I’d like to ask you not just about the diplomatic ultimatum but about what may be a military and political one that the U.S. president has presented to Russia. Trump has once again confirmed that Putin was given a 10-day deadline. In response, we heard that Russia is prepared for a confrontation with the United States though that statement came from former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who sits on Russia’s Security Council.If Russia refuses to comply with the ultimatum, is there a risk that the situation could escalate even further?I think it would be a wonderful thing if Mr. Putin complied with President Trump’s ultimatum regarding sanctions. However, I do not expect that to happen, and I would hope that my Ukrainian friends are not counting on Mr. Putin to stop the fighting within 10 days.He has made it very clear that he will persist until all of his objectives are achieved, including addressing the so-called root causes of the conflict, namely, NATO. Based on all the information I’ve received, Russia’s military-industrial production is running 24 hours a day, seven days a week.They are not deploying their best equipment in the fight against Ukraine. At the same time, they are building up their forces in Belarus opposite the Baltic states and also opposite Finland. This appears to be preparation for a prolonged war.After the 10-day ultimatum expires, I hope that we, the United States, will reinforce Ukraine's armed forces with additional military assistance and swiftly move to implement the sanctions that have been threatened.Recently, we saw how a small but well-armed country like Israel was able to effectively dismantle Iran’s air defense system and operate in its airspace with complete freedom. This highlights that success in war isn’t about size, but about military capability, smart and strategic leadership, and the ability to strike key military targets.In Ukraine, we've been trying to study the dynamics of the Iran-Israel conflict, but we simply don't have the kind of resources Israel does, especially when it comes to air power. I suspect the Kremlin is also starting to realize just how vulnerable they might be.I’d like to hear your thoughts on how modern warfare is changing – here a highly technological country can defeat a much larger, better-resourced adversary.There are several points to make in response to this. First of all, Israel has essentially been on a defensive wartime footing for many years, preparing to deal with Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile threat, as well as Iran’s terrorist proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.Iran has received some assistance from Russia, and likely from North Korea as well. But Iran’s military capabilities are not comparable to Russia’s. We know this.Secondly, the United States has provided virtually unlimited assistance to Israel in its defensive posture against Iran. According to news reports, we have expended around 25 percent of our own anti-missile stockpile to protect Israel during this period.These are missiles that cannot be easily replaced, given the current rate of production in the United States.Ukraine just hasn’t received that kind of support from the United States. In my view, the mistakes were made early on by the Biden administration.Had we acted promptly and provided artillery, HIMARS, F-16s, ATACMS, munitions, and small arms quickly to Ukraine, the tide of Russian attacks might have turned.The early successes seen in September 2022 might have been repeated or continued on a larger scale, but the United States failed to stand up to the threats of Russian aggression. As a result, this war is still ongoing.Europe seems to be taking a stronger stand against Russia, but the resources it can provide to assist Ukraine are more limited. The idea of having Europeans buy American equipment is sound, and I hope they will purchase as much as possible and get it to the battlefield quickly. However, there are still major disparities on the battlefield.The range of potential targets in Russia, from a military perspective, is much greater than in Iran. The territory that needs to be defended in Ukraine is also far larger than the area to be defended in Israel. And even with Israel's advanced defense systems, we know that by the end of the campaign, about 25 percent of Iranian ballistic missiles were still getting through.So as much as we aim to be effective in defense, simply holding the line will not decide this conflict. It could be lost that way, but it cannot be won.I can’t confirm whether Trump actually asked Zelensky about potential strikes on Moscow and St. Petersburg – that was reported by American journalists. But we do understand that Moscow and St. Petersburg aren’t just Russian cities; they’re major logistical hubs, and Russia’s logistics network is highly centralized.If Trump did raise that question, it likely wasn’t for nothing, and the Kremlin seemed to take it seriously. Not long ago, Russia’s Aeroflot system was disrupted, and they were unable to operate flights. As far as I know, hackers were behind the attack.In your view, how prepared are the Russians right now to handle similar types of strikes? Or would they be more likely to respond with confusion? I realize this is a hypothetical question.I think Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russia’s logistical centers is critical to the success of the war effort. These centers should include weapons manufacturing, munitions production, and the petrochemical sector, including refineries, pipelines, and storage facilities. All of these are legitimate military targets within Russia and should be targeted.However, here is the challenge. Whether the strikes are carried out using kinetic or non-kinetic means, the objective must go beyond symbolic or one-time