Russian forces are increasingly relying on Shahed loitering munitions, a trend that has raised alarm among Ukrainians. A year ago, they were launching hundreds each month – now the number has surged into the thousands. What also causes significant damage are Russian reconnaissance drones which frequently infiltrate Ukraine's deep rear in broad daylight and guide ballistic missile strikes.

"They've scaled up Shahed production and are still scaling it up," says Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military radio technology specialist, in his blog. "If we don't act now, our infrastructure, production and defences will be done for."

Relying on allies is becoming increasingly uncertain. In June, the United States redirected 20,000 air defence rockets bound for Ukraine to the Middle East. Ukrainian forces had counted on these weapons to help counter Russian drones.

To survive, Ukraine must rapidly identify effective assets and ramp up local production. One such solution is the interceptor drone.

As far back as last year, Ukrainian troops began using first-person view (FPV) drones to destroy slow-moving Russian reconnaissance UAVs such as Orlan, Zala, Supercam and others. The Ukrainian military, together with engineers, made slight modifications to conventional FPV drones, saturated troop units with small radar systems to help detect targets and refined their interception tactics.

[BANNER1]

Interceptor drones are now starting to take down the much faster Shaheds, while specialised aircraft-type drones designed precisely to shoot down aerial targets are entering the market. Kyiv Oblast State Administration reported that during a recent Russian nighttime attack, the Clear Sky unit from Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces used such drones to destroy 33 Russian UAVs in a single operation.

Recently, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly mentioned interceptor drones, requesting funding from allies. This clearly signals the technology's strategic importance for Ukraine.

Ukraine's defence forces largely owe the supply of interceptor drones to charitable foundations. This area is currently being actively advanced by foundations led by Serhii Prytula and Serhii Sternenko and by Come Back Alive, a Ukrainian public organisation and charitable foundation supporting the Armed Forces.

The Dronefall project by Come Back Alive began last year as a fundraiser aimed at shooting down reconnaissance UAVs. Thanks to donations from businesses and citizens, the foundation built the infrastructure to destroy over 2,000 Russian drones, valued at around US$150 million. It is now gradually shifting focus to targeting Shaheds.

Speaking to Oboronka, a defence industry project by Mezha Media (a technology and IT news platform within Ukrainska Pravda's holding company), Come Back Alive consultant Taras Tymochko has outlined Ukrainian progress in drone interceptor technologies, specialised radar systems and countermeasures against Russian drones as well as the unlimited potential for scaling.

Each successive drone is cheaper to shoot down than the last

We often hear that drone air defence is simply a US$500 drone shooting down a US$50,000 reconnaissance UAV. In my view, this is an oversimplification, as the military still requires costly infrastructure: transport, communications, generators, equipment, operator training, etc. Have you ever calculated the actual cost of shooting down a single aerial target with an FPV drone?

This is something we often discuss among colleagues. If we roughly take the cost of all the equipment we've transferred to military units and divide it by the number of drones shot down, we get 245,000 hryvnias [approx. US$5,870] per enemy reconnaissance drone.

That's a very rough calculation, though. The reason is that the first downed drone requires significant investment in infrastructure development, while by the time you reach the hundredth, the costs are much lower.

[BANNER2]

The cost per downed enemy drone decreases over time as operators gain experience. At first, a soldier might need ten drones to take down one target, but as they master the technical details and improve their skills, the number of attempts per target drops significantly, and so does the cost of the operation.

But the Russians are also adapting to our drone air defence and developing new ways to counter it. Right now, is the effectiveness of our drone destruction improving, or has it started to decline?

The return on our investment is improving. Referring back to our rough calculations, last autumn we spent an average of UAH 300,000 (about US$7,188) per drone, while by spring that cost had dropped to UAH 245,000.

It's important to remember that we're deliberately involving more and more inexperienced units in the project. This means we're currently spending more on them to shoot down their first drones. But thanks to the seasoned units, the average cost per Russian drone is gradually coming down.

So, is each successive drone cheaper to shoot down than the last?

Absolutely.

What do you find scarcer when it comes to shooting down more Russian drones: money or people?

The biggest challenge right now is training personnel. We have very few training centres for interceptor drone pilots, so we need to find alternatives. For example, I often ask seasoned units to take on inexperienced ones for training.

As experience shows, this training is faster than usual. But there's a downside: a unit that should focus on interceptions ends up spending time training neighbouring units instead.

Taras Chmut, head of the Come Back Alive Foundation, burning Russian Supercam and Zala drones on camera to promote the Dronefall project

There is a 13-month waiting list for Ukrainian-made radar stations

One of the key elements of drone air defence is small radar stations that can detect a target's position and altitude. This equipment is imported and quite sophisticated. Do you have enough of them to keep expanding the number of interceptor groups?

The enemy is actively hunting for our radar stations. Sometimes they succeed, and sometimes they don't, because we've begun taking countermeasures. So far, there are no issues with the availability of these radars.

Are there any similar radars designed in Ukraine? How well do they meet the needs of interceptor drone operators?

There is strong demand for Ukrainian-made radar stations. The military speaks highly of them. The waiting list for a model from one domestic factory is now 13 months long. That's up from six months just half a year ago. This shows that our manufacturer is struggling to scale up. Demand is rising, but production capacity isn't keeping pace.

Ukrainian technology is easier and more stable for interceptor operators because it's designed specifically for their needs. Imported systems have multiple modes and settings for various purposes, which can sometimes cause issues.

[BANNER3]

The Russians are developing new ways to evade our FPV drones. For example, they mount a camera on the back of their drones and manoeuvre as soon as they spot an interceptor in the lens. Can this tactic defeat Dronefall?

