Contents1. How nuclear are Trump’s submarines?2. Trump’s response: bringing "Russian ayatollahs" to their senses3. Kremlin mentions Oreshnik: causes and consequencesDonald Trump made a bold move by deploying nuclear submarines against the most prominent Russian figure of this nuclear rhetoric show. This was Dmitry Medvedev, deputy head of Putin’s Security Council and Military-Industrial Commission, leader of the United Russia party, and former Russian president.In response to Medvedev’s latest nuclear threats against the U.S., Trump announced he had ordered nuclear submarines to be sent to the relevant regions.After several days of silent contemplation, the Kremlin decided to step back. The Kremlin spokesperson told Russian journalists — without mentioning Medvedev — that nuclear rhetoric is unacceptable. At the same time, Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry once again referenced the Oreshnik, an extremely expensive and highly inaccurate medium-range missile. Its only significance lies in the fact that its launches are detected by American early-warning systems as a potential nuclear strike on U.S. territory. In all other respects, the Oreshnik causes Russia more harm than benefit.This is a significantly new situation, created by the discreet movement of two American nuclear submarines. It was enough for Donald Trump simply to mention it. This signals that pressure on Putin, rather than friendship with him, has become the mainstream preference of the American electorate.Russia wants to talk to the U.S. about anything except ending the hostilities. Meanwhile, deprived of its usual nuclear blackmail tool, Russia will no longer be able to effectively limit the flow of American weapons to Ukraine or demand a ban on their use on Russian territory.How nuclear are Trump’s submarines?Donald Trump’s statements about nuclear submarines were not accompanied by any change in the defense readiness level known by the acronym DEFCON. It ranges from DEFCON 5 (normal readiness) to DEFCON 1 (imminent war). Changes in this level are usually not announced publicly, but sometimes become known through leaks or official notifications to allies. The most famous historical examples of DEFCON changes are the shift to DEFCON 2 during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and to DEFCON 3 during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. It is possible that the readiness level rose to DEFCON 3 during the Korean War (1950–1953), but this was never publicly disclosed.A change in DEFCON can have a significant political impact. In 1983, during NATO’s Able Archer exercises, the nervous Soviet leadership, already engulfed in a "casket race" with Soviet leaders dying in quick succession (Brezhnev in 1982, Andropov in 1984, Chernenko in 1985) on the eve of perestroika, mistook the simulated nuclear strike for preparation of a real one. Although the U.S. did not change the DEFCON level, the incident revealed a dangerous level of misunderstanding and prompted the creation of a communication channel between Washington and Moscow to prevent nuclear incidents.The communication channel still operates today. If Donald Trump had acted as irresponsibly as Putin, he would have only needed to inform Moscow of a DEFCON level increase and watch as Russia’s “nuclear cockroaches” scurried out from their information gaps. But Trump chose to act in tune with the times, demonstrating to Russians that the weight of a leader’s social media post matches the weight of the country.Donald Trump announced the deployment of two American nuclear submarines to “relevant regions” in response to Russian threats. Later, he said they were already where they needed to be. Terms like “nuclear submarines” and “relevant regions” don’t clearly explain what exactly happened. However, several plausible scenarios exist, all real enough to make the Russian leadership uneasy.Usually, the word “nuclear” regarding submarines refers to the type of propulsion system, not the presence of nuclear weapons on board. Although all nuclear-powered submarines today belong only to nuclear states, there is a tendency to assume they carry nuclear weapons. For the U.S., this is not always true. Only submarines assigned to the strategic nuclear forces carry nuclear weapons. They are equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles.Other types of nuclear submarines could theoretically carry non-strategic nuclear weapons — such as Tomahawk missiles with nuclear warheads — but in practice, the U.S. adheres to the so-called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991, agreed upon in letters between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev and confirmed in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin. According to these initiatives, the U.S. and Russia do not deploy tactical nuclear weapons on their navies during peacetime and keep as many tactical nuclear weapons as possible in central arsenals. The nuclear "cores" of the warheads for Tomahawks have not been destroyed but have been retired due to the aging of the Tomahawk variants designed to carry them.For the U.S., returning tactical nuclear weapons to the navy would not be a major problem after creating a new version of the warhead from stored nuclear cores for a new version of the sea-launched missile. It was previously believed that this could only happen if China and Russia collectively decided to engage in a nuclear arms race against the U.S. But now it appears that Donald Trump does not like being played. Therefore, even an American nuclear submarine without