actions. The goal must be sustained destruction of these systems inside Russia.Only consistent and prolonged disruption of these critical infrastructure targets will help bring the conflict to an end, assuming Ukraine can continue to hold the front.What I mean by sustained is illustrated by the example of the Second World War. When the Allies bombed Nazi Germany, they repeatedly targeted key sites, including petrochemical complexes, again and again. It was not just about demonstrating the ability to strike. It was about continuously degrading the enemy’s war-making capacity.The goal is to take these systems out of the conflict in a lasting way. I am not sure Ukraine currently has the capacity to do this. Of course, it is good for morale to report a strike on an arms factory in the St. Petersburg region.But if you truly want to affect the front lines, you need to target a wide range of critical infrastructure and ensure those targets remain suppressed or destroyed. A single strike is not enough. It must be part of a sustained campaign.How threatened does Putin really feel?We’re now in the realm of military and intelligence operations – satellites are in use, radar systems are active, and data is being collected and analyzed. Despite this, Putin keeps trying to show us and our European allies that he’s ready to continue the war indefinitely.But at the same time, it’s clear that when the conversation shifts to serious intercontinental matters, Putin doesn’t appear confident or secure. It’s no coincidence that he recently visited a nuclear submarine base, part of Russia’s nuclear triad. It suggests that Russia is running out of other options.What’s your assessment of Russia’s vulnerability? Why is Putin so nervous?Certainly, Putin is not going to show vulnerability to the world. If he eventually decides to end the conflict, he will try to present the strongest possible image. He is not going to say, "I'm getting weak, I’d better negotiate." As you know, Russia is doing its utmost to control information about its own vulnerabilities. But we are beginning to see those vulnerabilities.I believe there is strong intelligence sharing between Ukraine and its strategic partners, and perhaps this is enabling the strikes. Some weaknesses in Russia are becoming visible. Still, Putin will have to be stopped physically, either through the collapse of logistical support or by being defeated and pushed back on the battlefield. That is the only certain way to end this conflict.I would also like to address another issue, and that is the concern in the West about a possible weakening of anti-corruption measures in Ukraine.​​Your friends in the West are deeply concerned that any action undermining the work of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions could jeopardize continued support. Having an honest government and avoiding corruption is essential to maintaining strong backing from Western partners for the Ukrainian people. Many were encouraged to see the thousands who took to the streets in protest when attempts were made to weaken the Anti-Corruption Commission.Reversing those attempts is critically important, and I understand that it may require new legislation in the Rada. Ensuring the integrity and independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission remains a key priority.Observers are closely watching whether the government of Ukraine is upholding democratic and Western standards, particularly in relation to corruption. For instance, questions are being raised about the pipeline that transports oil across Ukraine to Hungary. People are asking who profits from this transit and what it implies. They also want to know whether this matter is being investigated by the Anti-Corruption Commission. I’d like to ask about Russia’s current military posture and their capacity to sustain a high-intensity war. We’re seeing that they’ve been able to rearm, ramp up drone production, and are now deploying fiber-optic-guided UAVs. In other words, they’re scaling up their war machine.At the same time, they’re heavily relying on infantry, and the fighting in eastern Ukraine remains extremely intense. A few weeks ago, in our conversation, you mentioned the Kremlin’s broader strategic objective, which also requires making gains in the south.What’s your sense of this current phase of the war? How long can the Kremlin keep this up, and where do you see Russia’s offensive operations heading next?I think the scenarios show Russia attempting to move forward in three principal directions.First, to intimidate and break the morale of the Ukrainian people through increasingly massive and destructive drone strikes on population centers, while simultaneously targeting Ukraine’s military-industrial production. This is a clear focus of the Russian campaign at the moment. They are expanding their drone inventory and enhancing their capacity to strike with missiles, including those supplied by North Korea.Second, to penetrate Ukrainian defenses and seize more territory. There is still a concentrated Russian effort near Sumy in the northeast, and they continue trying to secure and block key logistics hubs, particularly around Pokrovsk. Based on previous assessments, their ultimate objective likely remains the seizure of Odesa and the northern Black Sea coast to cut Ukraine off from international trade routes.Third, to build up their forces in a way that intimidates NATO, stretches NATO’s resources, and keeps Western allies distracted with the defense of the Baltic states and Finland. At the same time, Russia is demonstrating its nuclear capabilities in an attempt to deter further intervention by the United States or other Western powers.These appear to be the three main directions in which Russia is currently moving.On the northern front, Belarus remains a highly dangerous