It was very difficult to say anything about Ukraine.

I wrote an article about how we should also support Ukraine, as we support Palestine. Ooooh… You can imagine a lot of people attacking me on social media because of that.

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How can we change this narrative? Are there any opportunities for Ukraine to get back on track?

I think there are two ways. One way is to go big into soсial media, showing that Ukraine also supports us. And I think the MC [Muslim communities – ed.] have done that to some extent. But it is very difficult because Russia clearly looks at what Zelenskyy says and uses it for its own purposes. 

The other way is to go to the local communities. I think that's what we did before. The team that went to Ukraine in December 2023, when I went – I think there were three or four Muslim leaders from Indonesia.

We met with all the Muftis – the Crimean Mufti, the Ukrainian Mufti, and the former Mufti who is now a soldier in the Ukrainian army. We met with the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars. And we showed them that Ukraine actually has a lot of Muslim communities, and the Muslim communities in Ukraine have a very good connection with the Ukrainian government, and they also criticise Zelenskyy. 

Then the Ukrainian Muslim leaders came to Indonesia last year, in 2024. They met with local communities. But that didn’t translate to social media. So if you look only at social media, it’s still strongly critical of Zelenskyy, because Russian propaganda is very strong on social media.

But if you look at the communities, the Islamic council, the majority of people now know that "Oh, Ukraine is not like that. Even if Zelenskyy said that, it's Zelenskyy's position." 

I encouraged the Ukrainian team last year to bring the Mufti – I think it was Murat Suleimanov from Ukraine – not only to Jakarta, but to the smaller Islamic communities. Of course, they have limited funds and so on, but probably that's a better use because you're just going to a very traditional Islamic community, you talk to them.

Again, as I’ve mentioned a couple of times to many Ukrainian friends, you cannot counter it in the short term because Russia has more resources.

They're not like the Chinese. The Chinese in Indonesia are trying to be very subtle. Russia is not subtle. You know this better than we do – Russia is not subtle. And it's very difficult for Ukraine to counter that because of the limited resources. 

But one thing that I think they don't have is this connection with the Islamic community that you can actually use – the Crimean Tatar dimension. I think, even though they still don't say anything about Russia, I think they want peace in Ukraine, and then they put in their statement that they want freedom for the Crimean Tatars to go back to Crimea. Actually, you know, this is a very strong statement, because if they want them to go back to Crimea, that means Crimea would return to Ukraine and become free, not like now.

Yeah, Crimea has been occupied for 11 years. Most of the political prisoners there are Crimean Tatars who can't speak their language or do whatever they want to do there. They are very restricted. So I guess maybe it's a connecting point. 

The connection is there. It just needs to be developed further. I think maybe that's one way to go forward instead of fighting on social media, which is very difficult anyway. 

But if you depend on that, it means that the other Muslim part is being dominated by Russia, and they can invite Islamic leaders from Indonesia to Russia very easily. They also bring people from Chechnya. Indonesians love Ramzan Kadyrov for some reason.

Seriously? 

Yeah. 

He's also a strong man, so… 

Yeah, that's the problem. I think that's a very deliberate move by Russia: "Oh, they love strong men, let’s put Kadyrov there." 

It's very difficult, but you could bring Crimean Tatar leaders to Indonesia to talk to the Muslim communities, and they would see that Crimean Muslims have been discriminated against by Russia and they’re struggling a lot. Maybe their sympathy would not stretch to Ukraine as a whole yet, but at least there would be some connection. 

I know that you have an idea to start the first Ukrainian Studies programme in Indonesia. Can you elaborate on this?

Yeah, in 2022, when we inaugurated the Centre for European and Eurasian Studies, we invited the Ukrainian ambassador here in Indonesia, and also two professors from Estonia. We tried to discuss this at that time, just a couple of months after the full-scale invasion started. We tried to focus on Ukraine because I saw that there are not many people who know about Ukraine in Indonesia. 

And then we developed that idea in 2023. We organised a conference on the Global South non-Western Response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the last two years, 2023-2024, we organised cooperation with Ukrainian universities, with the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. We organised five joint courses on Ukrainian politics and society, the religious dimension in Ukraine and Indonesia – basically cooperation between Ukraine and Indonesia. And based on that, we’re trying to organise a course. 

Trying to start a Ukrainian Studies programme is very difficult at the moment, because probably there will be no immediate interest. Last year we organised a Ukrainian Politics and Society course with the help of people from the Ukrainian Catholic University and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and then we invited several professors from Ukraine online.

Last year it was still under War and Peace Studies in our course. But next year, in February, we are going to start an actual class in Ukrainian Politics as a part of our curriculum. So a new curriculum: for the next five years, we will introduce Ukrainian Politics. 

So it’s a course that people can choose?

Yes, people can choose it. Based on our experience at the university for the last two years, there are a lot of students who really want to learn about Ukraine because of the news, because of the war. They really wanted to know more, and they took the course. 

For next year, we just had a new curriculum approved by the university, and one of the courses is a Ukrainian course. I think we are the only ones in Indonesia starting to give a course. Not yet a degree, but a course.

Basically, the people from the university saw that students have an interest in this and they’ve agreed that it will be a programme?

Yes, hopefully, depending on how many people are interested in studying Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Let's see where that goes.

We usually have only American Politics and Society, Russia, China, Australia… all the neighbours of Indonesia, bigger countries. 

And now we're introducing two: Taiwan and Ukraine. So hopefully the students will get more interested, and then we can propose another subject in the future. But based on the last few years, usually around 70 people are interested out of 150 students a year – half of them. 

Alina Poliakova, Ukrainska Pravda

Photo: Ardiansyah Arsha