Over the past two years, Ukraine and its partners have launched a number of international projects in the field of unmanned and autonomous systems of various types. It is important to understand how these projects capitalize on Ukraine’s achievements in drone production and use.Map of Ukraine's international projects: from the U.S. and the UK to the Netherlands and FranceSince 2024, Ukraine and the U.S. have been establishing a framework for launching long production runs based on combat experience with the mass use of various types of drones. Joint projects include large-scale purchases of mass drones, licensing, and the launch of joint production lines in Ukraine and the United States, as well as cleansing supply chains of Chinese or other sanction-risk components.The U.S. interest in this project is less about drone design and more about access to battlefield data and the experience of rapid update cycles for aerial UAVs. “Battlefield data,” “combat data,” “operational data” — these terms are not yet as widely used in Ukraine as their equivalents are in international military terminology. But this is precisely the “digital treasure” of the new generation of warfare, and it is becoming the key factor in sustaining combat capability.What do we call battlefield data?It refers to the collection of digital data about the conduct of combat operations, including the use of specific weapon types. Beyond improving employment tactics, this data is critically important for shortening adaptation and production cycles, especially on flexible automated manufacturing lines.How large are the joint U.S.–Ukraine projects and what benefits will they bring to Ukraine? Targets for 2025–2026 include production benchmarks of millions of FPV drones and large batches of heavy UAVs. For Ukraine, this means long-term contracts, joint certification, and predictable logistics. For the U.S., it means industrializing combat‑proven, digitized solutions and supply chains cleansed of Chinese dependence. Joint projects also include maritime uncrewed systems and the associated combat‑use data.This summer plans were also announced to deliver 33,000 artificial‑intelligence packages for Ukrainian air‑defense drones.This will be carried out under several parallel contracts with the U.S. and separate suppliers in the EU, starting in 2025. These are autonomous onboard AI modules capable of acquiring and tracking a target with a multisensor “vision” and intercepting it by predicting movement in complex EW conditions when GPS is lost. For Ukraine, this directly strengthens the effectiveness of low‑cost counter‑drone systems (C‑UAS); for partners, it offers the prospect of stable demand in the emerging market for autonomous AI modules and the opportunity to obtain a new dataset of battlefield data.Project Octopus, announced by the United Kingdom in 2025, is preparation for the serial production of low‑cost drone interceptors relying on Ukrainian combat experience. The stated target is thousands of interceptors per month. The project focuses on the platform, sensors, a protected control channel, guidance algorithms, and integration into layered air defence. The British side provides industrial discipline and standards, while the Ukrainian side supplies continuous combat feedback and rapid interceptor updates.Since 2025 the Netherlands has been rolling out the VDL Born industrial hub, where, among other things, ground robotic complexes (GRC), power modules, and UAV components for Ukraine are to be produced. Funding has also begun for production of the THeMIS GRC for Ukraine. This project gives us additional manufacturing capacity and closer alignment with European industrial standards — and for the Netherlands it provides jobs and the same combat‑use data mentioned earlier.From 2025 France has declared its intentions to jointly produce modular UAVs for tactical reconnaissance with Ukraine, equipped with electro‑optical and infrared sensors, protected data links, and integration with artillery systems. Ukraine will provide combat‑use data for this project, while France will provide certification and a production base for joint manufacturing.Since 2024 Germany has begun financing development, together with Ukraine, of long‑range strike and reconnaissance UAVs equipped with protected communications and an autonomous control system compatible with Bundeswehr and NATO requirements. The benefits for both sides are similar: for Ukraine — closer alignment with European industrial standards and scale; for Germany — integration of Ukraine’s combat experience into its own technical solutions.Thales Belgium in 2024 put into production 70‑mm air‑burst rockets for counter‑UAV use. Originally these were unguided aviation rockets and laser‑guided rockets for helicopters and aircraft. They have now been adapted for counter‑drone use thanks to a new warhead. Ukraine’s Defense Forces were the first to integrate and use this version of the rocket. Partial assembly in Ukraine is expected.These are not Ukraine’s only cooperative projects, but they are the most illustrative. What does their map show? The U.S. and the U.K. are working with Ukraine to quickly close the shortfall in strike UAVs, cleansing supply chains of Chinese components, and to supply drone interceptors (C‑UAS) with autonomous AI modules. The EU is building institutional tools for large‑scale procurements and a transition to supply chains without risky nodes. The Netherlands is providing a production hub (a defence‑industrial and technology park) for ground robotics. France and Germany — certification, manufacturing technology, and bringing production up to Western industrial standards.In these projects Ukraine gets what it needs here and now: access to series production of drones — including air‑defence models certified to European standards — their rapid updates based on combat‑use data, and long‑term contracts.Ukraine's drone revolution: what Ukraine can offer its partnersEven before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground robotic complexes (GRCs) had long been present in the armed forces of leading countries and were already used to a noticeable extent in Ukraine’s Joint Forces Operation in the east after Russia’s 2014 invasion. However, as we know, until 2022 drones were primarily tools for reconnaissance and combat support, with only limited strike capabilities.As early as 1982, Israel deployed UAVs in its system for suppressing Syrian air defenses during the 1982 Bekaa Valley operation. In the U.S., the drone era began in 2001, when reconnaissance‑strike systems based on UAVs became a regular tool in campaigns around the world, starting with Iraq, which had attempted to occupy Kuwait. By 2007–2008, the U.S. had established a unified classification of UAV groups (Groups 1–5) as a basis for operational planning and defense procurement. Turkey in the 2010s began serial production of strike UAVs, which appeared in Ukraine in 2019. By the time of Russia’s full-scale