staging ground for a potential Russian offensive or renewed assault on Ukraine. It seems clear that Belarus is trying to hold back, and Lukashenko understands that if he openly supports Putin militarily, Minsk could suffer devastating consequences.At the same time, it’s obvious that Russia wants to use Belarus as a strategic threat – not just against Ukraine, but also against the Baltic states. We also know that the Suwałki Gap is firmly on the radar of the Russian General Staff.Are we keeping close enough watch on what’s happening in Belarus? Or is there a risk that we’ll only realize too late that something serious is being prepared there?I think this is a serious threat. NATO should nearly double its preparations to defend the Baltic states, as well as strengthen Finland’s capabilities in the far northeast of the alliance.However, it would not be wise for NATO to respond in a way that reduces its support for Ukraine. Providing more air defense systems for Ukraine is an urgent priority. Delivering additional Patriot missiles is also critical, because Ukraine is the frontline of the war NATO is currently facing, not the Baltics, not Finland.While threats to those regions must be taken seriously, the success and security of Western Europe depend on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. That should be the top priority for every NATO member.It’s a delicate matter, but we understand that if a major conflict breaks out on the European continent, a larger war, the United States would be expected to play a key role. However, we don’t know how President Trump would respond. That said, we have Pete Hegseth heading the Pentagon and General Grynkewich, who has made a positive impression.Is there a sense that the situation is under control when it comes to our Western allies? Because when that sense of control disappears, a Russian provocation becomes much more likely. There’s a reason why Poland has scrambled its air force several times.The situation is serious. This has been acknowledged in talks between the U.S. President and the British Prime Minister, and there have also been consultations between Germany and the UK. So the Europeans are getting ready.But preparing and actually being prepared are two very different things.Europeans are not ready at this time. But step by step, they are beginning to prepare. Whether or not there is a ceasefire in the near future, Europe must do more to strengthen its own defenses. And so must the United States. The United States has also neglected critical areas of defense, including its strategic nuclear forces, strategic defense systems, and technological capabilities.The conflict in Ukraine is buying time for NATO countries to rearm and prepare to deter and confront Russia if it continues its aggression. In the meantime, I want to emphasize that, in my view, the first priority of NATO nations must be to provide Ukraine with the assistance needed to bring the conflict to a successful resolution.By success, I mean returning the abducted children, stopping the fighting, and ideally reversing Russian territorial gains since 2014.That includes Crimea, which must be considered an integral part of Ukraine, not only because it was seized illegally, but also because the maritime boundaries in the Black Sea are extremely unfavorable to Ukraine if Crimea remains under Russian control.Ukraine must stand firm on its broader objectives, and NATO must fully support Ukraine in pursuing them.I’d like to ask you to outline the potential strategic paths this difficult war might take. I realize that predicting the course of a war is a difficult and often thankless task. But given your deep military and strategic experience, I’d appreciate it if you could lay out a few possible scenarios, including the optimistic ones, the neutral, and those that may be harder for Ukrainians to hear.I’d also like to ask for your thoughts on the possible timeline. Could the war end this year? Or might it stretch into 2026, 2027, or even 2030?These are very difficult questions you are asking. I want to begin by saying that we deeply admire the strength and courage of the Ukrainian people for enduring this war for more than three years, even without a clear end in sight.In World War II, Germany attacked Poland in 1939, and the war continued for six years. It only ended when Germany’s military capacity was destroyed and the country was occupied.I do not foresee an attack that would result in the occupation of Russia, but I do see this conflict continuing as long as the people of Ukraine have the courage, the will, and the means to resist. This must be supported by stronger economic measures against Russia and its allies.It must also be accompanied by a significant buildup of Western defense production and the mobilization of additional NATO forces. Mr. Putin will continue this war as long as he believes he can win. That is the fundamental factor driving every scenario.Until he is convinced that he is going to lose, the war will not end. Therefore, it is incumbent on the nations of the world to send a direct and clear message to Mr. Putin: you will not succeed, you will be pushed out of Ukraine, and the sooner you give up, the better. That is the kind of strong message that must be delivered to stop this war, regardless of scenarios. It comes down to his intent and will.I think that if President Trump can truly muster the kind of diplomatic strength he envisions, there may be a path to bringing this war to a successful conclusion. But it will require strong leadership from the nations of the West, including the United States, to convince Mr. Putin that he has embarked on a serious misadventure with disastrous consequences for Russia and for himself, and that he must bring it to an end. That is the essence of what it will take to stop the conflict.