Article for the Polish Eastern Flank Institute, published on October 20, 2025

The war in Ukraine was the result of a whole complex of mistakes in foreign policy that had been made since independence. Since the early 1990s, our leadership has declared the so-called multi-vector policy, the intention to have good relations with both the West and Russia, trying to benefit from both directions. In addition to the fact that such a policy led the country to great trouble and did not allow it to resist external influences for a long time, this allowed us to receive economic benefits from both Europe and the US (through loans and investments), as well as to take advantage of preferential prices for Russian gas and have access to Russian markets. Russia, meanwhile, was systematically increasing its influence within the country, supporting loyal political parties and individual figures, as well as through economic pressure – through energy carriers and investing in strategic enterprises, propaganda in the media, and support for the Russian-speaking environment.

But perhaps the most important mistake was precisely the underestimation of Russia and excessive trust in the security guarantees established by the Budapest Memorandum. When the war began in 2014, none of the major powers came to the rescue, limiting themselves to sanctions against Russia. This shows that international agreements without clear security on the "ground" are simply an empty place, on which, looking for space, war will surely come.

We mention Ukraine today precisely because of the situation our country finds itself in, in the 4th year of a full-scale war, the likes of which humanity has not yet seen in the 21st century. I cannot say whether everything described above applies to anyone else besides Ukraine. There is only one thing we can say: Russia is militarizing today, its economy is running on military rails, and its society is being pumped with propaganda. What it did to you, its neighbors, yesterday is still worth checking, and why it is doing it today is something that needs to be clarified. And today, Russians see no reason why they should stop. The war in the center of Europe has not only affected every Ukrainian, it has become global, with the roar of the old world collapsing, and is about to knock on neighbor's door. A neighbor who lives with us on the same small floor, called Europe. We will talk about it. About Europe – as a neighbor in a global war.

In the fourth year of the war, it can be stated with confidence that the events that began precisely in February 2022, like any major war, led to the collapse of the ideas and theories that held up the very notion about peace. All those who thought they knew everything, or those who considered worry a panacea, were disappointed, even deeply. Everyone involved in this war, even those who watch it, saw something they had not planned and expected. Some even now, in the agony of disappointment in their own illusions, continue to claim that everything that is happening only concerns them. However, the truth is that for some it is grief and pain, and for others it is still a dry chronicle. However, it is definitely a whirlwind of events that will change the world forever.

What is happening today in this whirlpool that is gaining momentum with the tacit consent of the no longer existing old world?

On the night of September 27-28, 2025, 552 UAVs, at least 2 ballistic missiles, and at least 31 cruise missiles were used over the territory of Ukraine. The night of September 6-7 was the largest use of air attack weapons – 776 at the same time. Most recently, about two dozen Russian drones entered Poland, of which three or four were shot down using extremely expensive missiles.

Within a few days, Russian planes had calmly entered Estonian airspace. They were pursued by two Italy`s most modern fighters NATO F-35, that took off to intercept from an air base 50 km from Tallinn.

The Telegraph soon eloquently described NATO's reaction. "The Italians began standard interception procedure, flapping their wings from side to side. The Russians flapped theirs in response. Then one of the pilots raised his hand and waved amiably. Over the next 12 minutes, the Italian pilots accompanied the Russians all the way to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad – an unprecedentedly long time for an incursion into NATO airspace," the report says.

So, connecting only these events with the vortex of total war, we can make a simple conclusion: while Europe decides whether their response was decisive enough, the Russians are releasing the next thousands of drones, and the Ukrainians, surviving on their own, continue to gain time for their neighbors. Time to get rid of illusions first and foremost.

Once again, four years of fighting outline revolutionary changes in military affairs. It is already possible to say with confidence about the emergence of a new type of war and radical changes in the art of war for the entire 21st century. One of the main features of such a war is that no country in the world is able to independently withstand the current level of intensity of hostilities and fully satisfy the entire range of defense needs.

So, in order to survive, we need to find answers to a number of questions in the context of the ongoing war, but the main thing is to provide the necessary own security guarantees in the future.

First, is there a real way for Ukraine today to obtain the necessary level of cooperation with Europe to best meet the needs of today's war?

In the program of such survival, we are interested in:

• How realistic is the hope of receiving military assistance in the form of air defense systems and ammunition from Europe?
• How realistic is it to gain access to financial resources to finance one's own military-industrial complex in the near future?
• How realistic is it to gain access to exceptional European scientific and production technologies, including satellite technologies?
• How quickly can we organize our production and scale it up in Europe?

Second, is Europe, by stepping up its own efforts to transform its defense policy, really striving to build a new security architecture? Is there a place for Ukraine in it?