Russian rear-view cameras have a limited field of view. This allows us to study the use of cameras and approach the drones from blind spots. For example, if the Orlan's camera is on the bottom, it means you need to attack from above. With the Zala, the camera is on top, so you need to approach from below.

A rear-view camera on the Russian Zala drone

Photo: Serhii Flash's Telegram channel about military radar technology

More often than not, the Russians equip their drones with radio sensors that let operators detect incoming FPVs. Once alerted, they start manoeuvring, dodging and trying to escape, using the camera to gauge how far away our drone is.

At first glance, this tactic might seem like an effective countermeasure, but we have our own ways of responding. It's a constant process of adaptation. Besides, those evasive manoeuvres require highly skilled operators. Inexperienced operators usually dive right away, triggering the parachute and losing the drone.

The situation with the Russians is clear. But technically speaking, how are we improving our ability to shoot down drones?

We're extending flight time, especially with the advent of aircraft-type interceptors. It can now reach up to an hour, which allows patrol missions to be conducted. However, the flight time is shorter in pursuit scenarios because the engines are running at full power.

Ukrainian-made communication systems are getting increasingly better. Ukraine is doing very well in this area, and I believe our companies have a bright future after the war.

We're also seeing more frequent use of automated systems that help establish visual contact with targets. This shortens both the search time and the time spent in the air before striking the target.

Is it realistic to fully automate a shootdown system, where target detection happens automatically, and with a single command from an operator at a computer, the drone launches, locates the target and takes it down on its own?

This is quite possible but requires a lot of time and work. Such systems already exist, but they are separate. One system handles automatic launch, another manages target acquisition and a third controls engagement. Each is at a different stage of development, but there have been some successful application results.

The problem is that these different segments belong to different companies. If they had all been combined into one system and the engineers had worked together, I believe we would have had a drone with automatic launch and targeting long ago.

[BANNER4]

You might have a machine to chop vegetables when you cook, but you still have to cook the spaghetti yourself. And chopping vegetables isn't always the hardest part of cooking. It's the same with drones. If you've flown them a thousand times and can guide them manually, that task doesn't really need to be automated.

But what happens if there are ten drones and only two operators on site?

We have communication systems that enable multiple drones to be controlled at once. However, currently there is no direct demand for such automated technology on the battlefield.

Are friendly - fire incidents common among interceptor units? How do you counteract them?

Such cases do happen, but as technology and interceptor tactics improve, they are becoming less frequent. There is only one recipe: communication and close coordination with neighbouring units operating in the same area.

We need more training and more money to shoot down the Shaheds

Have interceptor drones been successful in the large-scale downing of Shaheds and their decoy drones, which are a nightmare for Ukrainian cities?

Shaheds are being shot down, and that's no secret. Several different assets have shown consistent results. In other words, the same unit, using the same drone and tactics, is successfully taking down multiple Shaheds.

A Russian Gerbera drone used as a decoy for a Shahed, captured through the lens of a drone developed by Wild Hornets, a Ukrainian company producing combat drones

The challenge is scaling all this up. Additional training and funding are needed to master the anti-Shahed tools. Our foundation is already supporting efforts to intercept Shaheds.

What's the difference between a drone that shoots down Shaheds and a UAV that targets reconnaissance drones?

Higher speed, a larger warhead and a few other features best kept secret.

Many people wonder whether drones could shoot down cruise missiles. For example, if they were fitted with small jet engines.

No, it doesn't make sense. For example, when you approach a Shahed, it's at high speed, so you need to know exactly when to press the detonation button. You can't afford to make a mistake, as every second counts as a metre closer to the target.

That's why, at the very high speeds cruise missiles travel, it's best to automate the entire process using a specific trigger – thermal or visual. But then, this is essentially a fully-fledged air defence missile.

[BANNER5]

Do you encounter any red tape when scaling up your shootdowns?

There are no obstacles within the Foundation's scope of activities. However, this project has reached a point where collaboration and coordination with government agencies are necessary to move to a higher qualitative and quantitative level. There's room for improvement.

Does Dronefall help develop the technology, or are you just scaling up numbers and training?

We don't have our own R&D centre or production facilities, nor have we aimed to create them. We support others in their development efforts, though the technologies themselves are not our own.

Various companies offer their developments to us, especially in communication systems, new engines and wing and fuselage shapes, if we're talking about aircraft-type FPVs. Sometimes we purchase equipment for testing to support manufacturers in the early stages of development, provide quality feedback from military units and then the manufacturer refines the product and develops it further according to market demands.

Ukrainian interceptor drone STING by Wild Hornets

Sometimes we receive new solutions, like a communication module designed to reduce the effects of hostile or friendly electronic warfare. We coordinate with the units, and if they're interested, we test the new technology.

If you suddenly received an extra US$10 million for Dronefall, how would you use it?

We would invest in training. We have a few training centres, though they are small, so we could scale them up. We'd also focus on training anti-Shahed operators. Additionally, we'd support diversifying the production of drones capable of intercepting Shaheds and promote the qualitative development of these systems. Competition in the market would help accelerate technological progress.

The need for resources is enormous. We're far from reaching the limits of our institutional capacity or completing all the tasks currently before us.

Right now, Dronefall covers the battlefield. We're actively involved in fighting Shaheds, but there's still a tremendous amount of work ahead. An even bigger challenge is providing coverage for entire cities, creating a second echelon of small air defence to protect Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and other cities.

Every citizen of Ukraine can help develop drone air defence right now by donating funds to the Dronefall project or any similar initiative from volunteer foundations. The Come Back Alive fundraiser is available here.

Translation: Artem Yakymyshyn

Editing: Susan McDonald