It’s worth recalling the uneven division of the Black Sea Fleet “the Moscow way”: the 1997 agreement granted Ukraine’s Navy only 18.3% of the fleet’s ships, while Russia took 81.7% along with the main base in Sevastopol. Yet, despite practically having no surface fleet, Ukraine shook the foundation of both the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Crimea, because one cannot function effectively without the other. Ukraine’s defense forces reached a point where dominance in the western Black Sea was not only eliminated but Russia’s main forces were forced to retreat to Novorossiysk under the pressure of drones.From the cruiser Moskva to a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet destroyedThe sinking of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in April 2022 was a game-changer in the war’s course. The psychological impact of this achievement is hard to overstate, as it first and foremost boosted confidence in Ukraine’s naval strength—a country without a fleet. It proved that creative new solutions can triumph over traditional ones, and fundamentally showed the power of technology on land and in the air. This was not simply a victory of a single Neptune anti-ship missile system but a well-coordinated complex operation where intelligence and drone usage played a crucial role.What followed was an almost continuous series of complex operations accompanied by rapid development of specialized weapons. Ukrainian maritime drones were first reported on September 21, 2022, when Russians found and destroyed one near Sevastopol’s coast. By late October 2022, a group of seven sea drones attacked ships in Sevastopol Bay. Several successful raids on occupiers’ ships forced them literally to hide their vessels in bays and further fortify those bays.Of course, the naval war was not without setbacks. The recognition of human vulnerability during maritime operations—for example, during the liberation of Snake Island or the ambush of Ukrainian special forces from the 73rd Marine Center near Tendrivska Spit in February 2024—and the need to protect soldiers gradually transformed naval tactics. While people continued to risk and demonstrate heroism, “smart machines” began to take autonomous roles at sea.In July 2023, surface naval drones significantly damaged the roadway of the Crimean Bridge, showcasing the broad capabilities of these drones and marking a new level for the Defense Forces: acquiring combat skills that never existed before.Serial combat use of maritime drones in the Black Sea began in early summer 2023, and since then, these drones underwent a complex transformation into advanced combat systems. Former 'kamikaze' drones with explosives evolved into unique multifunctional and reusable complexes. The Defense Forces acknowledged that only 30% of maritime drones hit intended targets, while 60–70% were destroyed by Russia. Still, the shift to serial production of naval robotic complexes foreshadowed the success of attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet using 'kamikaze' boats.In August 2023, Ukrainian intelligence publicly released rare footage of an experimental sea drone attacking the Crimean Bridge. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officially took responsibility for the July 17 operation that damaged the bridge’s traffic lanes—the second attack on a vital Russian logistics link. From 2023, Ukrainian engineers also began developing underwater drones, with reports about guided torpedoes “Toloka” and underwater drones “Marichka,” though they had not yet seen active combat deployment.One officially confirmed maritime drone success was the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet minesweeper Ivan Golubets (Project 266M “Aquamarine”). Each operation since then became a fascinating story. For example, in early February 2024, six Magura sea drones attacked the Russian boat Ivanovets, sinking it. Mid-February 2024 saw special forces of the Defense Intelligence Directorate sink the large landing ship Caesar Kunikov using drones.The ongoing improvement of Ukraine’s maritime robotic systems is striking. In May 2024, the SBU converted the Sea Baby drone into a multifunctional platform equipped with a rocket launcher. In December 2024, the Ukrainian Navy showcased kamikaze boats acting as “drone motherships,” capable of launching their own FPV drones.The combat capabilities of maritime drones grew so rapidly they often became a “surprise” for Russia. A notable battle took place in early December 2024 when a group of SBU Sea Baby RCCs engaged Russian helicopters, planes, and Raptor patrol boats trying to intercept them. Impressively, Russian pilots who considered themselves drone hunters became prey as Sea Baby drones were armed with heavy machine guns featuring ballistic auto-aim and target lock. The SBU reported intercepted Russian radio communications indicating casualties and severe damage to helicopters.In 2025, Ukraine’s maritime robotic systems saw another surge in development. Reports emerged of successful use of maritime drones armed with naval mines, machine guns, unguided rockets, surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, and even “drone motherships” with FPV drones. The SBU equipped Sea Baby drones with RPV-16 dynamoreactive grenade launchers carrying thermobaric unguided rockets. In March 2025, Ukraine employed unmanned torpedo carriers in the Black Sea—a sea drone launched a torpedo or smaller kamikaze drone to strike surface targets.Also, in April 2025, the Russian Volunteer Corps of the Armed Forces received Katran surface drones carrying airstrike-capable aircraft-type drones mounted on launchers that protect them in water and raise them before launch.Among major 2024–2025 operations were attacks on Russian-occupied offshore gas rigs using Ukrainian surface drones equipped with guided missiles. A whole series of Ukrainian naval drone strikes targeted both land and sea objectives. The Magura V5 maritime unmanned ship (RCC) gained fame equipped with an adapted infrared-guided R-73 missile. This RCC became a powerful mobile platform for air defense and striking stationary targets. The R-73, an older Soviet short-range air-to-air missile, was successfully modified for surface launch, giving Magura V5 the unique ability to shoot down aerial targets. According to some