Here, taking into account own experience, it is appropriate to see:

• Is there the political will to make radical changes in the security landscape of Europe.
• Are there signs of the formation of the European army as the basis of combat capabilities and future alliances.
• How realistic is the reform and consolidation of Europe's defense industry.
• How realistic is it today to meet Ukraine's urgent needs as part of the reform of Europe's defense industry.

Despite the many conversations taking place on various platforms both in Ukraine and Europe, and postponed next sanctions packages, today there is only one programmatic document that has appeared in Europe.

It's about the joint "White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030", which was prepared by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on March 19, 2025.

Obviously, this document is also a reaction to the work of a group of European experts led by Mario Draghi (former president of the European Central Bank) who in September 2024 prepared a comprehensive document entitled "The future of European competitiveness."

For the first time, it emphasizes in a concentrated manner the need for Europe's strategic autonomy in the face of growing competition, including from the United States.

In addition to describing the problems facing the European Union, Draghi's report described an action plan and demanded the immediate implementation of the specified steps, with a special emphasis on coordination in the field of European military-industrial complex.

In this regard, the presentation by the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, of the conceptual document Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, is, of course, a response to the above problems. Indeed, the White Paper identifies both the threats and challenges that Europe faces now and will grow in the future, as well as the directions for their neutralization through the development of the European security and defense sector.

This document, written under the pressure of war, was supposed to globally convince Europe that it is capable of defending itself.

Meanwhile, for now, this official material remains for us almost the only prescribed way to achieve at least some idea of ​​the formation of future European security, which is obviously still based on strengthening the European military-industrial complex.

The extremely complex situation that currently exists in Ukraine, and my own experience, give me the right to look at Europe's security precisely from practical, including military, considerations. The main goal, of course, is to find out more about whether Ukraine will be able to fully count on Europe in a war of attrition, if not as an ally, then at least as a reliable partner. The second and no less important thing for us is to find out whether Europe understands the need to form a new security architecture on the European continent.

For this I will recall the words of a classic of military strategy. At the beginning of the 20th century, he wrote: "... In modern realities, peace itself is, first and foremost, the result of violence and is maintained by violence. Every state border is the result of war, and the outlines of all the states on the map introduce us to the strategic and political thinking of the victors, and political geography and peace treaties are also a strategic lesson…"

So, it is precisely in light of the strategic lessons that we in Ukraine have learned today, waging war with the largest empire on the continent, I would like to note that the very definition of security and its unconditional achievement is based on fairly simple concepts that do not change over time, and most importantly – tested by our war.

The first is the political will to be ready to take practical, including unpopular, steps to ensure this security. An example of such political will was Winston Churchill (1874–1965), a British politician, Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1940–1945 and 1951–1955, who is a key figure of World War II. A logical question today: the extent to which citizens of EU member states and their political elites are willing to prioritize defense issues if this means, for example, a deterioration in economic well-being?

The second is well-trained and equipped armed forces with modern weapons and modern doctrines. These armed forces, in addition, must be formed into a clear hierarchical system based on a unified management system and application doctrine. Even in our conditions, where the centralized subordination of the defense forces is legally enshrined, there was not always enough time for joint standardization in matters of armament, training, and application.

The third is the military-industrial complex. One of the important components that determines the readiness of the armed forces to realize their capabilities in matters of ensuring security. At the same time, taking into account our experience, when talking about the military-industrial complex as a component of ensuring security, it is necessary to understand that globally this military-industrial complex will be determined by the following criteria:

1. Availability of raw materials, primarily for the production of ammunition. It is especially important to find out whether there are enough components today, for example, to produce gunpowder, the basis of all explosives. As you know, its formula is based on nitrocellulose. It can be obtained after processing cellulose from industrial hemp, cotton, and wood. Does this program envisage increasing the cultivation of these crops, or perhaps it will be in cooperation? And how will the issue of the same chips and microcircuits that are manufactured in completely different global regions be decided?
2. The availability of technologies and infrastructure (enterprises and transport) that can be expanded and reorganized for maximum production specifically in the interests of defense. Such infrastructure must be united politically, economically, and with unified standards and supply chains. Will this not harm, for example, national governments, which form their revenues and budgets at the expense of such national infrastructure.
3. A workforce of sufficient quantity and skill to meet the needs of all industries. Sufficiency and qualification, especially in high-tech areas, will be decisive in the implementation of any production programs and requests.
4. It is still the same political will when, through coercion, propaganda, and calls to fulfill civic duty, the civilian population is encouraged not only to accept certain restrictions, but even to make future sacrifices, even if they are unbearable.

Therefore, it is necessary to look at this first systemic document only from a strategic point of view, especially in the perspective of not only its present, but also its mandatory foresight. The war in Ukraine, a review of the US role in ensuring European security, and the buildup of the combat capabilities of the Russian armed forces beyond the scope of today's war, should form only a realistic vision of the future security architecture .

