Oleksii Yizhak discussed the issue on Espreso TV.In June, as the threat of further Russian advances grew, several countries began steps to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines."By early 2026, the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Ukraine could form a kind of 'anti-personnel mine coalition' to deter Russian territorial moves. This coalition may last for years, even as Europe officially sticks to the ban on anti-personnel mines," the expert said.Since EU and NATO members still part of the Ottawa Convention will be legally restricted in helping, supplying parts, or funding anything related to these mines, production will restart inside the countries themselves, either nationally or jointly between Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states."Fixed minefield defense can work well if it’s part of a larger system that includes surveillance, rapid response units, and clear rules of use," he said.A working example of such a mine barrier is the one between South Korea and North Korea. The Korean Demilitarized Zone stretches 250 km along the 38th parallel and is about 4 km wide. For 70 years, it has blocked North Korean incursions.Experts say copying the Korean setup for Ukraine, Poland, the Baltics, and Finland would take more than 55 million mines, raising serious production, logistics, and political issues. A lower-density model may be more practical."If density is reduced to 6,000 mines per km², the minefield shortened, and backed by modern surveillance, fire control, and fast mining tech, the countries could build a solid defense line at a more reasonable cost. In this setup, Ukraine would need around 6 million mines for a 1,000 km² zone. Poland would need 3.6 million for 600 km². The Baltic states would need 4.8 million for 800 km². Finland would also need 4.8 million for a high-priority 800 km² stretch. These numbers are large but doable within a few years, if national production is steady or international cooperation is in place," Yizhak said.He also pointed out key challenges for Ukraine. One of them is to "avoid turning minefields into a de facto border with temporarily occupied areas," since Korea’s fortified zone, though not an officially recognized border, has become a lasting symbol of separation."If these minefields are used, they must come with a clear plan for phased demining after reintegration, transparent steps, and a commitment to reduce risks for civilians," Yizhak concluded.