nuclear weapons on board can look intimidating to those trying to negotiate with the U.S. not about nuclear disarmament but about nuclear armament.The United States has three types of nuclear submarines. The first class is SSBNs—strategic submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles. This class includes the Ohio-class submarines, of which 14 are in service. Each carries 24 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying up to 8 nuclear warheads, but in practice usually only 4 are deployed to allow Russia, chronically lacking quality nuclear delivery systems since Soviet times, to maintain parity under the New START treaty. The Trident II D5 warheads include the W76-1 with a yield of 100 kilotons, the W88 with 500 kilotons, and the W76-2 with a yield up to 8 kilotons. The U.S. has only a few dozen of these low-yield W76-2 warheads, deployed on two or three of the 14 Ohio-class submarines.The W76-2 is technically a W76-1 without the thermonuclear component. They were created during Donald Trump’s first term as a rapid response to the U.S. recognition of Russia’s serious intent to use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons for political blackmail of NATO countries. At that time, the U.S. did not have ready-to-use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that could respond to a Russian strike without forcing capitulation or escalating to total nuclear war. The United Kingdom and France still do not have such low-yield nuclear weapons. This is one reason why they continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe.The primary candidate for Trump’s “nuclear submarine” title is the Ohio-class submarines armed with Trident II ballistic missiles equipped with W76-2 warheads. These seem specifically designed for rapid, precise nuclear strikes in global hotspots.The key point is that these Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines spend about three-quarters of their operational life at sea, from commissioning to decommissioning. They only return to port for crew changes or repairs. Usually, they are always exactly where they are supposed to be — in designated zones of the world’s oceans. If Donald Trump sent these closer to danger zones, the physical impact might be unclear. On the other hand, this explains his comment the very next day that the submarines were already “where they needed to be.”Another class is the SSGNs — nuclear-powered submarines equipped with conventional strike missiles. These are four Ohio-class subs converted to carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles in a non-nuclear configuration instead of 24 Trident II ballistic missiles, and equipped with two special forces lockout chambers.These submarines don’t have two crews or maintain constant patrols. They go on regular deployments. Thus, the phrase “sent to relevant regions” fits better, since they are not always where they are needed, but only when they are needed. Donald Trump has previously used such submarines for show, surfacing in key ports to create a negotiation effect. In 2017, USS Michigan (SSGN-727) docked in Pusan, South Korea, after another North Korean ballistic missile test and threats to strike Guam. Kim Jong Un agreed to talks, which ultimately failed but took place in 2018–2019. In 2023, under President Joe Biden, the same submarine made the same move at the same port in response to another North Korean missile test. However, Biden did not attempt talks with Kim.                                                                                                                                                                  Submarine USS Michigan, photo: U.S. Pacific FleetCurrently, Donald Trump could use the same demonstration mechanism — a reference to Ohio-class submarines armed with conventional cruise missiles — that previously convinced the North Korean leader to be more restrained in statements toward the U.S. If such submarines appeared in ports like those in the Baltic or Black Sea, they could create a similar effect on the Russian elites who have decided to rely on North Korea in the war against Ukraine. These subs can unleash a salvo with strike power exceeding that of a low-yield nuclear warhead and any combined missile-drone attack Russia has demonstrated so far. Finally, the U.S. also fields SSN submarines, multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines of the Virginia, Seawolf, and Los Angeles classes. Virginia is the newest design, Seawolf is limited in number but technically advanced, and Los Angeles is the most numerous but gradually being retired. These subs are armed with torpedoes and conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. They do not carry nuclear weapons but play a critical role in fighting enemy submarines and escorting surface combat groups. They are the least likely candidates for Trump’s “nuclear submarines” since they are primarily designed for naval warfare. However, their large numbers, about fifty in combat-ready status, and their regular deployments and relocations allow for a rapid show of presence, for example, in the Arctic, which Russian elites have turned into a geopolitical fetish and have even involved China in, with China declaring itself an “Arctic near-state.”Trump’s response: bringing "Russian ayatollahs" to their sensesAnnouncing the order for two nuclear submarines to deploy to “relevant regions,” Donald Trump said he would no longer ignore “irresponsible statements by people like Medvedev.” In international communication, nuances matter. Is Putin such a