However, examining the document, looking specifically at our and the European perspective, we can state that the declared distribution of money is absolutely not enough to achieve the main goal of this document. Unfortunately, Europe needs both political will and time.

Speaking specifically about political will as the main driver of such progress, it is necessary to understand that today this means that the success of these initiatives will depend on the political will of all 27 different countries. These countries, having gone through an extremely difficult path to membership, still have different priorities, resources, and visions of the threat. That is probably why the White Paper constantly emphasizes that defense remains the prerogative of individual states and a matter of unanimity , as provided for by the Treaty on European Union. Whether this will become a factor in slowing down or blocking key defense projects remains to be seen. However, it is definitely impossible to achieve the implementation of the basic principle of a centralized approach to forming one's own security in such an approach.

Regarding the production base, a wide field for work is also opening up. It should be noted that according to the same Draghi report, more than 60% of defense purchases in Europe are made in the US. This is as of today. But this needs to be expanded, and accordingly, a fragmented military industrial base across countries will clearly require political will and time to scale. When talking about personnel, it is necessary to remember the well-developed labor law, which does not allow to neglect the working conditions standards. It is difficult to say whether there are enough specialists today and where their preparation will be organized.

We have a good understanding of who is currently working in factories in Europe. It is already possible to predict how this will affect the expansion of production capacity. Of course, speaking in fact about preparations for "not World War II," this White Paper also declares the desire for leadership in the field of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersound, and robotics. However, in terms of investment, human resources, and maturity, all of these industries in Europe are many years behind the US and China. It is obvious that achieving such ambitious goals by 2030 is not very real.

It should be noted that the main reasons for the creation of the European Union were the desire for peace and stability, the stimulation of economic development through a common market, and the support of democracy and common values. All this was accompanied by an absolute security guarantee from the US and NATO . Therefore, it is logical that the European Union itself currently lacks clear mechanisms of so-called coercion. As a result, there is no basis for the implementation of political will. Therefore, the implementation of the intentions stated in this document will be carried out on the basis of "motivation" and "encouragement", without creating mandatory mechanisms. This, of course, encourages large countries such as France, Germany, Italy to continue developing national projects. Other countries will remain outside of such opportunities. How this will affect the declared capabilities of the remaining national armed forces of EU countries is still unknown.

Looking at the implementation of such a project, it is worth noting that, despite leaving NATO as a priority for security, the EU is already developing cooperation within Europe. For example, through the Kensington Treaty between Great Britain and Germany, The Aachen Treaty between Germany and France, renewed the Lancaster House Treaties between Great Britain and France. Are these treaties taken into account in the future vision, and what, for example, is the role of the UK, which is not a member of the EU but is located on the European continent and still has its own potential?

This program document has already been widely studied and analyzed. Its richness in declarative statements and formulations allowed a wide circle in Ukraine to find both benefits and drawbacks in this document. For us, the main thing remains that, despite the ambitious goals stated regarding support for Ukraine, all this will likely be implemented without deadlines and mechanisms for mandatory implementation, and as a result – without appropriate guarantees.

So, despite high expectations, it is in Europe's security, in its practical sense, that dependence on the US will remain. At the same time, emphasizing cooperation, interaction and competitiveness of the military-industrial complex, The White Paper provides wide opportunities to advance our individual interests and opens the way to participation of Ukraine, as a country outside the EU, on an equal basis, perhaps to "enter" the military-industrial complex once united by the real influence of Russia. In the absence of binding mechanisms, our main activity will be the active promotion at the government, business, and expert levels of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex own interests as part of the potentially opening European market. It is necessary to fight for finance, technology, and production with every country that interests us, remembering that the basis of our power is in our technologies and practices of use. It is this approach that will not only protect Ukraine, but can also turn our military-industrial complex into a point of economic growth, similar to what happened in Israel and South Korea.

Therefore, despite the determination of European countries to take more responsibility for their own security, specific concepts for a new defense architecture probably only someday will begin to take shape. Thus, against the background of proposals for the consolidation of the defense industry and the declaration of collective combat capabilities, the White Paper for the period until 2030 does not plan the main – the formation of joint military structures within the EU and structures capable of managing them.

All this shows that despite the fact that the White Paper declares that the EU will prepare to deter external armed aggression and for this purpose the EU Member States must possess the full range of military capabilities, it remains unclear, who in the EU will be responsible for implementing joint projects, developing joint capabilities, and managing and using these capabilities within the framework of, for example, joint operations or airspace control outside NATO borders?