estimates, the cost of Magura V5 is under $250,000, while Russia spends millions destroying helicopters and warships.The Defense Forces of Ukraine achieved many naval firsts in the war. On May 2, 2025, for the first time in history, two Russian Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters were shot down in the Black Sea using unmanned boats armed with AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The operation involved three Magura V7 sea drones, two of which fired on the aircraft. One Su-30 was downed near Novorossiysk, the other over the Black Sea.The Magura V7 is a modified version of the Magura V5 designed for air defense. Interestingly, the AIM-9 Sidewinder is a U.S. short-range infrared homing missile in service since 1956, still produced and used by over 50 countries. The combination of new drone tech with legacy missile systems marks a true innovation in naval air defense drones.In May, the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Directorate released the documentary “Naval Battle: The Era of Drones,” detailing how Ukraine achieves targets 1,000–1,500 km away, effectively paralyzing the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. The film highlights the epochal sinking of the Russian missile boat Ivanovets with its approximately 40 crew members—a morale-boosting event impacting the Russiancollective psyche.The documentary also showcased a drone carrier capable of carrying 500 to 3,000 kilograms of various air, surface, and underwater weapons. “The system uses the latest NATO artificial intelligence technology,” said a Ukrainian intelligence officer, symbolizing the bright future of innovative military solutions.In early May 2025, a historic naval engagement occurred between the Russian fast assault boat BK-16 (capable of 40+ knots and armed with 12.7mm machine guns and grenade launchers) and the Ukrainian Magura V5 drone armed with an R-73 missile. Experts described it as a clash of traditional versus modern technology, manned versus robotic arms, highlighting the evolution of naval warfare as unmanned systems challenge manned forces on near equal terms. Videos show Russia struggling to neutralize the drone despite machine guns, rocket launchers, and small arms. Although the drone was eventually destroyed, the encounter foreshadows future battles unlikely to favor human crews.At a spring 2025 MoD Intelligence presentation, Magura V7 drones with American AIM-9 missiles and remotely controlled machine gun turrets were publicly shown. By May 2025, military intelligence declared the drones were “engaging all targets at sea.”Although fighter aviation was still active, after helicopter losses on December 31, 2024, Russian forces ceased helicopter operations whenever drones armed with missiles appeared.“Russia barely ventures 20 miles from their eastern bases, showing they fear being targeted even 800+ kilometers away. I think we can say Ukraine controls more than 90% of the Black Sea now,” said the commander of Group 13 of the Defense Ministry Intelligence in May 2025, noting Russia currently lacks significant maritime drone capabilities. This may be an exaggeration, but it underscores the Defense Forces’ unprecedented achievements based on advanced tech and a mosquito-like strategy.In early June 2025, the SBU struck the Crimean Bridge for the third time—mining and damaging the structurally complex underwater supports. The SBU reported heavy damage to bridge foundations at the seabed level, aided by 1,100 kg of explosives equivalent. While effectiveness remains hard to measure, this operation marked the expansion of special forces into underwater warfare, with noted advances in underwater drone development.The future of maritime robots: Where Ukraine and the world are headedThere’s no doubt that unmanned systems will continue to evolve at sea.First, multi-domain capabilities will develop, as we already see drones striking aerial targets and diving underwater, moving toward autonomous swarms linked in a network. Following the success of maritime drones, river drones are likely the next frontier. Ukraine already fields combat river drones such as “Ursula,” nicknamed a “saboteur and scout.”Second, new weapons development will involve hybrids, new materials, and innovations. Underwater drones won’t just strike at depth but will use the environment for stealthy movement. In 2025, several private companies advanced underwater drones, with First Contact (part of the New Energy Ukraine alliance) announcing a “submarine drone mothership” capable of sudden FPV drone delivery anywhere at sea.Third, military-technical cooperation and allied partnerships will boost technological sophistication and firepower, equipping weapons with new offensive and defensive capabilities. For example, British assistance supports new naval robotic complexes like the Wasp and Snapper surface drones for Ukrainian Black Sea capabilities.In early 2025, the UK announced the development of the COOKSON, a low-observable heavy-weapon carrier drone for operations in Ukraine and beyond. It’s a reusable platform resistant to Russian electronic warfare and able to strike targets even if signals are lost. The drone boasts speeds over 40 knots in strong storms and carries several fragmentation warhead missiles with a 30–100 km range.Not only Ukraine but also others advance naval robotization. Recently, the U.S. DARPA showed its 54-meter, 240-ton USX-1 Defiant—a fully autonomous naval drone carrying full armament—undergoing sea trials since March 2025 without crew onboard.Even more impressive is South Korea, which is replacing aircraft carriers with a drone fleet led by a large flagship. Hyundai Heavy Industries’ Combat USV conducts reconnaissance and close combat missions in forward areas instead of manned ships. Alongside an escadrille of maritime drones, an air and surface drone escadrille and a Naval Unmanned Forces Command are planned. The trend points to “smart unmanned ships” replacing crews, as the choice between aircraft carriers and large multipurpose unmanned command ships increasingly favors the latter.This article was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project uniting Ukrainian analytical and research organizations aimed at strengthening information support and analytical capacity in national security, defense, and geopolitics.