Contents1. Could the unprecedented incident turn the tide of Russia's war against Ukraine?2. Future scenarios: how Europe is reluctantly marching toward inevitable confrontation with Russia3. Opportunity for Ukraine: how to seize itParadoxically, perhaps, the Russian attack on Poland has created certain opportunities for countering Russia and its allies from the West and Ukraine's side. Much depends on the human factor — primarily how the U.S. President Trump and his closest advisers perceive the situation, and, secondly, but no less importantly, on European leaders. Ultimately, it also depends on Ukraine itself.Could the unprecedented incident turn the tide of Russia's war against Ukraine?On the night of September 10, Russian attack drones struck Polish territory. Although Russia had previously sent drones into Poland, violating its airspace and even targeting helicopters, this strike marked the largest incursion to date. Reports indicate that Moscow had been preparing such attacks on Poland since at least July 2025, with Polish SIM cards discovered on some Russian drones.Immediately following the attack, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Sejm that around 19 drones had entered Polish airspace, noting that, for the first time, some had flown in from Belarus. In addition to the drones, the Polish Interior Ministry reported that wreckage from one missile was also found on Polish territory.The turning point, however, came when Poland began intercepting Russian attack drones over its own territory for the first time. The Polish military successfully shot down several of the drones, with significant assistance from NATO and Dutch aircraft. Dutch F-35A fighters and Polish F-16 jets actively participated in neutralizing the targets. Additionally, a German Air Force Patriot PAC-3 air defense system was placed on alert, while an Italian Air Force Gulfstream G550 CAEW surveillance aircraft was deployed to monitor the situation.However, NATO continues to reveal weaknesses.The first level of weakness is military. According to various sources, only three to four Russian attack drones were shot down. In other words, the Kremlin achieved its primary objective: demonstrating, through the example of Poland, the apparent unpreparedness of Poland’s air and missile defense system—and, by extension, NATO—for a modern combined missile and drone attack. This is notable given that Poland is a leading NATO member in defense spending, allocating 4.48% of its GDP to military capabilities.The second level of weakness is political. Poland’s military and political leadership appeared so stunned that it did not explicitly label Russia as the aggressor. Meanwhile, Belarus, acting as Russia’s vassal, claimed through its First Deputy Minister of Defense that it had provided information about “lost” Russian drones to Poland and emphasized the “destruction of some drones by Belarusian air defenses over its own territory.” Additionally, media outlets promoted narratives suggesting that the drones were not Shahed-type UAVs but rather Gerbera drones, which are essentially simulated drones without lethal payloads, implying they posed no real threat.Observers have rightly noted that Russia’s large-scale drone incursion into Poland came just before the Zapad-2025 military exercises in Belarus, which act as a shield for Moscow against potential Western reactions. Europe also recalls alarming statements by another Russian official, Dmitry Medvedev, regarding ambitions to alter Finland’s borders, along with the massive buildup of up to 500,000 troops in northern Russia, near the Scandinavian states.A few hours later, Reuters, citing its sources, reported that NATO declined to officially recognize the Russian drone incursion into Poland as an act of aggression.It is difficult to reconcile this with the image of Poland as “Europe’s new military superpower,” as POLITICO described it in November 2022. Indeed, if Poland — building the largest land army in Europe, as The Telegraph noted in March 2023 — is hesitating, what can we say about other European NATO countries? And isn't this reaction an invitation to the bloody Moscow KGB to continue “collecting land?”Future scenarios: how Europe is reluctantly marching toward inevitable confrontation with RussiaIt’s no surprise that Poland was targeted. Since the early 1990s, the country has been shaped as a key U.S. outpost in Europe. For Putin, humiliating Poland is like delivering a personal slap to Trump. This came on the heels of the Russian dictator’s high-profile meetings with Trump in Alaska, followed by Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, and Kim Jong-un at the SCO summit. His non-verbal message is clear: “I kill thousands, destroy cities in the heart of Europe, and gain respect for it.”The crucial element now is Trump’s response to this shocking event in Poland. Not a statement, but a decisive action. Without visible U.S. leadership, Article 5 of NATO’s Charter and the principle of collective defense risk being hollow words.Can we find China's shadow in the event? Many experts believe so. After the military parade, Xi Jinping openly challenged Washington and appears to be leveraging Putin, who depends on Beijing for critical military supplies and energy purchases. There is also speculation that Putin may have offered rare earth metals to the U.S. to improve relations — something Xi likely disapproves of. It’s possible that Xi has nudged Putin toward a European attack or large-scale provocation, both to intimidate and to unsettle Trump. This would put Putin in a difficult position: balancing closer ties with China against the possibility of appeasing the U.S. Such a scenario aligns with Xi’s broader strategy: support Putin just enough to keep Russia at war, while preventing it from becoming an independent global power.From Russia’s perspective, an offensive against Europe fits its broader imperial strategy. In this light, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent warning gains weight: Putin’s ambitions will not be confined to Ukraine; Ukraine is just the beginning.Opportunity for Ukraine: how to seize itUkraine has been given new opportunities, several in fact.First, the heightened focus on Poland could strengthen cooperation and