Speaking specifically about military capabilities, I would also like to note that their acquisition in modern conditions is possible only through the implementation of the only one comprehensive system of transformations in a number of industries:

• development and implementation of new technologies;
• a radical reform of the military-industrial complex, implemented within a strict state program;
• logistics and procurement, taking into account rapid and dramatic changes in needs;
• managing processes not only on the battlefield, but also in state structures to achieve a defined political goal;
• the structure of the Defense Forces and the Armed Forces, as the main carriers of capabilities;
• doctrines of training and application of all components of the defense forces.

It is then obvious that the EU will rely only on NATO and, accordingly, the US to ensure its own security by 2030. So it is definitely premature to talk about Europe's strategic autonomy from the US. The EU will likely increase the share of its own weapons in parallel, trying to increase production volumes, including those that will be produced together with Ukraine.

The formation of a new European security architecture is probably not considered a priority task by 2030. And if it is being considered, it is only declaratively and focusing on the re-equipment of the national armed forces of the EU countries. Accordingly, in its foreign policy, the EU will focus on preserving the existing format of ensuring its own security, trying to keep, first of all, the US in the focus of its attention.

Accordingly, the involvement of Ukraine as a full player in the future European security architecture is not considered either formally or in principle, except partial use of combat experience and assistance in the war with Russia, following a strategy of avoiding war by supporting an already warring neighbor .

It is obvious that until there are no components of a defense system in Europe, the only way to achieve such necessary integration of Ukraine into the European defense system, primarily air and missile defense, is to continue working with NATO and its members that share borders with Russia or have historical warnings. This is almost the only way to bypass both political and other blockades within the EU, despite the fact that such a step carries significant geopolitical risks for member states.

Still, speaking of readiness for war as the main factor of combat capability, I would like to remind that our experience in waging such a war already demonstrates that:

• The war can be long. And so this completely changes the approach to the organization of the Armed Forces.
• New technologies have arrived on the battlefield, mastering which requires not only a replacement of weapons, but also a radical change in strategy, doctrine, and training.
• The war has truly become hybrid. It is being waged with absolute brutality both on the front lines and inside the country, using everything, including the information capabilities of the state.
• It is in modern conflicts that the role of the private sector has grown and continues to grow, which requires a completely different approach to shaping relations between the state and private business. A so-called public-private partnership appears, which involves allowing private business and foreign capital not only to production, but also to the development of weapons and military equipment.
• In a war of attrition, personnel play a crucial role. Their training and education become critical. This applies not only to military operations management, but also to the military-industrial complex, where, in the context of the integration of scientific centers and production, the integration of universities and, for example, design bureaus is also necessary.
• The key to successful combat operations is effective logistics and material and technical support. They are the priority targets in a war of attrition. Unfortunately, such problems cannot be solved simply by reviewing transport corridors. And it is also important to remember that the basis of logistics is uninterrupted supply, including electrical energy, which, as is already clear, must not only be protected, but also defended. This same electricity, in its absence, has a painful impact on both civilian infrastructure and people. This is a complex of measures that cannot be done without military participation. Conclusion: European security, despite the goals declared in the document, will continue to depend solely on the stability of Ukraine and its Armed Forces, as well as future effective partnership.

As expected, the creation of a new architecture for the European continent will take at least 5 years , which will be accompanied by both inertia associated with the hope of preserving an acceptable way of life and overcoming barriers in a democratic society.

I would also like to add that over the almost four years of the war in Ukraine, Russia has been systematically learning to fight better. It has already built a new army that collects, analyzes, and immediately implements combat experience. All of this culminates in the development of new doctrines and training programs. The national composition of prisoners entering the Armed Forces of Ukraine may also indicate the transfer of this unique experience to countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea. And therefore, this indicates the inevitable large-scale reform of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, both during the war and, possibly, in the post-war period.

Taking into account the trends in the development of scientific and technological progress in the conditions of modern combat operations and the completion of the formation of a fundamentally new doctrine of warfare, such a reform will obviously be completed no later than 2030. These will be armed forces of robots, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence, united by experience and already existing doctrines. Most importantly, they will be able to scale their new capabilities to the necessary level. This will be a new arms race for the right to control the global security system. It is already easy to predict the participants in this new arms race. These are certainly not those who only want to rearm profitably. I don't see all this in the structures of NATO armies, which will probably be ready for war with armies that no longer exist.

Looking back on our history, perhaps another problem of our former leaders was postponing unpopular steps for the sake of short-term popularity and following populist promises.

Obviously, in order to accelerate institutional defense readiness in a democratic society, it is necessary to conduct a dialogue with this society. Who will start this dialogue first, whether it is the European governments or the Russian army, depends on us and our partners.

Only our joint work will allow Ukraine to share not only its grief, but also its unique experience of waging war, which will help EU countries improve their defense strategies as soon as possible, and not only in the field of defense-industrial cooperation.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021 – 2024)