The problem is that they are already perceived as compensation for territorial compromises on our part. In other words, the West links them to Ukraine’s concessions as a step toward support and formal stabilization.However, in reality, security guarantees must be organically “sewn” into the long-term security architecture as an element of strategic and effective deterrence of Russia.What is the risk? Security positions for Ukraine should not become another set of declarative papers, but in fact an invitation for delayed escalation on the part of the Russian Federation — a red carpet for it.The fact is that in a situation of fearmongering about a global war between Russia and NATO countries, the latter are tempted to give Ukraine only formal guarantees, which may ultimately be interpreted as actual encouragement for Russia to repeat its attack on Ukraine in the future and to deter it from attacking NATO countries.The option of so-called “strategic uncertainty,” which would not allow Moscow to clearly understand the extent to which allies would be prepared to help defend Ukraine, may also not work.After all, if the West refuses to fight Russia on Ukraine’s side today, there is no reason to believe it will suddenly become willing to do so in the event of a new escalation after the current war ends. Putin understands this perfectly well.This is the most difficult and painful issue in the topic of security guarantees for Ukraine.SourceAbout the author. Oleh Posternak, political strategist, political consultant, member of the Association of Professional Political Consultants of Ukraine.The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.