mutual support. President Zelenskyy immediately offered Ukraine’s assistance in helping Poland build an effective warning and protection system against Russian provocations.Some, like Ihor Lutsenko, former MP and now an Armed Forces member and civic activist, advocate going further. He believes Ukraine should formally offer to deploy anti-Shahed units to Poland, assist in organizing anti-drone defense, and even host Polish personnel in Ukrainian training centers to practice intercepting Shahed drones.The importance of Poland cannot be overstated, both in terms of general political support and purely military assistance. Poland was seen as a member of a sub-regional military and political alliance within the UK-Poland-Ukraine framework, and possibly with the Baltic states as well. With Poland, missiles and drones could be scaled up together (something that is already being deployed as part of the Ukrainian-British technology hub), in addition to its unique role as a hub for Western weapons sent to Ukraine. It is worth remembering that Poland, as a buyer of a huge amount of American weapons, has missiles for the Patriot system and ammunition for the HIMARS system, including ATACMS ballistic missiles. Of course, this is in case of joint survival.Europe is the second chance, and therefore the second level. A joint NATO decision could ensure that Ukraine's skies are “closed” to Russian drones and missiles, including hypersonic ones. It would also be possible to jointly scale up anti-drone interceptors, anti-aircraft drones, and radars for them. The Ukrainian Air Force is at the limit of what it can do to fight Russian missiles and drones, using an army of more than 200 Rada radars (collected around the world). Moreover, even these radars are not enough, and they can only “see” Shaheds from 5 kilometers away. Meanwhile, the “Snov” radar developed by a private company, which was adopted in 2021 (which can “see” a Russian drone from 50 km away), is not being purchased due to lack of funds. It would be possible to jointly produce the latest Ukrainian air defense system, which is not inferior to the German IRIS-T in terms of characteristics, but is many times cheaper.Of course, with integration into the European defense space, there are many more versions of joint development and production of weapons than purely Ukrainian ones. And the fact that Putin's war is approaching a clash with NATO will force Ukraine to be accepted as an asset, as part of Europe that can actively defend itself. The third opportunity, at a new geopolitical level, involves the United States. Trump recognizing that it’s impossible to negotiate with Putin could trigger a strategic shift. Many politicians in his party already grasp the situation. For instance, following the drone attack on Poland, Republican Congressman Joe Wilson called on Trump to impose sanctions on Russia and supply Ukraine with weapons capable of striking Russian territory. Wilson stressed that sanctions should be used to economically weaken Russia’s military machine while arming Ukraine to hit targets within Russia itself.As a businessman, Trump also cannot ignore the position of European allies in NATO to refuse American weapons, a phenomenon that could gain momentum and have a negative impact on the American military economy. U.S. arms exports in 2024 reached a record high of $318.7 billion. However, the consistent alienation of Europe could significantly reduce the profits of American defense companies and their commitment to Trump. Therefore, the purchase of Patriot, HIMARS, and hundreds of ballistic missiles for Ukraine would be a simultaneous contribution from the United States and Europe. It's time to talk about selling or transferring Tomahawk cruise missiles with a basic range of 1,600 kilometers to Ukraine.Ukraine needs no less than Tomahawk missiles and the latest Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) with a range of 500 kilometers. These ballistic missiles are difficult to intercept over Russia — similar to the previous ATACMS, which was rarely shot down. Both ATACMS and PrSM can be launched from HIMARS MLRS, which Ukraine has been operating since summer 2022, meaning minimal additional training is required. Even 100–200 missiles could have a significant impact, especially when used alongside cruise missiles and other strike assets.Tactical systems such as Avengers, Vampires, and Stinger MANPADS would also be valuable for Ukraine. Additionally, counter-drone weapons like the U.S. Coyote jet drone, which can be launched from an M2 Bradley, would help defend against Shahed/Geran UAVs. Advanced systems such as the 50-kilowatt IM-SHORAD combat laser and the Phalanx CIWS with its 20-mm Vulcan cannon — capable of firing up to 4,500 rounds per minute — would strengthen air defense. The land-based Centurion C-RAM, used by the U.S. Army to protect bases, would also be particularly useful.Finally, the United States could provide Ukraine with one or two batteries of the latest THAAD missile defense systems on a temporary or leased basis. (Two such batteries were previously deployed to Israel during heightened tensions with Iran; the U.S. Army has a total of seven THAAD batteries.) Equally important would be access to the MRC Typhon ground-based missile system, equipped with SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles and Tomahawk Block V cruise missiles. This system was considered for temporary deployment in Germany and was used in February 2025 to protect the Philippines. Ukraine, together with European partners, could lease or purchase this medium-range system.While these proposals may sound like science fiction, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in early July that if China decided to attack Taiwan, it could “most likely” compel a Putin dependent on Beijing to attack Europe simultaneously. The recent incident in Poland could be the first step of such a scenario. For this reason, the Western camp cannot afford to continue showing weakness.The material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that brings together Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and aims to strengthen information support and analytical support in the field of national security, defense, and geopolitics.