aggression, established tactics, technologies, and procedures for military drone use existed worldwide, though limited in scale and functionality.Meanwhile, from 2014 to 2021, Ukraine was building its own drone foundation — from volunteer reconnaissance units and the first standard UAVs in the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) zone to the creation of an integrated observation system along the frontline in the east.Russia’s full-scale invasion gave drone use in warfare a new dimension — over a few years of high-intensity conflict, drones have evolved from a supporting tool into a key instrument of war.The “drone transition” in warfare has manifested in the emergence of a continuously expanding dead zone along the front. This zone is created through the extensive use of strike and reconnaissance drones, as well as countermeasures — electronic warfare, air-defense drones, and other means to combat strike and reconnaissance UAVs.Another manifestation of the new war‑technology was the scale of production with shortened iteration and adaptation cycles to meet frontline needs. Electronics, control systems, communications channels, and UAV airframes updated for the front could appear in the Defense Forces within weeks. The government, the Ministry of Defence, and the defence industry launched new development and procurement instruments such as DOT‑Chain Defence and Brave1. Previously, such instruments existed in the world only as plans and pilot projects.A third manifestation of the drone revolution is the wide use of UAVs to compensate for shortages in far more expensive strike aviation and conventional cruise missiles. At the same time as using long‑range strike UAVs, Ukraine demonstrated the effectiveness of long‑range strike systems that employ swarms of small drones - autonomously or guided from afar - using a “hybrid” long‑range delivery system.A new project has been the mass deployment of air‑defence drones as a lower, relatively inexpensive and highly accessible layer of counter‑drone measures (C‑UAS): they are intended to fill the cost gap between the relatively cheap target (the drone) and expensive missile‑based air‑defence systems.Another breakthrough in drone technology demonstrated by Ukraine is the effective asymmetric use of uncrewed boats (uncrewed surface vessels) against conventional warships. Ukrainian USVs have effectively neutralized the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, confining its remnants to Russian ports on the sea’s eastern shore. USVs have also shown considerable potential for destroying the aggressor’s port infrastructure.As a result, Ukraine’s drone achievements—unseen anywhere in the world before 2022 - can be described as a combat drone capability kit at the tactical, operational and even strategic levels. This kit includes drone platforms of various classes, their electronics and software, tactics, technology and employment procedures. It also includes large‑scale combat‑use data — the very “digital treasure” without which delivering high combat capability in the new generation of wars is impossible.However, the main problem is that this Ukrainian achievement is still clearly under‑capitalized. What’s needed are long production runs of components with transparent provenance from partner countries, standards, intellectual property protection, and contracts that bind combat‑use data to the weapons’ lifecycle with continuous adaptation and modernization to wartime conditions. In other words, the situation is such that Ukraine lacks the instruments to capitalize on its digitized combat drone experience, while allies and partners lack that very digitized experience.What can be done in this situation?Barriers that need to be removed for the development of international projectsFirst, we should see what on the map of international projects is already working well today and what will require serious investment and effort.For example, Britain’s Project Octopus for serial production of air‑defence drones together with U.S. deliveries of onboard AI packages for guiding such drones closes an extremely sensitive gap in protection against Russian medium‑ and long‑range strike drones. This direction is complemented by the creation of relatively cheap air‑defence rockets based on unguided aviation rockets.European joint procurements and standardization help reduce unit costs, raise technological levels, and make demand predictable. In particular, deploying production at the Dutch VDL Born hub potentially strengthens Ukraine’s ground military robotics. The French initiative for serial production of tactical reconnaissance UAVs with protected communications potentially fills the need for high‑quality target designation for artillery and FPV swarms. The U.S. project will provide access to cutting‑edge American technologies, notably AI‑based autonomous control systems.These are clear, unambiguous positives.Now about where there is only a partial "hit." American and European projects are still more about “how to manufacture correctly” than about “how to sustain ultra‑fast adaptation cycles.” If contracts do not lock in the mechanics of access to combat‑use data, adaptation speeds may lag behind the emergence of new tactics, techniques and procedures on the battlefield.The French and German approaches are strong on production technology and certification. But there is a risk of excessive regulation — the relative lack of which was largely what attracted external interest in the first place. The Dutch hub can meet the front’s need for ground robotic complexes, but likely only for a limited range of types so far.Unfortunately, the maritime segment — development and production of USVs and other marine drones — appears underrepresented in international projects. Yet this segment is precisely what gave Ukraine an asymmetric advantage at sea and reopened maritime routes for external trade.Finally, there are also outright gaps in the international projects.First, guaranteed volumes for small drones are not yet locked into long‑term contracts with options for surge scaling.Second, the transition to components with transparent provenance requires not only intent but also a common catalogue of approved modules, joint procurement of critical electronics/optics, and preferential working‑capital financing for manufacturers. In practice, this means de‑facto including Ukraine in a shared EU‑ or U.S.‑aligned export‑control system that reduces mutual technological barriers.In short, this new level of cooperation demands new, increasingly complex solutions. The sooner we find them, the more certain Ukraine's battlefield advantage over the Russians will be.This material was prepared in collaboration with the Consortium for Defence Information (CDI), a project that unites Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and is aimed at strengthening information support and analytical capacity in the fields of national security, defense, and geopolitics.