The myth of the Russian tank boom: high costs and low efficiency

Military analysts cited the example of Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), the main tank manufacturer in the Russian Federation, as showing that the actual production volumes of modern equipment may be smaller than it seems.

1. Manual repair requires significantly more time and labor resources than assembly line. Due to minimal automation and low wages for workers, the total amount of work seems large, but does not provide an adequate increase in modern technology.

2. The total number of really new vehicles is very modest: instead of thousands of tanks, as was the case in Soviet times, a modern UVZ can at best produce about a hundred new T-90Ms, several dozen tank support combat vehicles (BMPTs), and several hundred repaired T-72B3s.

3. The plant has long ceased to function as intended. Some of the main industrial equipment was sold abroad (in particular, to India), so the current "resumption" of the production cycle looks like a large repair shop that makes a profit from the capital restoration of old Soviet models.

In conclusion, Russia's large military spending does not necessarily translate into a commensurate increase in the effectiveness of its armed forces. Often, the money is spent on supporting the restoration of old equipment, rather than on the widespread production of the latest models.