The security situation, especially in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, remains extremely tense. Several negotiation tracks are under way, both public and discreet. Yet Russia seems intent on continuing the war and may even be preparing for further escalation. How do you envision events unfolding in the coming weeks and months?I believe that Russia is prepared to continue the war. I see no indication that President Putin has changed his maximalist objectives, which have now been in place for almost four years. So I think the most likely scenario, unfortunately, is that the fighting will continue.How would you assess the resources Russia still has to sustain its war, and what does Ukraine’s own resource base look like at this stage? Ukraine needs a strategic breakthrough, which requires long-range weapons and a significant strengthening of our ability to counter Russian aggression.I agree that Ukraine depends on the support of its Western partners, particularly European partners, and less so on the United States. Today, most of the systems are being purchased by European NATO allies and then transferred to Ukraine. These systems include high-end air-defense platforms such as the Patriot and NASAMS systems."If there is one additional capability that I believe would make a difference—although it would not, by itself, win the war—it would be long-range precision-strike systems."They would allow Ukraine to more effectively target Russian oil infrastructure and the logistical lines on which the Russian occupying forces rely, including, for example, the Kerch Strait Bridge.Unfortunately, I do not believe that such systems are likely to be provided in the near future.Is there any sense of how the U.S. administration and the United States overall would respond if Russia were to escalate against European Union countries that are NATO members? Putin has repeatedly insisted that Europe is preparing to attack Russia. He claims that Moscow would never take such a step itself, but that Europe is arming and militarizing, an unmistakable threat. How should we read this? And how do you assess the current level of U.S. presence and engagement along NATO’s eastern flank?I think that Russia does pose a threat. Obviously, the war in Ukraine is the most serious challenge today. But we should also recognize that beyond Ukraine, Russia is waging a campaign of so-called hybrid warfare, or actions short of an armed attack. This includes cyberattacks, election interference, energy pressure, sabotage, and similar activities. These attacks are already taking place across NATO member states. Americans should remember that the 2016 election saw significant Russian attempts to interfere in the electoral process."So NATO must stay alert not only to the possibility that after the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin could take military action against NATO, but also to the current reality that Russia is already conducting a campaign of hybrid attacks against NATO allies."We can also see Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as part of a wider preparation for potential aggression against European countries. In any case, this war serves as a tool of pressure on the European Union. At the same time, it reflects a shift in how Russia’s military leadership thinks and operates. If we talk about real, not rhetorical, readiness, when could Russia actually be in a position to launch open military action, including against Estonia or Finland? Could this happen before 2030, or only later?Of course, no one actually knows what is in Vladimir Putin’s mind. But in terms of the military balance of power, I think that the war in Ukraine—and the Ukrainian military and people—has inflicted such heavy attrition on Russia’s conventional forces that it is unlikely Russia will pose a conventional military threat to NATO anytime soon. By that I mean a combined-arms attack with tanks, aircraft, naval forces, and so on. Ukraine has essentially destroyed the Russian army that invaded in 2022, and that force is not yet capable of projecting power beyond Ukraine and into NATO."Where NATO does need to remain alert, however, is Russia’s long-range air and missile capabilities. These are the same drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles that strike Ukraine every night. Those could also be used against the Alliance."And, as we have already discussed, NATO must stay vigilant in the face of hybrid attacks—operations designed to confuse NATO, sow divisions among allies, and drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. I believe those Russian threats will be the most significant over the next couple of years.Real security guarantees for Ukraine were once promised if a diplomatic agreement with the Russian Federation were reached. Yet we seem to be back where we started, hearing that even if an agreement is concluded, the guarantees would only come afterward. In your view, what meaningful security guarantees could Ukraine realistically expect if some broader, possibly continent-wide, arrangement with the Russian Federation were to be negotiated?Of course, Ukraine has a history of being issued security guarantees that have then failed on the ground—most prominently the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, but also the NATO–Russia Founding Act, which guaranteed national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and even the Minsk agreements. Over time there have been a number of documents with the right wording, but when tested in reality, they have failed."I think the best security guarantee going forward is a national Ukrainian guarantee."By that I mean a Ukrainian defense industry capable of producing the country’s own defense needs, supported by and possibly in partnership with European and American defense-industrial firms, and backed by a deterrence and defense capability that is fully owned and operated by Ukrainians.I do not expect a significant European military presence in Ukraine after a ceasefire; I simply do not see that as politically or militarily viable. So I believe the strongest guarantee for Ukrainians is a Ukrainian guarantee, supported by the West.