person? Or maybe the Kovalchuk and Rotenberg brothers? Lavrov and Volodin? Trump’s move was not aimed merely at Medvedev but at the Russian elites influencing Moscow’s policies. Medvedev was chosen as the public target to reprimand in front of other elite members.Trump’s statement came just before the planned visit of Steve Witkoff, the U.S. president’s special envoy to Russia, an invitation actually extended by the Russians to discuss Moscow’s compliance with Trump’s updated demands. This invitation coincided with renewed Russian attacks on Ukraine and Medvedev’s provocative statements, which provoked Trump’s response.There was a clear link between the Kremlin’s reaction to the movement of American submarines and the U.S. willingness to once again listen to Russian proposals. The Kremlin did not dare to continue its nuclear rhetoric. After several days of consideration, the Kremlin spokesperson told journalists that Russia takes statements about nuclear weapons seriously, but only Putin and the foreign minister are authorized to make official nuclear statements. The rest are simply “public figures” expressing personal views.Such comments from the Kremlin have been made before, saying that Russia’s nuclear “talk show” should be taken as normal and only Putin or the foreign minister should be listened to. Only once in recent years has the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly toned down Putin’s rhetoric. That happened in early May 2022, when the Russian ambassador to the U.S., speaking to Newsweek, explained Russia’s written nuclear doctrine rules, which appeared civilized. The ambassador said that Putin’s statements should not be interpreted as going beyond those limits.Before that, Putin threatened “unprecedented consequences in history” and “immediate retaliatory strikes” against those aiding Ukraine, raising the readiness level of Russia’s nuclear forces to a level not even defined in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. This allowed Russia in early 2022 to extend the Western moratorium on supplying Ukraine with field artillery and armored vehicles for several months and to limit deliveries of light weapons for partisan warfare. But when the West decided on large-scale military aid for Ukraine’s localized ground war, Putin changed his tone, and the Russian ambassador to the U.S. said Putin’s words had been misinterpreted.This time, the Kremlin expressed unwillingness to “engage in polemics.” This can be seen as a readiness to shut down the nuclear “talk show.” Medvedev was classified as one of the “public figures.” Possibly, the Kremlin is ready to remove him from official positions if needed to save relations with the U.S. However, it does not seem that the public international rebuke of Medvedev encourages “people like Medvedev” at the top of Russian power. Theoretically, they could easily remove him from the Kremlin tower as a goodwill gesture toward the U.S. But that would mean the next could be anyone among them, if Donald Trump so wishes.This is even more powerful than the W76-2 warhead, whose strength is enough to stop Russian nuclear provocations but insufficient to start a total nuclear war. None of "people like Medvedev" will personally defend Medvedev from, say, Donald Trump’s nuclear submarines if personal risks in the Kremlin become too high. If the "supreme Russian ayatollah" publicly sacrifices his loyal "ayatollahs" to Western rebuke, this will inevitably lead to the regime’s collapse. It was previously believed that the collapse of Putin’s regime was taboo for the U.S. Likely, this still holds, but no longer applies when the regime agrees to destroy itself.This is a critical vulnerability point for Putin’s regime. Therefore, Trump’s “showdown” with the powerless Medvedev, backed by nuclear submarine maneuvers, may not be an emotional act but a cold offer to Putin: either destroy your own regime with your own hands or change your policy. In this case, the policy on the war against Ukraine. According to Donald Trump, Putin must stop it immediately. Or else, sacrifice Medvedev today, and someone else tomorrow.Kremlin mentions Oreshnik: causes and consequencesThe Kremlin decided to shift the focus. First, Putin announced the start of serial production of the Oreshnik missile, then the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia "no longer considers itself bound by the obligation to refrain from deploying ground-based missiles of intermediate and shorter range." Russia refers to a term from a treaty that has lost validity but remains well-known. In this context, the reference is specifically to the Oreshnik, as no other non-nuclear intermediate or shorter-range missiles exist in Russia’s arsenal to attract the attention of the U.S. and Europe.The non-nuclear Russian Oreshnik, as intended by the Kremlin, is likely meant to create a political sensation similar to the Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles in the late 1970s, which forced the U.S. to make disarmament proposals to the Soviet Empire. Those events ultimately led to a treaty banning American and Soviet missiles in Europe with ranges from 500 to 5,500 km, often still referred to, especially by Russians, as missiles of “intermediate and shorter range” due to negotiation terminology from the 1980s.The Soviet ballistic missile Pioneer, deployed on a mobile wheeled launcher and classified by NATO as SS-20, caused a major sensation. It was an unfinished mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reliably delivering a nuclear warhead weighing about 1.5 tons over an “intermediate” range of several hundred to several thousand kilometers. At that time, the Soviet Empire had stationary ICBMs with ranges of several thousand kilometers in the European part of its territory, based on 1950s–60s technology, which never reached Cuba. But the SS-20 represented a new technological level and the potential of a mobile ICBM. In the 1980s, the Pioneer was further developed into the Topol ICBM, which delivered slightly less than one ton over about 10,000 km. In the 1990s, the Topol-M (SS-25) appeared, capable of delivering over one ton at the same range. In the 2000s, Russia advanced this line to the Yars (SS-27), with similar power but improved technology and a separable warhead. Finally, Russia tried to convert the Yars into an intermediate-range missile similar in combat function to the SS-20. The project proved pointless — too costly for such a payload and range under modern production constraints. Russia has had a chronic and genetic shortage of nuclear weapons carriers. The entire SS-20/25/27 missile line is produced at a single factory. Therefore, diverting production capacity to intimidate Europeans rather than Americans was deemed unnecessary by the Kremlin.The argument that the Rubezh missile violated the then-current Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was a cover for a deeper conceptual failure. When Russia began experimenting in the early 2010s with a land-based version of the naval Kalibr missile, which violated the treaty, this did not stop them. Since 2012, the U.S. repeatedly warned Russia about these violations and demanded the project be canceled. Russia responded by claiming it was a shorter-range Iskander-K and ignored American warnings. The Obama administration tolerated this, but when Donald Trump took office, he made this issue a priority. His administration set a deadline of several months for Russia to comply, after which the U.S. would withdraw from the treaty if Russia did not respond. This was Trump’s first deadline for Russia. Russia did not return to treaty compliance, and in 2019, the U.S., under Trump’s decision, withdrew from the treaty. It then became clear that Russia’s problem was not only a shortage of carriers for nuclear ballistic missiles but also for non-nuclear cruise missiles. The issue was the number of Kalibr missiles Russia could produce, not where to base them. It turned out that provoking the U.S. in such a senseless way was pointless for Russia, but they did it anyway.After the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia tried to halt the development of American and European missiles in that range. The Kremlin declared it would observe self-imposed restrictions in line with the defunct treaty as long as the U.S. did not deploy such missiles in regions important to Russia. Europe and the Far East were specifically mentioned — the latter more out of concern for China’s interests.When the Oreshnik missile was showcased in November 2024, Russia made no statement about lifting its self-imposed INF restrictions. The Oreshnik project turned out to be even more senseless than the Rubezh. The missile performs extremely poorly at minimum ranges, even as short as 1,000 kilometers, suffering from catastrophic inaccuracy. Its payload of roughly one ton does not deliver better combat effectiveness than a single supersonic Kh-22 or two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, yet comes at a vastly higher cost — tens of millions of dollars instead of a few million. Moreover, production diverts resources from building Yars missiles, or from the warhead stockpile for the Yars and Topol systems, which Russia is already struggling to maintain in order to preserve strategic parity with the U.S.Now, following the maneuvers of Donald Trump’s nuclear submarines, Putin has decided to bring up the Oreshnik again. The Russian Foreign Ministry amplified this message with a statement declaring that Russia will no longer abide by self-imposed restrictions on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.What happened? Simply put, Russia has no other non-nuclear means of drawing the U.S.'s attention and shifting the bilateral dialogue away from the need to end hostilities. The only value the Oreshnik missile has as a weapon is that its launch is detected by American early warning systems for missile attacks, which, under the protocol of nuclear powers, necessitates communication that is independent of all other circumstances.By bringing up the Oreshnik and the forgotten treaty, Russia is trying to signal that it is willing not to launch it (and would prefer not to, since it’s unclear whether it would fly again), provided Ukraine does not receive new strike systems with ranges from 500 to several thousand kilometers, and does not use them to target Russian territory. This mirrors Russia’s hints about a potential aerial ceasefire — a willingness to halt airstrikes on Ukrainian cities if Ukraine does not gain additional airstrike capabilities for hitting military targets inside Russia.This is a key outcome of the U.S. steps that ended Russia’s nuclear showmanship. It means that Russia can no longer use nuclear rhetoric to block the next phase of military aid to Ukraine or to restrict how that aid is used against targets in Russia, if the logic of war demands it.This material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that brings together Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and aims to strengthen informational support and analytical capacity in the fields of national security, defense, and geopolitics.